The argumentative complexity of veto decision in the Brazilian Federal Executive Branch

Abstract

The Brazilian President doesn´t decide alone. The Executive and Legislative branch are close because of the Brazilian Coalitional Presidentialism. It demands better presidential justifications when the President decides. This article explores the argumentative complexity of the Brazilian Executive Branch in the presidential decision of the veto. The paper uses a bibliographic review of Law and Political Science. It´s qualitative research about vetoes and arguments. The article aims to study the arguments brought to the Brazilian President during the production of law. The research seeks to answer two questions: how does the argumentative decision-making debate of presidential sanction and veto occur? Can the Argumentation Theory help in decision process of veto? In response, it demonstrates that there is no solipsistic presidential decision. It´s a complex decision-making process, based on merit and legal reasons. Legal arguments can help in the construction of such justifications and bring the branches together. The work seeks to offer a fertile field for future research using Argumentation Theory.

Keywords:
Veto; Executive branch; Argumentation theory; Complexity