ABSTRACT
The present paper aims at showing that the arguments defended by Ryle may be a critical stance to the problem of realism and mental processes: first, because realism, unlike some contemporary theories of mind, separates mental life from other properties that make up the world, and subsequently, because such argument would need to explain how such properties may instantiate a content that would not be part of a physical system [such as the brain]. Thus, this study argues that, based on Ryle, the interaction of mental processes with the possibility of existence of objects that are external to consciousness does not depend on any biological architecture, but on semantic elements used in everyday life to speak and refer to the world. On the one hand, this stance redraws criticisms to the so-called official doctrine, and on the other, nourishes a number of realistic arguments that should be attacked and dissolved by the current theories of mind.
Keywords:
Realism; language; mental processes; cognition; Ryle