Abuse of dominance in the airport sector

Abuso de dominância no setor aeroportuário

Abstracts

This paper investigates the efficacy of the Competition Law in dealing the abuse of dominance in the European airport sector. Starting with discussion of whether airports are natural monopolies or may face real competition, it is followed by an analysis of special features about the sector and a comparison between the policies of the European Union Member States. It is found that above the variety of regulatory frameworks, scarce capacity issues and public subsidies, the EU Competition Law stands as a universal mechanism to protect customers from the abuse of the airports' dominant position. However, in reviewing the case law it concludes that EU Competition Law has been rarely enforced in the sector, which seems to be the result not only of the lack of incentives for airports to explore their dominant position but also of the risk of reducing the revenues generated from their commercial activities. Another possible reason is related to the fact that some airlines have shown that airport switching can be a credible threat. Finally, it follows the agreement that competition is a "first best" policy which provides the firms with the strongest incentives to give consumers what they need in terms of price and quality. In the airport sector, it can be a good instrument against a regulator that has been acting in the interests of the national airline or even be part of a liberalization process.

airports; regulation; competition; law

O presente artigo investiga a aplicação do Direito da Concorrência Europeu na repressão ao abuso do poder econômico no setor de aeroportos do Velho Continente. Partindo-se da discussão se aeroportos constituem um monopólio natural, segue-se uma análise das características especiais do setor e uma comparação entre as políticas aeroportuárias dos Países Membros. O estudo revela que, em meio a uma variedade de marcos regulatórios, problemas de escassez de infraestrutura e subsídios públicos, o Direito da Concorrência Europeu se apresenta como uma ferramenta universal para proteger os consumidores dos possíveis abusos decorrentes da posição dominante dos aeroportos. Por outro lado, a análise da jurisprudência das Cortes Européias demonstrou que o Direito da Concorrência foi raramente invocado. O artigo sugere que isso pode ser resultado da ausência de incentivos para que os aeroportos aumentem excessivamente seus preços, arriscando perder voos e reduzir suas receitas comerciais. Além disso, algumas empresas aéreas já demonstraram que a ameaça de transferir voos entre aeroportos por causa do preço da infraestrutura é factível. Por fim, o artigo concorda com a parcela da doutrina que define a livre concorrência como a política pública mais favorável aos consumidores e afirma que, no setor aeroportuário, pode ser um bom instrumento para lidar com um regulador que visa beneficiar uma empresa aérea nacional ou até mesmo como parte de um processo de desregulamentação da infraestrutura.

aeroportos; regulação; direito da concorrência

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Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  30 June 2015
• Date of issue
  Jan 2013

History

• Received
  25 Dec 2011
• Accepted
  26 Jan 2012