Traditional issues of hermeneutics on language, comprehension and interpretation are retak-en here in their relation to translation studies, under the less common philosophical perspective of the late Wittgenstein, taking into account also some aspects of linguistic pragmatics. Main target is a prophylaxis of the dogmatism that emerges when properties of the theoretical model are projected into the object under examination. Two kinds of necessity are to be distinguished: on one hand, a necessity derived from internal relations, which are the conditions of possibility for the system as a whole; on the other, a system-external necessity which is simply taken as granted. The current debate often ig-nores that any theory is organized in different layers, which leads some arguments to move off others, simply because they do not operate at the same level. To avoid conceptual confusion, one should acknowledge the different spheres in which these intertwined layers operate. As an alternative to the dichotomy between the traditional essentialist perspective and postmodern relativism, I propose a rad-ically pragmatic language conception, blending insights from the later philosophy of Wittgenstein with some central ideas of hermeneutics. The so resulting concept of translation/interpretation reverses the conventional relationship between commensurability and translation.
Theory of translation/interpretation; hermeneutics; philosophical grammar; Wittgenstein