“Our flag is not sexuality”: discursive construction in @gaycombolsonaro on Twitter

Abstract

This article aims to analyze the discursive construction of the movement Gays com Bolsonaro through its Twitter profile (@gaycombolsonaro). From their discursive practices, we illuminate their alliances with elements of heterocisexism (BORRILLO, 2010; JUN, 2018) and the consequent legitimation of this ideology. Based on the Discourse Analysis (ROCHA, 2014) and on the tweets and retweets of this self-titled “new LGBT movement”, we point out how the formation of this online discursive network – constitutive of this movement – has, as one of its bases, the polemic negation (DUCROT, 1987) that it establishes in relation to the previous movements. In this sense, we note the construction of a type of nationalist discourse that is produced in opposition to the discussions and agendas of the LGBTI movement, contributing to its erasure.

Keywords
LGBTI movements; Twitter; Heterocissexism; Right movements; Discourse Analysis

Resumo

Este artigo busca refletir sobre a construção discursiva do movimento Gays com Bolsonaro (GcB) por meio de seu perfil no Twitter (@gaycombolsonaro). A partir de suas práticas discursivas, iluminamos suas alianças com elementos do heterocissexismo (BORRILLO, 2010; JUN, 2018) e a consequente legitimação dessa ideologia. Tendo como base a Análise do Discurso (ROCHA, 2014) e como corpus os tweets e retweets deste autointitulado “novo movimento LGBT”, apontamos como a formação dessa rede discursiva on-line – constitutiva desse movimento – tem como uma de suas bases a negação polêmica (DUCROT, 1987) que estabelece em relação aos movimentos anteriores. Nesse sentido, assinalamos a construção de um tipo de discurso nacionalista que é produzido em oposição às discussões e pautas do movimento LGBTI, contribuindo para o seu apagamento.

Palavras-chave
Movimentos LGBTI; Twitter; Heterocissexismo; Movimentos de direita; Análise do Discurso

Resumen

Este artículo busca reflexionar sobre la construcción discursiva del movimiento Gays con Bolsonaro (GcB) por medio de su perfil en el Twitter (@gaycombolsonaro). A partir de sus prácticas discursivas, destacamos alianzas con elementos del heterocisexismo (BORRILLO, 2010; JUN, 2018) y la consecuente legitimación de esa ideología. Con base en el Análisis del Discurso (ROCHA, 2014) y como corpus los tweets y retweets de este denominado “nuevo movimiento LGBT”, indicamos como la formación de esa red discursiva en línea – constitutiva de ese movimiento – tiene como una de sus bases la negación polémica (DUCROT, 1987) que establece en relación a los movimientos anteriores. En ese sentido, observamos la construcción de un tipo de discurso nacionalista que es producido en oposición a las discusiones y a la agenda del movimiento LGBTI, contribuyendo para su olvido.

Palabras clave
Movimientos LGBTI; Twitter; Heterocisexismo; Movimientos de derecha; Análisis del discurso

Introduction

Despite finding a common point in the discussions about the different forms of gender identities and sexual orientations, we cannot affirm the existence of homogeneity within the LGBTI¹ community. In the midst of the GLS, LGBT, LGBTI, LGBTT, LGBT+, LGBTQ, LGBTQIAP+² movements, among others, it is possible to identify different subjects and perspectives that have diversified, merging with the fight of other social movements, seeking the visibility for their forms of existence in the face of a society that constantly tries to erase them. Furthermore, the movement of changing the acronym itself explains an internal and multiple field of disputes for the incorporation and recognition of identities that, even though existed previously, did not have – and many of them still do not have – visibility within the community itself. A striking example was the passage from the acronym GLS to LGBT, which reversed the position of the first letters as a way of giving greater visibility to lesbians – reducing the central focus on the gay community, in order to diversify the movement –, as well as incorporating other sexual and gender identities, a process that continues to the present day.

This heterogeneity is not only due to the diversity of encompassed identities – lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transsexuals, intersex, transvestites, transgenders, pansexuals, asexuals, queers and many others –, but also to the different perspectives on each of these forms of being, as well as those of imposing themselves politically in the face of tensions and approximations of these subjects with heterocisnormative³ hegemonies. This way, we see the emergence, within the LGBTI community, of movements that aim from the deconstruction of these normativities to the existence of those who negotiate spaces, building alliances with heterocisnormative groups, often legitimizing and reinforcing various oppressions on this community.

We also see the advancement of digital technologies and online digital media, increasingly present in various activities, inserting us into a constant articulation of human and non-human practices. Such technological-informational advances have allowed, since the formation of Web 2.0, a shift in the classic unidirectionality of the production and consumption of information, given that, at least in principle, any user who has access to the Internet can share their opinions with thousands of people around the globe.

Among these media, we highlight the development of social networks that have become increasingly commonplace, moreover with an increase in the use of these platforms for political-activist practices. Whether as a space for debates on social issues, as a means of disseminating and producing statements by political figures, or even as a tool for controlling data and disseminating fake news – a major impasse for the affirmation of contemporary democracy –, social networks have assumed a role of great relevance for the understanding of the current socio-political field, especially with regard to the rise of groups on the right of the political spectrum. These varied groups have found in the new models of organization of Internet ways to spread their political perceptions and gain popular support.

Based on the above, in this article we are interested in the construction of movements within the LGBTI community that are discursively allied, through online social networks, with heterocisnormative hegemonic groups contrary to social policies for sexual and gender diversity. We selected as a corpus of analysis tweets published and republished by the page of the Gays com Bolsonaro (Gays with Bolsonaro) movement (@gaycombolsonaro, henceforth GcB), on the social network Twitter, as a means of reflecting on the construction of these alliances and the movement itself, from the mobilization of elements of this social network. The initial selection of (re)tweets took place through an initial survey of the tweets uttered by the page and the retweets made by it – including tweets posted prior to its creation, in April 2018 –, carried out between May 20th and 27th, 2020. Thus, the (re)tweets selected mostly dated from October 2017 to the end of 2018, with others posted between 2019 and May 2020. In dialogue with the constructed corpus, we opted for the linguistic marks of polemic negation (DUCROT, 1987), mostly present in the (re)tweets that precede the election; and by the use of a lexicon that refers to the LGBTI Movement.

We seek in Discourse Analysis (ROCHA; DEUSDARÁ, 2005; MAINGUENEAU, 2004) and in the categories of polemic negation and implicit (DUCROT, 1987), a theoretical contribution to our analyses. We are also based on the concept of language-intervention (ROCHA, 2014), according to which language, more than having a role of mere representation of reality, produces displacements and effects of meaning that act by intervening in its construction; and in Foucault (2018) and Scott (2005) we seek a way to reflect on the relationships between sexualities, groups, individuals and structures of power and law. The discussion by Borrillo (2010) and Jun (2018) about heterosexism and cissexism is also present.

We, therefore, divide the article into three parts. The first addresses LGBTI rights, focusing on issues such as their recent institutionalization and the responses of the opposing movements. In the second, we deal with the recent advance of the rights, and how this process took place, made possible by online social networks and by the opposition to the advance of LGBTI agendas. Then, we do our analyses.

LGBTI rights in Brazil today: disputes and dilemmas

One of the central issues for the discussion of LGBTI agendas is the individual-group and equality-difference relationships. Our society generally tends to treat these concepts as opposites and irreconcilable, but, according to Scott (2005), these concepts have been related, tensioned and reconfigured in different ways throughout history.

Having the individual as the central point of the application of the law, policies aimed at the affirmation of a certain social group prevent individuals from being evaluated by themselves – the only fair way before the Modern/capitalist State and its concept of subject of law –, being evaluated as belonging to a group. Equality would only be applied when all individuals were judged as such. However, representative minority groups, defenders of these affirmative actions, assert that “as long as prejudice and discrimination remain, [...] individuals will not all be evaluated according to the same criteria; eliminating discrimination requires attention to the economic, political and social status of groups” (SCOTT, 2005, p. 13, our translation).

The very perception of “individual” is fictional, having been built as a norm throughout history, assuming the white, heterosexual, cisgender man from the wealthier classes as its expression and reference. Individuals who have these characteristics – and who for that reason are entitled to full rights – are not considered a group; only those who deviate from these standards are considered as such. “Difference has been represented as a fundamental or natural trait of a group while the standardized norm [...] is not considered to possess collective traits” (SCOTT, 2005, p. 24, our translation). Thus, many times, different subjects, even if they do not belong to hegemonic groups, align themselves with this social perception, which ends up disqualifying their agendas, causing even more discrimination.

We therefore understand that even if the groups are composed of individuals gathered around a common characteristic, they are still diverse individuals in their ways of exercising different sexual orientations and gender identities. If it is through discursive practices – understood as the joint relationship of text and community construction (MAINGUENEAU, 2004) – that we interact with the world and build ourselves in it from the clash between different social voices (FIORIN, 2008) that contradict and/or discontinue each other (FOUCAULT, 2014), we can say that the LGBTI population does not have a single form of identity, so that the whole community is expected to build the same relationship with society. In this sense, we take as a basis the studies by Souza and Pereira (2013, p. 89, our translation) in relation specifically to homosexuals, but applicable to LGBTI, according to which we should not believe that their discourses “have identity, centrality and uniqueness, as they manifest utterances that may even be antagonistic and contrary to their sexual orientation, for example”.

Regarding the advancement of recognition of LGBTI agendas and rights in the Brazilian scenario, the end of the 1990s was of central importance. Decisions such as the release of sex readjustment/reassignment surgeries, in 1997, by the Federal Council of Medicine (CFM), and Resolution nº 01/99 of the Federal Council of Psychology (CFP) – which prohibits the treatment of “sexual reversal” of homosexuality, depathologized in 1985 by the CFM – are decisions that represent important achievements for the recognition of LGBTI identities and for the reduction of violence against these bodies by medical-clinical sectors.

In the following two decades (2000 and 2010), we saw the continuation of other discussions regarding family issues, which culminated in the legalization of a stable union between people of the same sex in 2011, marriage in 2013, and the possibility of adopting children in 2015. There was also progress regarding the recognition of gender identity with the offer of sex reassignment surgeries by the Unified Health System (SUS), from 2008, and through the possibility of any citizen to decide how to identify himself, in 2018, with the provision nº 73/2018, by the National Council of Justice (CNJ), which established the rules for trans people to change their name and gender in their documents. Also in 2018, the CFP issued Resolution nº 01/2018, which guides psychology professionals in Brazil that transvestility and transsexuality are not addressed as pathologies. Only in May 2019, the World Health Organization (WHO) officially depathologized transsexuality, through the issuance of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) 11, which it had signaled it would do, still in 2018.

These debates and achievements are not the result of a linear process of LGBTI agendas. They were accompanied by negative reactions from conservative sectors of society – mostly religious – who presented several counter-proposals, especially those from the 2010s, in various institutional spaces, which aimed precisely at the withdrawal or suspension of rights that had been made official in recent years.

Thus, we saw the boiling of different propositions, such as the Legislative Decree Project (PDC) nº 234/2011, which sought to suspend paragraphs of CFP Resolution nº 01/99 that prohibit “sexual reversal” treatments in homosexuals. This decree aimed to legitimize and institutionalize, once again, homophobia/heterosexism in Brazilian psychology (VILLELA et al., 2020). Along with this process, we also saw the rise of candidates who, according to Bulgarelli (2018), have in antifeminism and anti-LGBTI an agenda that gives them notoriety, along with the attacks on human rights that, according to them, “infiltrated different spheres: from state institutions to politics, from the family nucleus to the minds of future generations” (BULGARELLI, 2018, p. 101, our translation). Faced with this scenario of social achievements, albeit timid, this conservative front – conceived by itself as a set of model individuals and not as a group – began to feel its ideological and economic hegemony threatened, starting to systematically attack the agendas and achievements of black, feminist and LGBTI movements.

Rise of “new rights” and online social networks

Interested in language practices, we understand that Rocha’s (2014) concept of language-intervention is central to the discussion proposed here, since more than just representing an extralinguistic social reality, language causes displacements, effects of meaning and qualities of the real through discursive practices. These practices, as stated by Rocha (2014), are defined as the construction of texts that, while coming from a discursive community responsible for its production, simultaneously provide the basis for the existence of this community itself. Indeed, language, when acting on the production of social reality, acts on the production of subjectivities. In this sense, we outline in this section a reflection on the process of strengthening of the so-called “new Brazilian right”.

The popular manifestations, which began in 2013 against the increase in ticket prices and were transformed into an uprising that was intended to be “against corruption”, became a movement of attack and destabilization of the government of Dilma Rousseff (Workers’ Party, Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT), evidencing the growth of the Brazilian extreme right. To understand it, it is necessary to consider that there is not one right, in fact,

What exists today is the confluence of diverse groups, whose union is above all pragmatic and motivated by the perception of a common enemy. The most extreme sectors include three main strands, which are libertarianism, religious foundations and recycling of old anti-communism

(MIGUEL, 2018, p. 19, our translation).

Thus, there is an alliance between different groups that seek: 1) minimal state socioeconomic intervention; 2) the full “restoration” of ultra-conservative Christian religious values – mainly neo-Pentecostal evangelicals and conservative Catholics – “attacked” by advances in feminist and LGBTI agendas; and 3) the revival, in Brazil, of a presumptuous nationalism, of McCarthyist/anti-communist inspirations, which are updated, having the Bolivarian and Cuban governments as enemies, which originated expressions such as “Go to Cuba!” and “Brazil will not become Venezuela”. As much as these are distinct strands, we often find subjects and groups that defend different combinations of these points (MIGUEL, 2018).

The rise of these new rights is not only the result of the interest of large groups that cooperated with the funding of this process aiming at the approval of ultra-liberal proposals. Indeed,

Many other factors must be considered and are related to the perception of threats and opportunities by militancy, the consolidation of ties and common identities, mobilization of affections and the use of social networks, and in certain circumstances, these factors were more important. than the possession of abundant resources

(ROCHA, 2018, p. 52, our translation).

The use of social networks was one of the major factors that made it possible to engage a popular base in the rise of these groups that presented themselves as a response to the economic crisis that, despite being a reflection of the global crisis of capitalism that began in 2008, was built as a “moral” crisis, with corruption understood as a problem of PT management and not as a result of capitalist structures.

We also emphasize the advance of a supposed “cultural marxism” and of feminist and LGBTI agendas produced as threats. As a result, hegemonic forces, self-constructed as victims of this supposed threat, reproduce “The same type of reasoning [...] as a way of sustaining its opposition to any initiative to reduce gender inequalities, and arrives on social networks in the form of denunciations against the ‘gay communist dictatorship’ in formation” (MIGUEL, 2018, p. 22, our translation).

These discourses with conspiracy biases are responsible for mobilizing large bases of support for neoconservative groups, especially on Facebook and Twitter. This last platform stands out due to its recurrent use by major political figures, both international and Brazilian, sometimes creating diplomatic tensions.

In face of this, we can understand how the production of tweets, by profiles of high visibility and social impact, has a great power of social intervention in the means of subjectivation and in the production of subjects, with great political power.

“The world is not just gay”: negation of LGBTI agendas and their “new” movement on Twitter

Twitter was created in 2006, in the United States, and since then it has not stopped becoming popular. Brazil takes the sixth position in the ranking of countries with the highest number of users⁴. This platform presents itself as a microblog, in which its users talk about themselves and communicate essentially through tweets, with the possibility of sending private messages.

Tweets are short texts, with a maximum of 280 characters (140 characters until 2017), and allow three types of interaction: “like”, “comment” and “retweet”. Retweets can be understood as the construction of a kind of dialogue with a tweet: you can simply share this content without any addendum, generally meaning agreement with that text or even add comments reinforcing or rejecting the content presented there. Thus, retweets constitute an online discursive network between different subjects, either through the opposition between discursive formations or through the collectivization of an utterance – which is assumed by other subjects. Due to these structural characteristics, the discursive genre tweet has traditionally been marked by the use of informal language and succinct statements, since there is a restricted number of characters that the platform imposes, which makes the use of abbreviations common. On account of its new uses and the insertion of the political-institutional field in this platform, we see progressively more complex constructions being developed, through threads and the use of external links, so that their traditional use is only one of the possibilities of enunciation in this platform (MOURA; BLANCO; THERESO, 2020). Despite this movement, the tweets on the analyzed page are the ones with the most traditional use.

When we access a page on Twitter, we see the profile and cover image, the bio, how it presents itself, some information such as location, when the user joined this platform, number of followers, how many profiles he follows; as well as the “Follow” option and four sections: Tweets, Tweets & Replies, Media and Likes. The first presents all the tweets and retweets made by the page, the second includes the tweets that are responses from this page to the publications of others, the third presents all the files in visual or audiovisual format and the last shows all the tweets that the page liked. We can observe two moments of the GcB movement’s profile in the following images.

Image 1
Screenshots of the Twitter profile of the Gays com Bolsonaro

The GcB Twitter page was created in April 2018, six months before the election of President Bolsonaro, at which time we identified several tweets that justified the votes of LGBTI people for this candidate, and that currently ratify discourses and decisions of characters that surround the government and the head of the nation himself.

The GcB presents itself in the bio of its page as a “Brazilian Gay Conservative Org., Christian, northeastern; a new LGBT mov.”⁵; a conservative right-wing group with Christian religious inspirations and which is built as a counter-proposal to the current LGBTI movements, understood by them as a homogeneous collectivity. Despite calling itself the “new LGBT movement”, homosexuality is the center of its agenda, as well as masculinity, as indicated by the choice of the name of the page, which, opting for the term Gay, excludes lesbians who do not feel contemplated by it. Other sexualities and gender identities, such as bisexuals, asexual, intersex, transgender and transvestites were selectively erased in this choice.

We analyzed the tweets and retweets present in the “Tweets” section of the GcB profile (@gaycombolsonaro), surveyed in May 2020 and selected, as already mentioned, from the linguistic marks, in particular the polemic negation (DUCROT, 1987), very present in the (re)tweets of 2017 and 2018, and the use of lexicons referring to the LGBTI Movement, that are more present in the publications of the years 2019 and 2020. We are interested in understanding how this “new movement” is built through its tweets. It is necessary to explain that retweets, when attached to its page, are (re)uttered, so that they also act discursively in the construction of the identity of this movement.

A recurring point in these tweets and retweets is the negation of political agendas and disputes presented by the LGBTI movements. It proved to be productive to illuminate the rejection constructed in the utterances through the category of polemic negation, proposed by Ducrot (1987), for whom these utterances mark their polyphony through two antagonistic worldviews attributable to two different discursive subjects. In turn, there are two different discursive positions: one associated with the positive perspective and the other with the perspective that rejects the first, and with which the speaker is allied.

Table 1
Polemic negations, underlying assertions and implicits.

Polemic negations	Underlying assertions
“The world is not just gay; but of citizens” (tweet 3)	“The world is only gay; and not of citizens” “gays are citizens”
“The world is not just for gays….but for CITIZENS” (tweet 7)	“The world is only for gays….and not for CITIZENS” “gays are CITIZENS”
“Sexuality does not interfere with my character!” (tweet 8)	“Sexuality interferes with my character!”
“I’m not proud to be gay, because that doesn’t define character, I’m proud to be who I am” (tweet 16)	“I’m proud to be gay because that defines character, I’m not proud to be who I am”
“Sexuality does not define anyone, character does” (tweet 37)	“Sexuality defines someone, character does not”
“[...] [we]6 don’t need rights for minorities” (tweet 2)	“(...) we do need rights for minorities”
“Sexuality or gender doesn’t make anyone special” (tweet 23)	“Sexuality or gender makes someone special”
“Nobody wants problems” (tweet 13)	“Somebody wants problems”
“Our flag is not sexuality. Our flag is Brazil” (tweet 36)	“Our flag is sexuality. Our flag is not Brazil”

• Source: made by the authors. Authors’ translation and emphasis.

By constructing and updating such negations, the GcB dialogues with underlying assertions, understood as statements that generate the polemic negation, attributed to another discursive being; another one that has to be contested, denied; another enunciator of the LGBTI movements, which could also be called the “old LGBT movement”, in contrast to the one that called itself the “new LGBT movement”.

We understand that the GcB produces these negations in favor of a supposed affirmation of citizenship, as if both fights – for sexual and gender rights and for citizenship – were irreconcilable elements. In this sense, the fact that a certain group acquires rights would constitute a threat to those who have their rights consolidated. At the same time, this discursive strategy associates the inverse construction with LGBTI movements: the denial of citizenship in favor of their guidelines and specifications. We observe that the GcB builds a simulacrum, a discursive image of the LGBTI movement in which “the world would be ‘only gay’ and not citizen”. This assertion underlies another claim: that there would be an opposition between “gays” and “citizens”, and that the subject needs to choose one of these two identities: “citizen”, which would be a positive perspective of the subject, or “gay”, its negative counterpart. Faced with this duality presented by the GcB discourse, its interlocutors are left with two alternatives: to defend homosexual agendas and tarnish their character for being “proud to be gay”, or to renounce this fight and be perceived as a “citizen”, which makes the option for the page’s name even more strange. The affirmation of the “gay” identity, that can be assumed from the option of the profile name, conflicts with the discourses reproduced by the page, that almost always seek to erase this identity in detriment of a supposed citizenship that excludes the possibility of being “gay with proud”.

This perception ‒ that the LGBTI movement defends a world formed only by gays, and/or that gives privileged space to gender identities and sexual orientations - is strongly linked to the perspective of opposition between individuals and groups, discussed above, and tends to reinforce hegemonic conceptions about LGBTI people. Referencing Scott (2005, p. 14, our translation) when discussing this issue: “individuals and groups, [...] equality and difference are not opposites, but interdependent concepts that are necessarily in tension”. In this sense, the affirmation of a minority group through political representation does not mean its opposition to other individuals or groups and their rights, being precisely the way to affirm themselves in a society that has left them on the sidelines. The use of these positivization actions through the fight for recognition of these same groups can be understood as a strategy of (re)existence, since they suffered historical and social processes of differentiation, erasure and oppression that denied them precisely the possibility of asserting themselves as citizens/individuals with full rights.

In our society, it is common to understand as groups only the so-called “minority”, socially, historically and culturally excluded, who require rights, while individuals (with full rights) are seen as a norm and a goal. Regarding the issue of gender identity and sexual orientation, the normative individual of society is one who is cisgender and heterosexual. That is, being cisgender and heterosexual is seen as having the absence of a sexual orientation and gender identity and being simply an individual – and not a heterocisnormative group that is “preferred” by society to have rights –, whereas being LGBTI would be an “option” for a group, in order to insert the difference and seek preference for itself.

This construction is, therefore, justified and reaffirmed by the GcB, through a binary logic, in which the concomitant fight for sexuality (and consequently for gender) and for Brazil would not be possible. It is built through the underlying assertions and the implicit in which the LGBTI movements (to which the page is opposed) would fight for the rights of representative minorities by treating them as “special”, allying itself with discourses that treat these rights as privileges, ignoring that society has already chosen, social and historically, a “special” sexual orientation and gender identity whose subjects do not have their individual rights attacked by this social cut. We observed that the GcB movement, by discursively constructing that LGBTI movements would negate their nationality when defending the right to exercise their sexualities and gender identities, also ends up building the perception that both LGBTI movements and the fights for their rights would be against Brazil.

Thinking about the concepts of heterosexism, understood as the “belief in the existence of a hierarchy of sexualities, in which heterosexuality occupies the highest position” and by which the other sexualities are considered, as “pathological⁷, criminal, immoral and destroyers of civilization” (BORRILLO, 2010, p. 31, our translation), and cissexism, understood as the “systemic oppression of transgender youth and adults to benefit cisgender men and women who conform to society’s gender expectations” (JUN, 2018, p. 162), we can understand that the GcB legitimizes heterocissexist practices, especially through its differentialist facet – use of the diversity of identities to justify diverse social treatments. Borrillo (2010), when presenting this more modern facet of heterosexism⁸, defines that, at first, it discards heterosexual superiority – in favor of the diversity of sexualities, but, in reality, it acts as a legitimator for differentiated treatment of these subjects.

By denying not only LGBTI agendas, but their placement as representative minorities who suffer discrimination and who, therefore, need rights, the GcB promotes the erasure of these fights “for Brazil”. Through this discursive strategy, it makes invisible the existence of differentiated treatments for these populations as well as the existence of differentialist heterocissexism, which results in the reinforcement and legitimation of these exclusionary treatments for LGBTI.

It is necessary to consider that the emergence of the “homosexual movement”, which in time would become the LGBTI movements, “indicates the aspiration to claim universal and full civil rights, through political actions that were not restricted to the ‘ghetto’, but who turned to society more broadly” (FACCHINI, s/d, n.p., our translation). Thus, the GcB, by acting in the negation of these movements and the politicization of their agendas, legitimizes the isolation of the LGBTI population, relocating them in the “ghetto”, while reaffirming the heterocisnormative privilege.

Foucault (2018) points to movements in the management of power that, since the 18th century, has been using sexuality as a device based on its displacement from private space. Thus, bourgeois society generated a system of power-knowledge-pleasure relations, as well as re-updating its disciplinary power, in order to manage which sexualities and gender identities⁹ are accepted and which are not. And, in our society with a strong Judeo-Christian tradition, the “optimal standard” of functioning of sexuality and gender identity was given by the construction of heterosexuality and cisgenderity as a norm, while the others are seen as exceptions that would have deviations and even “abnormalities”.

In this sense, the GcB movement proposes to intervene in the conception of the separation of what is public and what is private, the latter being a space that should be disconnected from politics. In other words, sexuality and gender identity, as factors of private life, should not be at the center of political discussions and, if they are, it is for the creation of “privileges” for the LGBTI population.

However, the GcB doesn’t present itself as a less political group. On the contrary, it constructs itself as a political movement focused on attacking the LGBTI movement’s political questioning of oppressions against their forms of existence, a political movement against the politicization of “a” movement.

We can analyze the continuity of this negation of specifications and LGBTI fights in favor of the erasure of this issue and the reaffirmation of nationalism – common in groups of supporters of the current government – still in the use of the subject, in tweet 2. We perceive the construction of the GcB’s distance from the fight for the rights of the LGBTI population in the use of the hidden subject “we”. There is a group – “we” – that denies the need for rights that are not intended for this “we”, but “for minorities”, with which this subject does not identify, despite placing himself as part of it. Along with the other premises of the GcB analyzed by us, this construction leads us to infer that this hidden “we” can be understood as “the citizens” whose “flag is not sexuality”, but that the “flag is Brazil” (there including the GcB); while “minorities” would be those whose “flag is not Brazil”, but “is sexuality”.

It is also observed the use of terms that refer to the LGBTI movements, which, at the same time corroborate the perspective of negation of the fight for rights for this population, as previously presented, also dialogue with heterocissexism and with the various prejudices related to the LGBTI community, such as “snowflake¹⁰”, “depraved” and “of the devil”. We present some (re)tweets and their meaning effects in the following table:

Table 2
Use of lexicon that refers to the LGBTI Movement

Lexicon	Meaning effects
“I AM GAY AND I VOTE FOR BOLSONARO, LET’S STOP BEING SNOWFLAKES” (tweet 5)	Being gay and opposing Bolsonaro because of his stance on LGBTI is being a snowflake.
“Because I’m not depraved” (tweet 22, in reply to “[...]. What is your theoretical basis for being against the LGBTQ movement?”)	Supporting the agendas and the “LGBTQ movement” is depravity, dialoguing with prejudices that hypersexualize LGBTI bodies and relationships.
“GENDER IDEOLOGY? ‘This is the devil’s thing!’ - @jairbolsonaro [...]” (tweet 26)	Issues of gender and sexuality (designated under the nickname “GENDER IDEOLOGY”) are “devil’s things” to be fought, preferably by religious means.

• Source: made by the authors. Authors’ translation and italics.

Conclusion

Based on the analysis of some concepts and discourses present on tweets from the GcB movement, we could illuminate how this group has been constituted mainly through (polemic) negation and the construction of a simulacrum of the LGBTI movements.

The GcB comes from a context marked by the (re)rise of the so-called new Brazilian rights, which found on the Internet and in their social networks a way to develop and build their popular base, which is precisely where the GcB is structured. Its emergence occurs in response to a period of institutionalization of the agendas of social movements, including the LGBTI. It uses elements present in the aspects of these new rights to build a simulacrum of movements for the rights of the LGBTI population, presenting them as a threat to the national agenda.

Relying on the oppositions between individuals-groups and equality-difference, we perceive how the GcB ends up discursively building itself as a heterocissexist “new LGBT movement”. Despite not explicitly defending a hierarchy of sexualities and gender identities that privilege cisgender and heterosexual people, this movement opposes, denies and delegitimizes the fights that aim to deconstruct these belief systems – heterosexism and cissexism –, reinforcing the violence suffered by this population, including those who compose the GcB, putting them back in the “ghetto”, from which many of these subjects are still fighting to get out.

It is also worth reflecting that the individuals that make up this “new LGBT movement” are the result of a heterocisnormative society that acts in the processes of subjectivation and that often find in the negation of themselves, and in the consequent alliance with hegemonic groups, a way to occupy certain spaces. However, this same movement ends up reinforcing structures that oppress other parts of the LGBTI population, especially those who are most vulnerable.

• 1
  We chose the acronym LGBTI due to its strong presence in institutional discussions at national and international level.
• 2
  Following: Gays, Lesbians and Supporters; Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transsexuals; Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Trans and Intersex; Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Transsexuals and Transvestites; Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Trans, plus; Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Trans, Queers; Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals, Trans, Queers, Intesex, Asexuals, Pansexuals, plus.
• 3
  We understand heterocisnormativity as pre-established patterns of gender – in line with biological sex – and of sexuality – with heterosexuality – taken as a norm and constantly reinforced in family and social relationships, which do not recognize sexual and gender plurality (BORRILLO, 2010; JUN, 2018).
• 4
  See: <https://www.tecmundo.com.br/redes-sociais/144654-brasil-10-paises-usuarios-twitter.htm>. Access on:.13 nov. 2022.
• 5
  Our translation, excluding the text in italics, which already was in English, even though it is a Brazilian page.
• 6
  In Portuguese, it is possible to construct sentences without using the subject explicitly, thus, we chose to recreate a similar structure in order to try to reproduce – at the best way possible – the meaning effects in the original language.
• 7
  Despite the depathologization of homosexuality by the WHO in 1990, we saw in Brazil, in the 2000s, projects that aimed to attack deliberations against the pathologization of homosexuality, such as the Legislative Decree Project nº 234 of 2011. See discussion in: Villela et al. (2020).
• 8
  However, we understand that such a process of the differentialist discourse is also present, in a way, in the cissexism and, therefore, we added this concept to our discussion.
• 9
  Foucault specifically develops the issue of sexuality, however cisnormativity is also the product of a social construction, so that other gender identities besides the cis also suffered processes of marginalization and oppression (RODOVALHO, 2017).
• 10
  We chose to use the term “snowflake” and “being a snowflake” believing that it has a similar meaning effect to “fresco” and “frescura” in Portuguese, that dialogues with homophobia.

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Edited by

Editor: Maria Ataide Malcher

Editorial assistant: Weverton Raiol

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  05 Dec 2022
• Date of issue
  2022

History

• Received
  16 Dec 2020
• Accepted
  05 Nov 2022