Cuando el Tiempo Importa: Cambios Federales, Temporalidad y Recentralización en Brasil

Vale, Helder Ferreira do

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ARTIGOS ORIGINAIS • Dados rev. ciênc. sociais 65 (2) • 2022 • https://doi.org/10.1590/dados.2022.65.2.257 copiar

Cuando el Tiempo Importa: Cambios Federales, Temporalidad y Recentralización en Brasil

Autoría SCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

RESUMEN

Gran parte del trabajo académico sobre el federalismo brasileño se ha centrado durante mucho tiempo en las formas en las que la descentralización ha producido una parálisis institucional bajo el conflicto intergubernamental. Este artículo, por el contrario, sugiere que Brasil ha experimentado una transformación gradual desde su democratización, lo que llevó a una recentralización del poder en manos del gobierno federal. Se presenta un marco de análisis que explica cómo un proceso de descentralización inicial (1983-1994) se convirtió en un proceso de centralización (1995-2007) que finalmente aumentó los poderes de regulación y coordinación del gobierno federal brasileño. Además, el análisis muestra que dos grupos principales de partidos políticos compitieron para influir en la secuencia y velocidad de la legislación relacionada con los procesos de descentralización y centralización. Específicamente, estos partidos utilizaron dos estrategias temporales – generar demoras ( foot-dragging ) y marcar el ritmo ( pace-setting ) – que competían para ralentizar o acelerar la aprobación de la legislación que regula la autonomía subnacional. Una vez que el bloque centralizador de partidos promulgó legislación centralizadora clave, utilizó la estrategia de construcción de vallas ( fence-building ) para institucionalizar las relaciones intergubernamentales, consolidando así los poderes de coordinación del centro. La principal contribución de este artículo es avanzar en un enfoque temporal de los cambios federales, lo que explica cómo el gobierno federal brasileño centralizó la autoridad bajo una Constitución descentralizadora.

descentralización; centralización; temporalidad; autonomía subnacional; federalismo; relaciones intergubernamentales

	Modalities	Types of modalities	Who benefits?	Strategies
TEMPORAL DIMENSION	Sequence	Fiscal layer ex ante administrative layer	Municipal and state governments	Foot-dragging
	Sequence	Administrative layer ex ante fiscal layer	Federal government	Pace-setting
	Speed	Slow approval of laws	Municipal and state governments	Foot-dragging
	Speed	Fast approval of laws	Federal government	Pace-setting
INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION	Institutionalization of ING	Bottom-up dynamics	Municipal and state governments	Fence-building
INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION	Institutionalization of ING	Top-down dynamics	Federal government	Fence-building

Causal Mechanism	Description	Influence on recentralization	Explanatory citations
Fiscal profligacy behavior	The exercise of subnational fiscal autonomy through high subnational expenditure and indebtedness	Reinforces the decentralization to subnational governments; favors the expenditure powers of the subnational governments vis-à-vis the fiscal regulatory powers of the federal government	Falleti, 2005FALLETI, Tulia. (2005), “A sequential theory of decentralization: Latin American cases in comparative perspective”. American Political Science Review, vol. 99, no3, pp. 327-346. ; Rodden, 2006RODDEN, Jonathan A. (2006), Hamilton’s paradox: the promise and peril of fiscal federalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ;
Fiscal prudence behavior	Reduction of costs of the high subnational expenditure by imposing limits and sanctions to subnational governments with high indebtedness	Imposition of limitations and sanctions on subnational expenditure and indebtedness reducing macroeconomic instability and strengthening the position of the federal government vis-à-vis subnational governments	Melo, 2005MELO, Marcus. (2005), “O sucesso inesperado das reformas de segunda geração: federalismo, reformas constitucionais e política Social”. DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais, vol. 48, no4, pp. 845-889. ; Rodden, 2006RODDEN, Jonathan A. (2006), Hamilton’s paradox: the promise and peril of fiscal federalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Status quo bias	Partisan polarization and institutional opportunity to delay parliamentary procedures to vote bills	Delays in the approval of laws that regulate constitutional provisions giving ample autonomy to subnational governments	Binder, Lawrence and Smith, 2002BINDER, Sarah A.; LAWRENCE, Eric D.; SMITH, Steven S. (2002), “Tracking the Filibuster, 1917 to 1996”. American Politics Research, vol. 30, no4, pp. 406-422. ; Wawro and Schickler, 2013
Institutional layering	Creation of new institutions juxtaposing old institutions. Neglect and redirection of old institutions with the creation of new ones that reestablish new goals and dynamics	Institutionalize vertical intergovernmental relations through the imposition of either a top-down or bottom-up dynamic	Mahoney and Thelen, 2010

	Authors	Causes	Main Actors	Main Institutions-Instruments
DECENTRALIZATION	Abrucio, 1998ABRUCIO, Fernando. (1998), Os barões da federação: os governadores e a redemocratização brasileira. São Paulo: Hucitec.	Democratization	State governments	Governor’s influence over deputies at the national congress; Low checks and balances on the powers of the governors
	Arretche, 2004ARRETCHE, Marta. (2004), “Federalismo e políticas sociais no Brasil: problemas de coordenação e autonomia”. Revista São Paulo em Perspectiva, vol. 18, no2, pp. 17-26.	Social policy autonomy of subnational governments (especially in the health sector)	Federal, state and municipal governments	Different capacity of subnational governments to exercise social policy autonomy
	Cheibub. Figueiredo and Limongi, 2009CHEIBUB, José Antônio; FIGUEIREDO, Argelina; LIMONGI, Fernando. (2009), “Political parties and governors as determinant of legislative behavior in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, 1988-2006”. Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 51, no1, pp. 1-30.	Institutional powers of the executive branch of states	Federal and state governments, national congress	The powers of the governors and local political elites are limited by the centralized legislative procedures of the national congress and the agenda power of the national executive
	Falleti, 2005FALLETI, Tulia. (2005), “A sequential theory of decentralization: Latin American cases in comparative perspective”. American Political Science Review, vol. 99, no3, pp. 327-346.	Decentralization sequence: fiscal decentralization occurring before administrative decentralization	Federal and state governments, national congress	Temporal sequence of law approval
	Rodden, 2006RODDEN, Jonathan A. (2006), Hamilton’s paradox: the promise and peril of fiscal federalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.	Inherently divided sovereignty of economic unions	Federal and subnational governments	Subnational fiscal deficits, federal bailouts, fiscal discipline, degree of subnational fiscal autonomy and dependence on the federal government
DECENTRALIZATION	Samuels and Abrucio, 2000SAMUELS, David; ABRUCIO, Fernando Luis. (2000), “Federalism and democratic transitions: the ‘new’ politics of the governors in Brazil”. Publius, vol. 30, no2, pp. 46-61.	Subnational actor’s power over democratization	Subnational governments	Constitution drafting, fiscal autonomy of subnational governments, and nonconcurrent subnational elections
	Souza, 1998SOUZA, Celina. (1998), “Intermediação de interesses regionais no Brasil: o impacto do federalismo e da descentralização”. DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais, vol. 41, no3, pp. 569-592. , 2001SOUZA, Celina. (2001), “Federalismo e descentralização na Constituição de 1988: processo decisório, conflitos e alianças”. DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais, vol. 44, no3, pp. 513-560.	Democratization	National congress, central and subnational governments	Constitution drafting, separation between political and fiscal powers
	Montero, 2001MONTERO, Alfred. (2001), “After decentralization: patterns of intergovernmental conflict in Argentina, Brazil, Spain, and Mexico”. Publius, vol. 31, pp. 43-64.	Vertical intergovernmental conflict	Federal and subnational governments	Pace of decentralization, macroeconomic crises, vertical coordination
CENTRALIZATION	Almeida, 2005ALMEIDA, Maria Hermínia Tavares. (2005), “Recentralizando a Federação?”. Revista de Sociologia e Política, no24, pp. 29-40.	Effort to increase federal policy effectiveness	Federal government	Centralizing fiscal and social policies in a context of cooperative federalism
	Abrucio, 2005ABRUCIO, Fernando. (2005), “A coordenação federativa no Brasil: a experiência do período FHC e os desafios do governo Lula”. Revista de Sociologia e Política, no24, pp. 41-67.	Attempt of the federal government to increase policy coordination	Federal government under the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration	Monitoring and evaluation of subnational governments, increase of regulatory powers of federal government, creation of intergovernmental coordination fora
	Arretche, 2007ARRETCHE, Marta. (2007), “The veto power of sub-national government in Brazil: political institutions and parliamentary behaviour in the post-1988 period”. Brazilian Political Science Review, no2, pp. 40-73. , 2009ARRETCHE, Marta. (2009), “Continuidades e descontinuidades da federação brasileira: de como 1988 facilitou 1995”. DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais, vol. 52, no2, pp. 377-423. , 2012ARRETCHE, Marta. (2012), Democracia, centralização e federalismo no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: FGV/ Fiocruz. , 2013ARRETCHE, Marta. (2013), “Demos-constraining or demos-enabling federalism? political institutions and policy change in Brazil”. Journal of Politics in Latin America, vol. 5, no2, pp. 133-150.	Legislation at the national congress, limited veto-powers of subnational governments	Members of parliament	National executive, legislative branches and other federal institutions
	Dickovich, 2007	Desire of the federal government to diminish the influence of governors	Federal and municipal governments	National executive and legislative branches
CENTRALIZATION	Fenwick, 2009FENWICK, Tracy Beck. (2009), “Avoiding governors: the success of Bolsa Família”. Latin American Research Review, vol. 44, no1, pp. 102-131.	Desire of the federal government to diminish the influence of governors	Federal and municipal governments, policy actors	Social assistance policies, partnership federal-local governments
	Melo, 2005MELO, Marcus. (2005), “O sucesso inesperado das reformas de segunda geração: federalismo, reformas constitucionais e política Social”. DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais, vol. 48, no4, pp. 845-889.	Pursuit of macroeconomic stability	Presidents	National executive branch
	Palotti and Machado, 2014PALOTTI, Pedro L. de Moura; MACHADO, José Angelo. (2014), “Coordenação federativa e a ‘armadilhada decisão conjunta’: as comissões de articulação intergovernamental das políticas sociais no Brasil”. DADOS – Revista de Ciências Sociais, vol. 46, no4, pp. 399-441.	Attempt to improve federal coordination in the educational, health and social policy areas	Federal government	Intergovernmental coordinating forums, incomplete federal pact
	Rich and Gómez, 2012RICH, Jessica A.; GÓMEZ, Eduardo J. (2012), “Centralizing decentralized governance in Brazil”. Publius, vol. 42, no4, pp. 636-661.	Policy efficiency in the health sector	Federal government	Expansion of regulatory capacity of the federal government
	Sugiyama, 2011SUGIYAMA, Natasha Borges. (2011), “Bottom-up policy diffusion: national emulation of a conditional cash transfer program in Brazil”. Publius, vol. 43, no1, pp. 25-51.	Social policy diffusion	Federal and municipal governments	Vertical and horizontal intergovernmental institutions

Government Period (party of the president)	Presidential coalition†	Party of the president	Parties in Coalition	% of seats in the lower chamber		Decentralizing law ordered by date of proposal (proponent)	Decentralizing law ordered by date of approval
				Party of the president	Coalition
1983-1988	Autocratic governments	---	---	---	---	Passos Porto Amdt (PDS), Calmon Amdt (PDS), Airton Sandoval Amdt (MDB)	Passos Porto Amdt, Calmon Amdt, Airton Sandoval Amdt
1988-1990 (PMDB)	Sarney 2	PMDB	PMDB-PFL	41,4	63,03	LDB (PSDB)* Camata Law (PMDB), Law 8080 (Executive)	---
1990-1992 (PRN)	Collor 1	PRN	PRN-PFL	5,1	33,94	---	---
	Collor 2	PRN	PRN-PFL-PDS	6,1	34,59	Law 8142 (Executive)	Law 8142
	Collor 3	PRN	PRN-PFL-PDS	8	34,59	Amdt 15/96 (PFL)	Camata Law, Law 8080
	Collor 4	PRN	PRN-PFL-PDS-PTB-PL	6,2	43,54	---	---
1992-1944 (No party)	Franco 1	No party	PFL-PTB-PMDB-PSDB-PSB	---	60	---	---
	Franco 2	No party	PFL-PTB-PMDB-PSDB-PP	---	59,64	---	---
	Franco 3	No party	PFL-PMDB-PSB-PP	---	55,27	---	---
1995-1998 (PSDB)	Cardoso I 1	PSDB	PSDB-PFL-PMDB-PTB	12,5	56,14	Amdt 10/96 (Executive), Amdt 5/95 (Executive), Amdt 20/98 (Executive), Amdt 19/98 (Executive), Amdt 14/96 (Executive), Amdt 41/03 (PCB)*, Amdt 29/00 (PSDB), Amdt 34/01 (PCB)	Amdt 5/95, Amdt 10/96
1995-1998 (PSDB)	Cardoso I 2	PSDB	PSDB-PFL-PMDB-PTB-PPB	16,6	77,19	Kandir Law (PSDB), Amdt 30/00 (PSDB), Amdt 53/06 (PL)*, Amdt 25/00 (PPB)	LDB, Amdt 14/96, Amdt 15/96, Kandir Law, Amdt 19/98, Amdt 20/98
1998-2002 (PSDB)	Cardoso II 1	PSDB	PSDB-PFL-PMDB-PPB	18,3	73,88	LRF (Executive), CFL (Executive), Amdt 27/00 (Executive), Amdt 31/00 (PFL)	LRF, CFL, Amdt 25/00, Amdt 27/00, Amdt 29/00, Amdt 30/00, Amdt 31/00, Amdt 34/01
1998-2002 (PSDB)	Cardoso II 2	PSDB	PSDB-PMDB-PPB	18,2	45,22	Amdt 39/02 (PDT)*	Amdt 39/02
2003-2007 (PT)	Lula I 1	PT	PT-PL-PCB-PSB-PTB-PDT-PPS-PV	18	42,88	Amdt 51/06 (PT), Amdt41/03 (Executive), Amdt 42/03 (Executive)	Amdt 41/03, Amdt 42/03
	Lula I 2	PT	PT-PL-PCB-PSB-PTB-PPS-PV-PMDB	17,7	62,38	Amdt 47/05 (PT), Amdt 58/07 (Executive)	---
	Lula I 3	PT	PT-PL-PCB-PSB-PTB-PV-PMDB	17,7	57,7	---	Amdt 47/05
	Lula I 4	PT	PT-PL-PCB-PSB-PTB-PMDB	17,7	58,28	---	---
	Lula I 5	PT	PT-PL-PCB-PSB-PTB-PP-PMDB	17,7	69,59	---	Amdt 53/06, Amdt 51/06, Amdt 55/07

	Formal initiative to create the forum	Instrument of formal creation	Who proposes	Output of meetings	Binding decisions	Type of interaction
CNE	Central gvt	Presidential decree/ Complementary law	Education Ministry	Recommendations	No	Top-Down
CONFAZ	Central gvt	Presidential decree/ Complementary law	Finance Ministry	Agreements	Yes	Top-Down
CAF	Central gvt	Presidential decree/ Complementary law	Presidential Office	Agreements	Yes	Top-Down
CIT	Central gvt	Ministerial directive	Health Ministry	Agreements	Yes	Top-Down
CIB	Subnational gvt	Ministerial directive	States and Municipalities	Agreements	Yes	Bottom-Up

Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos (IESP) da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ) R. da Matriz, 82, Botafogo, 22260-100 Rio de Janeiro RJ Brazil, Tel. (55 21) 2266-8300, Fax: (55 21) 2266-8345 - Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brazil
E-mail: dados@iesp.uerj.br

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