Resumo em Português:

Resumo: Tradução para o português do opúsculo Da adivinhação durante o sono, de Aristóteles, precedido de breve apresentação e acompanhada de notas elucidativas do texto.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: Portuguese translation of Aristotle’s Prophecy in Sleep, preceded by a short presentation of the text and accompanied by explanatory notes

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: In this article, we present and explain ten different possible meanings of a chance event - some ontological, some epistemic - and provide examples whenever possible. We describe and illustrate more carefully the view of chance (tyche) expressed by Aristotle in his Physics, a demanding and complex notion, and critically contrast it with the other senses examined, attempting to determine any (in)compatibilism.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: This paper is centered on Thassos, an island situated in the Northern Aegean, settled by Greeks from Paros. We focus on the Archaic Period, more specifically on the sixth century BC, the peak of local production. Departing from the archaeological contexts through excavation reports, we analyze significant social and religious connections among votive materials associated with the Thasian black-figure pottery. These connections brought us elements that allowed us to interpret the multiculturalism imbricated within the objects, the mimicry and the innovations in the decoration of this black-figure pottery, as well as the particular demand in quantitative terms of a type of vessel called lekane, an object that was loaded with information and religious and apotropaic meaning. In addition, those same elements also showed us traits that reveal votive practices, judging by the way the pottery was exhibited, and its decorative features, which to date are only attested in Thassos. The research revealed intrinsic relationships linked to the various facets of Artemis, the protection of women in childbirth, revealed through the analysis of the objects in context.

Resumo em Português:

Resumo: Em Leis, a mousike é restabelecida na constituição da cidade (Magnésia) como um instrumento para a educação dos cidadãos. Segundo o Estrangeiro Ateniense, a regulação e preservação das formas corretas da mousike, através de melos e schema, é também responsável pela manutenção da estabilidade cultural e política de Magnésia. Neste contexto, Platão enuncia um elogio à arte egípcia, que teria mantido o seu estilo e, consequentemente, a política egípcia teria permanecido estável por um longo tempo. Este artigo apresentará uma tradução do trecho 653c - 654a e três interpretações contemporâneas deste elogio. Por fim, as interpretações expostas serão avaliadas e uma possibilidade de aproximação entre o elogio platônico e a própria arte (visual) egípcia será sugerida, considerando suas prováveis funções sociais, religiosas e políticas.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: In Laws, mousike is restored to the constitution of the city (Magnesia) as an instrument for the education of citizens. According to the Athenian Stranger, the regulation and preservation of mousike's correct forms, through melos and schema, is also responsible for the maintenance of Magnesia's cultural and political stability. In this context, Plato praises Egyptian art, which would have maintained its style and, consequently, Egyptian politics stable for a long time. This article will thus present a translation of 653c - 654a and three contemporary interpretations of this eulogy. Lastly, the three interpretations will be evaluated and a possibility of an approximation between the Platonic praise and (visual) Egyptian art will be suggested, considering its probable social, religious and political functions.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Resumo: La aceptación de la identidad de la Idea del Bien con lo Uno no necesariamente implica, como recentemente ha sostenido Gerson (2019), que Platón y Plotino comparten esa identificación en los mismos términos. Para insistir en esta diferencia me apoyo en un argumento gnoseológico. Si bien ambos filósofos sostienen la posibilidad de acceder a una presencia en el principio y para describirla recurren a una metáfora erótica, para Platón esa presencia implica la realización plena del Nous en la aprehensión noética del Bien y la generación de episteme, mientras que para Plotino implica el recogimiento no solo de la intelección, sino del deseo mismo de inteligir para acceder a una presencia superior a la episteme. Consecuentemente, Platón concibe al Bien/Uno como Idea - como Idea de Ideas - y cúspide del ser y lo inteligible, mientras que Plotino lo concibe como aneideon, amorfon y apeiron, y, por ende, como radicalmente transcendente al ser y al pensar.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: The acceptance of the identity of the Idea of the Good and the One does not necessarily implies that Plato and Plotinus understand it in the same way, as Gerson has recently sustained. The difference, I intend to show, is supported by a gnoseological aspect of their philosophies. Even if both philosophers accept the possibility of arriving at a presence in the principle itself, and even if they use the same erotic metaphor to describe it, this presence means for Plato the flourishing of Nous and the generation of episteme, whereas for Plotinus it is superior to episteme and requires the complete retirement not just of intellection, but also of the desire to think the Good. Correspondingly, Plato considers the Good/One as a Form - as the Form of Forms - at the summit of being and the intelligible realm, while Plotinus conceives it as aneideon, amorphon and apeiron, and therefore, as radically transcendent to being and thinking.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Resumen: De entre los héroes sofócleos, la figura de Neoptólemo sobresale por su particular dificultad para comprometerse de manera definitiva con un curso de acción. El joven acepta llevar a cabo un engaño pergeñado por Odiseo para obtener el arco infalible de Filoctetes, quien vive hace diez años abandonado en la isla desierta de Lemnos. Pero una vez avanzada la treta, cuando se aproxima realmente al objetivo, de pronto se ve asaltado por una duda que le impide seguir adelante, de manera tal que se desdibuja su posición de agente capaz de concretar el plan. Neoptólemo termina por confesar al solitario isleño el motivo fraudulento de su presencia, y, excusándose, aduce estar gobernado por una “necesidad” (v.923: ananke). En este trabajo presentaré, en primer lugar, las condiciones de emergencia y las características del plan ideado por el ingenioso rey de Ítaca; en segundo lugar, una explicación de la indecisión de Neoptólemo a partir de la particular relación entre su discurso y la realidad que pretende referir; en tercer lugar, me centraré en las derivas ontológicas del conflicto central de la obra y, finalmente, avanzaré sobre los corolarios prácticos que se siguen de lo laborado en los puntos anteriores.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: Among the Sophoclean heroes, the figure that stands out is the one of Neoptolemus, in particular because of his difficulty when successfully delivering a course of an action. The young man assumes to carry out a ruse devised by Odysseus in order to obtain the infallible bow of Philoctetes, who has been living for ten years marooned in the deserted island of Lemnos. But once being close to his goal, he is suddenly seized by a doubt that prevents him from achieving such purpose, and therefore undermining his capacity as an agent. Neoptolemus eventually confesses to the lonely islander the dishonest motive for his presence, and, by excusing himself, claims to be governed by a "necessity" (v.923: ananke). This paper will firstly expose the context of development and characteristics of the plan devised by the ingenious king of Ithaca; and will secondly explain Neoptolemus' indecision based on the particular relationship between his discourse and the reality he pretends; moreover it will emphasize the ontological derivations of the central conflict of the play and, finally, it will enter into the practical corollaries regarding the previous points.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Resumen: En este trabajo tomo como eje el concepto de ironía para analizar el elenchos que Sócrates practica sobre las opiniones de Calicles en el diálogo Gorgias. Asumo como punto de partida que Sócrates aspira a que su interlocutor modifique su disposición anímica y adopte un modo de vida filosófico, abandonando el retórico. Para ello, desarrolla un elenchos irónico que posee tres momentos: una fingida aceptación por parte de Sócrates de la dicotomía presentada por Calicles entre la vida del político, digna de imitación, y la del filósofo, merecedora de reproche; una inversión de dicha dicotomía; y finalmente una puesta en cuestión de dicha inversión. Concluiré sosteniendo que este tercer momento constituye una nueva maniobra socrática para instar a Calicles a que suspenda sus actividades políticas y examine previamente con él, de manera filosófica, el camino para volverse virtuoso.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: In this work I use the concept of irony to analyze the elenchos that Socrates practices on the opinions of Callicles in the Gorgias. I assume as a starting point that Socrates aims at the modification of his interlocutor´s animic disposition, adopting a philosophical way of life and abandoning the rhetorical one. To do this, he develops an ironic elenchos that has three moments: a feigned acceptance by Socrates of the dichotomy presented by Callicles between the life of the politician, worthy of imitation, and that of the philosopher, worthy of reproach; a reversal of that dichotomy; and finally, a questioning of that reversal. I will conclude by arguing that this third moment constitutes a new Socratic maneuver to urge Callicles to suspend his political activities, and previously examine philosophically with him the way to become virtuous.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Resumen: En el Fedón, tras ofrecer numerosos argumentos a favor de la inmortalidad del alma, se introduce un mythos acerca de su vida ultraterrena. Dado el tenor del tema en cuestión y las limitaciones humanas para dar con un logos estrictamente verdadero al respecto, Sócrates y sus allegados acuerdan en que se debe buscar el “más difícil de refutar” (85d1) entre los logoi humanos. Este trabajo intenta determinar en qué medida la asociación entre el mito presentado hacia el final del diálogo y los argumentos precedentes contribuye a ese objetivo. En este sentido pretende mostrar, por un lado, que el mito mencionado posee los caracteres atribuidos a la noble mentira en R. II-III -texto que plantea la necesidad de acudir a relatos que, aunque ficticios, resultan útiles para instaurar la justicia en el alma del auditorio-; y, por el otro, que en virtud de su carácter persuasivo, el mito contribuye a fortalecer el logos hasta allí desarrollado para volverlo lo más irrefutable posible, generando confianza en la necesidad de llevar adelante una vida virtuosa, inclusive en el auditorio que no forma parte del círculo filosófico.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: In the Phaedo, after offering several arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul, a mythos is introduced about its afterlife. Given the tenor of the topic at hand and the human limitations in coming up with strictly true logos on the subject, Socrates and his associates agree that the "most difficult to refute" (dysexelenktotaton, 85d1) should be sought among the human logoi. This paper attempts to determine to what extent the association between the myth presented towards the end of the dialogue and the preceding arguments contributes to this goal. In this sense it intends to show, on the one hand, that the myth mentioned has the characteristics of the noble lie in R. II-III -a text that suggests the need to use tales that, despite being fictional, are useful to establish justice in the soul of the audience-; and, on the other hand, that because of its persuasive character, the myth contributes to strengthen the logos developed so far in order to make it as irrefutable as possible, generating faith in the importance of virtuous life, even in the audience that is not part of the philosophical circle.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Resumen: Siguiendo la propuesta de aquellos intérpretes que se ocupan de señalar continuidades en la metodología empleada por Platón a lo largo de su obra, en este trabajo consideraremos al diálogo Sofista como un punto de confluencia de la refutación de cuño socrático y el método hipotético expuesto en República. Específicamente, intentaremos identificar en aquella obra tardía el punto culminante de dicho método, i.e. el principio no hipotético aludido por Sócrates. Asimismo, esa tarea nos conducirá a pensar, por un lado, en la relación entre Platón y su maestro y, por el otro, en el lugar que le cabe al diálogo Sofista y a su interlocutor principal, el Extranjero de Elea, en el proyecto filosófico de Platón.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: Following the proposal of interpreters who deal with the continuity of Plato’s methodology throughout his work, this paper will consider the Sophist dialogue as a convergence point for the Socratic refutation and for the hypothetical method displayed in Republic. Specifically, we will try to identify in this dialogue the highest point of the said method, i.e. the non-hypothetical principle mentioned by Socrates. In addition, this task will lead us to consider, on one hand, the relationship between Plato and his master and, on the other, the place the Sophist and his main interlocutor, the Eleatic Stranger, deserve within the framework of Plato’s philosophical project.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: While refutation is usually related to Plato's early, Socratic, dialogues, this paper is aimed at exploring the link between refutation and dialectic in some of his middle and late dialogues. First, it argues that refutation assumes a constructive role in the Phaedo, where the best logos is the least refutable, and also in the Republic, where the philosopher is invited to fight his way through all elenchoi. Then, it tries to show that the gymnasia of Prm. 130a ff. is aimed at training young Socrates to come to the aid of the theory he embraces preventing it from being refuted. He should travel and explore all the paths, by assuming a hypothesis as well as the opposite one. This methodology paves the way on which Plato advances in the Sophist, where the antinomic structure of the gymnasia gives way to a “constructive” dialectic in which the aporia is solved and a thesis is established by refutation. The last section of this paper is devoted to analysing Sph. 251c-252e, where the positive and constructive function of the elenchus is especially clear. Plato argues for the symploke eidon by exploring all the hypotheses that are open to the search and refuting those that ultimately represent obstacles to his position. The symploke is the truth which remains when all the hypotheses that contradict it have been refuted. The conclusion is that the elenchus does not disappear but is put at the service of the truth, as an essential part of the method for attaining a positive doctrine.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Resumen: Este trabajo ahonda en una de las estrategias básicas de Aristóteles en Physica I, la homogeneización de conceptos dispares de los primeros físicos, como parte del armado de su taxonomía de posiciones acerca de los principios. Esta estrategia propedéutica de la refutación consiste en el armado de una progresión y una genealogía de las posiciones de los físicos a partir del eleatismo. El objetivo principal de este trabajo es mostrar el sentido específico del concepto de separación en la física de Anaxágoras y las transformaciones que experimenta en la crítica aristotélica. En línea con trabajos recientes como los de Curd (2019) y Marmodoro (2017) que han llamado la atención sobre la especificidad del vocabulario físico de Anaxágoras, esta investigación muestra que las bases de su negación de la génesis y su reelaboración en términos de separación y mezcla reposan sobre tesis originales de su propia física. Tanto a nivel terminológico como conceptual, las nociones de separación y mezcla anaxagóricas no se pueden exportar a otra teoría física.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: This work delves into one of Aristotle's basic strategies in Physics I, the homogenization of disparate concepts of the first physicists, as part of the construction of his taxonomy of positions on principles. This propaedeutic strategy of the refutation consists in the assembly of a progression and a genealogy of the positions of the physicists from Eleatism. The main objective of this work is to show the specific meaning of the concept of separation in Anaxagoras' physics and the transformations that undergoes under Aristotelian criticism. In line with recent works such as those of Curd (2019) and Marmodoro (2017) that have drawn attention to the specificity of Anaxagoras' physical vocabulary, this research shows that the bases of his denial of genesis and its reworking in terms of separation and mix rest on original theses of his own physics. Both terminologically and conceptually, the notions of Anaxagorean separation and mixing cannot be exported to another physical theory.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: By framing Aristotle’s dialectic in the broader context of scientific inquiry and demonstration, this paper is aimed at showing of what use the “reputable opinions” can be for grasping the principles of sciences, as declared in Topics I.2. It argues that such a use cannot imply ‒ at any stage of inquiry ‒ a replacement of the logic and intrinsic goals of demonstration by those proper to dialectic. However, it also defends a substantive (but still modest) contribution of dialectic ‒ beyond its well-attested methodological role in discarding contradictory opinions and its (possible though not germane to the context of Topics I.2) application to proving the principle of non-contradiction by means of refutation. This contribution consists in providing the preliminary accounts of facts in order to have scientific inquiry started, as required in Posterior Analytics II.8. To better appreciate how the proposed location of dialectic in a pre-demonstrative stage of inquiry is operational, the paper finally examines Physics IV.1-5.

Resumo em Português:

Resumo: este texto investiga o problema da decisão majoritária numa democracia a partir de três passos paradigmáticos de Heródoto e Tucídides, examinando suas implicações para a forja de lideranças, para a promoção de crises e, principalmente, para a identificação de diferentes modos de igualdade. A partir do exame de passagens de Heródoto (6.109.5 e 8.79.3) e Tucídides (3.35-50), são elaborados paralelos que, partindo de problemas antigos, talvez lancem luz sobre seus análogos contemporâneos.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: this text investigates the problem of majority decision in democracies from three paradigmatic passages from Herodotus and Thucydides, and examines their implications for the forging of leadership, for the promotion of crises and, chiefly, for the identification of different modes of equality. From the examination of Herodotus 6.109.5 and 8.79.3, and Thucydides 3.35-50, parallels are drawn which, starting from ancient problems, may shed some light on contemporary analogue problems.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Resumen: El presente trabajo toma como punto de partida el contexto de la Metafísica en el que Aristóteles cita el fr. 28B 16 DK de Parménides, el cual es analizado a la luz de otros pasajes paralelos dentro del Corpus Aristotelicum, así como de la confrontación con el comentario que Teofrasto hace de ese mismo fragmento parmenídeo en el De Sensibus, con la finalidad de presentar, con base en un exhaustivo examen léxico y semántico, una reconstrucción de la interpretación que el Estagirita dio a los planteamientos parmenídeos relativos a ciertas funciones psíquicas (percepción sensorial y/o cognición). En consonancia con este análisis, hemos intentado también hacer una valoración acerca de la objetividad de la crítica de Aristóteles hacia los planteamientos filosóficos vertidos en el poema de Parménides.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: The starting point for this study is the passage in Metaphysics, in which Aristotle quotes Parmenides’ fr. 28B 16 DK, which is analyzed in the light of other parallel passages within the Corpus Aristotelicum, as well as through the confrontation with Theophrastus’ comment in the De Sensibus on this same Parmenides' fragment, in order to attempt, through an exhaustive lexical and semantic examination, a reconstruction of the interpretation that the Stagirite provided for Parmenides' approach to certain psychic functions (sensory perception and / or cognition). In line with this analysis, we will also try to assess the objectivity of the critique that Aristotle addressed to the philosophical views contained in Parmenides’ poem.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: In this note I will defend the correct understanding of a passage (Physics I 7, 190a31-34) that has been largely misunderstood by many modern commentators. The reason for the misleading translations and interpretations can be found in the presence of the problematic expression τόδε τι. In what follows, I will argue that there is no mention in this text of the expression τόδε τι, at least in its technical sense, that can be traced in Aristotle’s philosophy. At the beginning I will give my translation of the passage in question and some information about the context of Physics I 7. Secondly, I will give an account of the language categories of “coming to be” and I will show that Physics I 7, 190a31-34 continues in all respects this linguistic analysis. Finally, I will discuss the work of ancient commentators, which can be read according to my interpretation.

Resumo em Português:

Resumo: O problema de como se proteger do mal é um tema recorrente em diversos períodos históricos e sociedades. Textos apotropaicos judaicos, particularmente no período do Segundo Templo, trazem uma variedade de linguagens associadas com proteção. Esse artigo mapeia as diferentes linguagens apotropaicas descritas nos Manuscritos do Mar Morto, com enfoque para o uso da escrita como forma de registrar e preservar orações.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: The problem of how to protect yourself from harm is a recurrent theme in many historical periods and societies. Jewish apotropaic texts, particularly in the Second Temple period, bring a variety of languages associated with protection. This article delineates the different apotropaic languages described in the Dead Sea Scrolls, focusing on the use of writing as a way of recording and preserving prayers.

Resumo em Português:

Resumo: Em Suplicantes, uma das mais políticas tragédias de Eurípides, é produzida uma aproximação surpreendente entre o mundo do mito e o do espectador. Embora Teseu, seu protagonista, seja representado como um “rei democrático”, nela não está presente uma cena que possa ser equiparada à experiência da mais típica instituição da democracia ateniense, a deliberação coletiva definidora da assembleia aberta a todos os cidadãos. Todavia, em diferentes momentos do primeiro episódio, chega-se bastante perto. Assim, o objetivo deste texto é discutir como essa tragédia representa formas de deliberação e consenso, para o que se investigam os meandros de dois cenários que levam a uma política de guerra de ataque desenvolvidos no drama, um em Argos, outro, em Atenas.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: In Supplices, one of Euripides' most political tragedies, a surprising approximation between the world of myth and that of the spectator is produced. Although Theseus, its protagonist, is represented as a “democratic king”, it does not present a scene that can be compared to the experience of the most typical institution of Athenian democracy, the collective deliberation that defines the assembly open to all citizens. However, at different times in the first episode, it comes pretty close. Thus, the aim of this paper is to discuss how this tragedy represents forms of deliberation and consensus, and so it investigates the intricacies of two scenarios that lead to an attack war policy developed in the drama, one in Argos, the other in Athens.

Resumo em Português:

Resumo: A teoria freudiana da feminilidade é objeto de vários estudos. Tencionamos trazer uma contribuição a esse debate, mas, em vez de abordarmos os textos em que a mulher aparece explicitamente sob a pena freudiana, cuidamos de ler um texto específico de Freud em que ela não aparece, mas deveria aparecer. Trata-se do texto Zur Gewinnung des Feuers, de 1932, em que o pai da psicanálise interpreta o mito de Prometeu. O fato é que, em Hesíodo, a figura da primeira mulher (Pandora) é central, e sem ela o mito não pode ser compreendido em sua inteireza. Na versão de Freud, Pandora inexiste - ela não entra em consideração e não é sequer mencionada. Por isso, em vez do mito de Prometeu e Pandora, temos em Freud o mito de Prometeu - e isso não é sem consequências. Assim, a escrita masculina de Freud jazeria não somente ali onde ele discorre sobre a mulher, mas também onde ela sequer aparece.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: The Freudian theory of femininity is the object of several studies. We intend to make a contribution to this debate, but instead of approaching the Freudian texts in which woman appears explicitly, we aimed to read a specific Freudian text in which she appears not, although she should do so. It is the 1932 text Zur Gewinnung des Feuers, in which the father of psychoanalysis interprets the myth of Prometheus. The fact is that, in Hesiod, the figure of the first woman (Pandora) is central, and one cannot comprehend the myth in its totality without her. In Freud’s version, Pandora does not exist - she is not taken in consideration and is not even mentioned. Therefore, instead of the myth of Prometheus and Pandora, we have in Freud the myth of Prometheus - and that does not come without consequences. Thus, Freud’s masculine writing would lie not only where he expatiates on women, but also where she does not even appear.

Resumo em Português:

Resumo: Nas primeiras duas seções deste artigo, apresento alguns dos argumentos que os filósofos budistas indianos Nāgārjuna (ca. séculos II-III) e Vasubandhu (ca. séculos IV-V) usam para mostrar a insustentabilidade lógica dos fenômenos, respectivamente, do movimento e da existência de objetos externos/extramentais. A lógica desses argumentos é comparável à lógica que Zenão de Eleia utiliza nos seus paradoxos contra o movimento e a multiplicidade - e, de fato, no interior dos estudos budológicos contemporâneos, essa comparação já foi sugerida. Na terceira seção, entretanto, pretendo mostrar que os objetivos filosóficos mais imediatos desses três pensadores divergem e são inconciliáveis: enquanto Zenão critica o movimento e a multiplicidade para demonstrar a plausibilidade dos atributos da imobilidade e da univocidade do Ser parmenídico, os paradoxos de Nāgārjuna e Vasubandhu devem ser entendidos no âmbito de projetos filosóficos que, em continuidade com o ensinamento budiano do caminho do meio, pretendem ficar equidistantes das categorias do “ser” e do “não-ser”, evitando ambas. Finalmente, na quarta e última seção, defendo a tese de que os objetivos últimos dos Eleatas e aqueles dos dois filósofos budistas voltam a ser parecidos: Parmênides e o Buda, como também seus respectivos epígonos, buscam promover nos seus seguidores uma “revolução epistêmica” que consiste na passagem de uma visão ordinária da realidade a uma compreensão extraordinária ou suprema, coincidente com a realidade em si e, portanto, verdadeira em última análise.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: In the first two sections of this paper, I present some of the arguments that the Buddhist Indian philosophers Nāgārjuna (second/third century) and Vasubandhu (fourth/fifth century) use to show the logical untenability of the phenomena of motion and of the existence of multiple external/extramental objects. The logic of these arguments seems to be quite comparable - and actually, within contemporary buddhological studies, it was sometimes compared - to the one that Zeno of Elea uses in his paradoxes against motion and multiplicity. However, in the third section, I try to show that the most immediate philosophical purposes of these three thinkers diverge and are irreconcilable. While Zeno criticizes motion and multiplicity in order to show the plausibility of the attributes of motionlessness and uniqueness of Parmenides’ Being, Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu’s paradoxes should be understood within philosophical projects that, in tune with the Buddha’s teaching of the “middle way”, try to keep themselves equidistant from the categories of “being” and “non-being”, avoiding both. Finally, in the fourth and last section, I defend the thesis that the ultimate purposes of the Eleatics’ view and those of the two Buddhist philosophers are, once again, comparable. Both Parmenides and the Buddha, as well as their respective epigones, try to promote an “epistemic revolution”, in their followers, which consists in the shift from the ordinary vision of reality to an extraordinary or supreme understanding, coincident with reality in itself and, therefore, ultimately true.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Resumen: En este trabajo examino la “elección imposible” que Sócrates le plantea a Teeteto: elegir entre aceptar (a) que el juicio falso es imposible, o (b) que es posible conocer y no conocer el mismo objeto (Teeteto 196c7-d2). De acuerdo con la interpretación tradicional, Sócrates afirma que es necesario aceptar una de las dos opciones: (b). En consecuencia, Platón desarrollaría el Aviario como un modelo de explicación del error en el que es posible conocer y no conocer lo mismo. Aquí argumento en contra de esta lectura. Sostengo que Sócrates afirma que se deben rechazar las dos opciones (a) y (b), y, por ende, el Aviario presenta un modelo en donde el juicio falso es posible sin aceptar que es posible conocer y no conocer lo mismo.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: In this work I examine the "impossible choice" that Socrates poses to Theaetetus: to choose between accepting (a) that false judgment is impossible, or (b) that it is possible to know and not to know the same object (Theaetetus 196c7-d2). According to the traditional interpretation, Socrates states that it is necessary to accept one of the two options: (b). Consequently, Plato would develop the Aviary as a model of explanation of error in which it is possible to know and not to know the same thing. Here I argue against this reading. I claim that Socrates says that the two options (a) and (b) must be rejected, and, therefore, that the Aviary presents a model in which false judgment is possible without accepting that it is possible to know and not to know the same thing.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Resumo: La frase del poeta inglés Samuel Taylor Coleridge, “todos los hombres nacen aristotélicos o platónicos”, traída a colación por Borges en diversas ocasiones, es harto conocida y citada. Pero lo que a mi modo de ver no ha sido tan explorado es el sentido que la disyunción implicada en dicha frase asume en la obra borgeana. Analizar cómo juega en ella tal disyunción entre Platón y Aristóteles, a la luz de las referencias que Borges hace de ellos a lo largo de su obra, es el propósito de este trabajo. Para ello me interesa relevar algunos motivos platónicos y aristotélicos empleados por aquel en función de su universo ficcional, a fin de evaluar el sentido y alcance de dicha disyunción. Mi hipótesis es que ella asume en la obra de Borges un sentido débil e incluyente, que posiciona a este autor en una vía entre Platón y Aristóteles.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: The phrase of the English poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, “all men are born Aristotelians or Platonists”, brought up by Borges on several occasions, is well known and quoted. But what in my opinion has not been explored so much is the sense that the disjunction implied in that phrase assumes in Borges' work. The purpose of this paper is to analyze how this disjunction between Plato and Aristotle plays out in the light of the references Borges makes to them throughout his work. To this end, I am interested in relieving some Platonic and Aristotelian motifs used by Borges as a function of his fictional universe, in order to evaluate the meaning and scope of such disjunction. My hypothesis is that it assumes in Borges' work a weak and inclusive sense, which positions this author in a place between Plato and Aristotle.

Resumo em Português:

Resumo: Na primeira parte, fazemos um levantamento das ocorrências de pithanon (‘persuasivo’) e termos afins em textos e fragmentos do estoicismo antigo referentes à persuasão de asseríveis e argumentos e em textos e fragmentos em que a lógica estoica se apresenta como ferramenta para evitar a persuasão dos sofismas e o sábio estoico como aquele que capaz de vencer essa persuasão por sua perícia em dialética. Feito isso, consideramos criticamente as teses de Chiaradona, Sedley e Tieleman, para quem Crisipo está interessado em formas extralógicas de discurso. Avaliaremos também a tese de Tieleman segundo a qual Crisipo usa premissas persuasivas para fins construtivos. Em nossas conclusões, descartamos a tese sobre o reconhecimento de verdades extralógicas por Crisipo com base no ideal do sábio estoico. Concluímos que, no estoicismo, (1) pithanon refere-se principalmente a falsas afirmações, argumentos e representações e (2) que o sábio estoico não pode ser persuadido, mas pode persuadir seus ouvintes a fim de preparar suas almas para receber as doutrinas estoicas.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: In the first part, we survey the occurrences of pithanon (‘persuasive’) and related terms in texts and fragments of Ancient Stoicism referring to the persuasiveness of assertibles and arguments, and fragments in which the Stoic logic is presented as the tool to avoid the persuasiveness of sophisms and the Stoic sage as the one who can efface this persuasiveness by his expertise in dialectics. Once it is done, we consider critically the assessments of Chiaradona, Sedley and Tieleman, for whom Chrysippus is interested in extra-logical forms of discourse, and also another thesis from Tieleman, according to which Chrysippus uses persuasive premises for constructive purposes. In our conclusions, we discard the thesis concerning Chrysippus' recognition of extra-logical truths, on the basis of the Stoic ideal of the sage. We conclude that, in Stoicism, (1) pithanon refers primarily to false assertibles, arguments and presentations and (2) the Stoic sage cannot be persuaded, but he can persuade his students in order to prepare their souls to receive the Stoic doctrines.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: Plato’s division of the soul (Republic Book IV) into three parts - the rational, the spirited and the appetitive - had significant precedents in the works of the pre-Socratic philosophers. The Pythagoreans began a more systematic reflection, compared to previous authors, on the tensions and desires of the human soul, linked partly to the ethics of καιρός and harmony. The tripartite division of the soul also appears in the works of Diogenes Laertius and Iamblichus and would become the core doctrine of Platonic ethics and politics. Heraclitus’ position is emblematic. Although he may appear to be a “rigorist” due to his outspoken critique of worldly pleasures, there is a fairly enigmatic fragment that clearly highlights the complexity of his ideas. With the writings of Empedocles, and subsequently the Sophists and the Atomists, and especially Democritus, the terms that distinguish the three parts of the soul and their functions also took on other features which would be set within the theoretical framework of Plato.

Resumo em Português:

Resumo: O presente artigo tem como objetivo apresentar as premissas e justificativas que embasam o processo de elaboração e teste do projeto Kallipolis: o jogo dos governos. O projeto consistiu no desenvolvimento de um jogo que tem como objetivo ilustrar e criar um ambiente no qual um estudante ou interessado em filosofia descubra e pense a partir das reflexões que Platão apresenta no oitavo livro d’A República. Em vista disso, primeiro discorremos brevemente sobre os fundamentos filosóficos que embasam a concepção do jogo, isto é, como pensamos os seus elementos a partir do livro VIII d’A República de Platão. Em seguida, explicamos a metodologia que propusemos para sua elaboração e testagem e, a partir do que foi observado no processo de realização dos testes, discutimos e apontamos algumas potencialidades e limitações do jogo em vista de seu uso pelo professor de Filosofia no Ensino Médio.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: The present article has as its object to present the elaboration and testing process of the project Kallipolis: the governments’ game. The project involves the development of a game, aiming at the illustration and creation of an environment where a student can discover and think with the reflections that Plato presents in the eighth book of the Republic. In the light of that, firstly it is briefly explained the game’s theoretical basis and how it stems from the book VIII of Plato’s Republic. Subsequently, based on what has been observed in the testing process, the game’s limitations are considered along with its possible uses by a secondary school Philosophy teacher.

Resumo em Italiano:

Riassunto: Numenio appartiene all’ambito degli interpreti medioplatonici dei dialoghi di Platone. Nel Medioplatonismo, infatti, si diffuse la tendenza a interpretare la filosofia di Platone come in chiave sistematica. Il dialogo più rilevante per questa operazione esegetica nel Medioplatonismo fu certamente il Timeo. In questo contributo intendo concentrarmi sull’interpretazione delle pagine 28a-29a del Timeo da parte di Numenio di Apamea ed esaminarne l’esegesi alla luce della sua prospettiva onto-teologica. Nel Timeo, l’utilizzo del verbo βλέπω ha la funzione di descrivere il fatto che il demiurgo è contemplativo nei confronti del paradigma intelligibile. In Numenio, invece, l’associazione del verbo βλέπω al demiurgo è volta a mostrare il ruolo di mediatore che il secondo dio svolge tra il primo principio e la materia. In questo modo si mostrerà come i passi del Timeo vengano interpretati da Numenio alla luce della sua metafisica dualista.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: Numenius belongs to the contest of the Middle Platonic interpreters of Plato's dialogues. In Middle Platonism, in fact, spread a tendency to interpret Plato's philosophy in a systematic way. The most relevant dialogue for this exegetical operation in Middle Platonism was certainly the Timaeus. In this paper I intend to focus on Numenius' interpretation of pages 28a-29a of Timaeus and examine the exegesis in the light of his onto-theological perspective. In the Timaeus, the use of the verb βλέπω serves to describe the fact that the demiurge is contemplative of the intelligible paradigm. In Numenius, on the other hand, the association of the verb βλέπω with the demiurge is intended to show the role of mediator that the second god plays between the first principle and matter. In this way we will show how the passages of the Timaeus are interpreted by Numenius in the light of his dualist metaphysics.