La política de gestión de aguas residuales industriales en Yogyakarta, Indonesia: posibilidades para Controlar la contaminación industrial

Meilasari-Sugiana, Astrid

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Original Article • Ambient. soc. 24 • 2021 • https://doi.org/10.1590/1809-4422asoc20190260r1vu2021L4AO copiar

La política de gestión de aguas residuales industriales en Yogyakarta, Indonesia: posibilidades para Controlar la contaminación industrial

Autoría SCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

Resumen

El desarollo industrial es importante para la economia. Demasiada competicion sobre menguante agua fresca y el crecimiento de las industrias pequenas sin control de la polucion demonstra que es necesario para mejorar la institucion que manejar aguas residuales. Este investigacion investiga la aceptabilidad de la institucion y la efectividad de la instrumenta para manejar aguas residuales con estudio de caso. Esta investigacion utilisa el muestreo deliberado (purposive sampling). El resultado demonstra que ahi esta demasiada enfasis en medidas prescriptivas y pequena cooperacion y coordinacion. Es muy importante para diferenciar la regulacion y instrumentos economicos adoptados, para reducir los permisos y para introducir incentivos en la formacion de estados industriales. A traves de la programa que se llama rio limpio (Clean River Program), el gobierno puede supervisar y publicar la polucion en los periodicos.

Palabras-clave:
Gestion de aguas residualis industrial; arreglos institucionales; medidas regulatorias; instrumentos economicos; participacion deliberada

No	Programs	Lead Agency	Supporting Agency
1	Mentoring and Consultation on Management and Production (Capacity Building)	Provincial Chamber of Commerce and Industry	-----
2	Monitoring the Quantity and Quality of River Water Across Jurisdictions	Department of Public Health	Municipal and Provincial Environmental Impact Management Agency
3	Mentoring and Consultation on End of Pipe Technology and Waste Emission Prevention	Provincial and Municipal Environmental Impact Management Agency	Chamber of Commerce and Industry Municipal Government
4	Disclosure and Discussion with the Public and Surrounding Communities	Provincial Environmental Impact Management Agency	Chamber of Commerce and Industry
5	Subsidy for Wastewater Treatment Tank and Pipe Facilities	Provincial and Municipal Environmental Impact Management Agency	Municipal Government
6	Low Interest Loan for Construction of Common Production House and Wastewater Treatment	Provincial Government	Chamber of Commerce and Industry Provincial Environmental Impact Management Agency
7	The PROKASIH Clean River Program	Provincial Environmental Impact Management Agency	Chamber of Commerce and Industry Municipal Environmental Impact Management Agency
8	Environmentally Friendly Investments and Production Process	Chamber of Commerce and Industry	Provincial Environmental Impact Management Agency Provincial Investment Coordinating Board
9	Wastewater Discharge Permits and Taxes	The Municipal Government	Chamber of Commerce and Industry

No	Lack of Clarity in Present Regulatory Framework and Programs
1	The function of the Nuisance (HO) Permit: A legal instrument directed for integrated environmental management or simply an instrument to ensure approval from surrounding community and to establish agreement to minimize potential nuisances?
2	The function of Ministerial Decision No10/1994 concerning the Letter of Intent (SPPL) for implementing Environmental Management and Monitoring Plans is inconceivable and useless since enterprises will have to submit an Environmental Management and Monitoring Plan anyways.
3	Lack of clarity in the intent of Governor’s Decision No 214/1991 concerning Water Quality Standards: to set ambient water quality standards for different water bodies or to set effluent discharge standards at certain locations?
4	Provincial Regulation No 3/1997 concerning the Environmental Management and Monitoring Plans (RKL/RPL) for Wastewater Discharge.
5	Article 5 of Presidential Decree No 53/1989 dictates that no permit will be issued until after approval of the Environmental Management and Monitoring Plans (RKL/RPL). However, Article 5 is not specific about which permits it applies to.
6	The mentoring and consultation program on industrial pollution control and end of pipe treatment for micro, small and medium industries contain straightforward statement of the target, but lack clear guidance to follow.
7	Public health mentoring and consultation program for micro, small and medium enterprises aiming to control industrial pollution and promote end of pipe treatment simply prescribe in vague terms some desired future state of task and lack clear guidance for implementors to follow when concerned with pollution control and end of pipe treatment.

No	Inconsistencies and Conflicts among Objectives
1	Policy to increase the welfare of low-income groups by promoting home industries could be conflicting without adequate mentoring for implementation of end of pipe technology and sustainable land use planning.
2	Legal directives which give the sectoral ministries and departments the supreme power to execute and enforce environmental regulations could be in conflict with Presidential Decree No 77/1994 which gives the Environmental Impact Management Agency power to coordinate the formulation, monitoring and enforcement of environmental laws for increased integration and effectiveness.
3	In the absence of adequate land use and zoning policies, programs to promote small and micro enterprises could be in conflict with the Provincial Planning and Development Agency to promote zoning for micro, small and medium industries.
4	Mentoring by the Chamber of Commerce to promote increased production among micro and small enterprises while maintaining lenient corporate environmental management is in conflict with Ministerial Decision No 10/1994 on RKL and RPL and effluent and water quality standards.
5	The program to fully subsidize the construction of wastewater treatment tanks for micro and small industries is in conflict with legal directives to incorporate economic instruments for internalizing environmental costs.

No	Factors Constraining Coordination Procedures and Mechanisms
1	The combination of vertical and segmented-sectoral oriented approach in the bureaucratic public administration systems hinder coordination efforts at the provincial and municipal level and increase conflicts in the permitting system.
2	Because major initiatives for planning the development budget were made by the national-sectoral agencies, planning at the provincial and municipal levels became largely a matter of formulating specific plans to meet nationally determined goals.
3	Limited time allotted for the process of consultation and negotiation.
4	Heavy reliance on oral communication which caused problems of ineffective exchanges of information, consultation, collaboration and negotiation among agencies.
5	Inadequate budget and incapacity of municipal government agencies to provide information.
6	Difficulties in seeking common ground for clarifying responsibilities and resolving interagency conflicts, a particular party often use legal instruments for supporting its interests which are inconsistent with the legal and institutional framework underlying the other parties.
7	Coordination meetings for consensus making are often attended by representatives who do not possess authority for decision making on behalf of their agencies.
8	Semi-autonomous agencies such as the Environmental Impact Management Agency and the Provincial Investment Coordinating Board have inadequate power to influence sectoral agencies to participate in coordination since they have no control over sectoral budget and resource allocation.
9	Lack of adequate information and evidence over environmental issues.
	Factors Enhancing Coordination Procedures and Mechanisms
10	Legitimization for coordination among sectoral project proposals under the National and Provincial Development Budget imposed by the central and provincial government.
11	Gradual improvement of procedures made by the central and provincial government to accommodate provincial and local needs.
12	Opportunities given to related agencies within and among levels to meet together to exchange information, solicit others’ views, resolve conflicts and have discussions to search for common ground.
13	The need to clarify overlapping responsibilities and seek common ground for resolving conflicts of objectives and interests.
14	Presence of skillful actors who can bridge the gaps among agencies such as the mayors, district heads, governors and staffs from the Provincial Planning and Development Board (Bappeda).

No	*Progress in the Institutionalization of EIA and LCA (AMDAL)*
1	The intent of the EIA and LCA has shifted to provide a comprehensive project planning process.
2	Central EIA Commissions have been established in 14 departments (including the Ministry of Industries) with technical teas and working groups to assist with project reviews.
3	A representative from BAPEDALDA or the Environmental Impact Mitigation Agency chairs the Provincial EIA Commissions established by the governor of each province.
4	The formulation of laws and regulations to integrate EIA and LCA into the system of permits and licenses.
5	BAPEDALDA or the Environmental Impact Mitigation Agency is responsible for overall EIA and LCA policies, coordination and quality control in the provincial level, thus having the authority to formulate budget proposals for EIA and LCA activities in the province.
6	Strategies for the Evaluation of Environmental Impacts (SEMDAL) for investment activities prior to the incorporation of EIA and LCA have been revised and incorporated to complement the EIA and LCA.

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[1] Astrid Meilasari-Sugiana ✉ astrid.sugiana@bakrie.ac.id