

Negotiated division: the debates about Paraná province and the Imperial representative system, 1843¹

A emancipação negociada: os debates sobre a criação da província do Paraná e o sistema representativo imperial, 1843

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RESUMO

A criação de novas unidades administrativas no Brasil Império raramente é utilizada como ferramenta para se entender a dinâmica político-econômica do período. Entretanto, a análise dos documentos produzidos pelos ricos debates parlamentares em torno desse tema demonstra que essa prática precisa ser revista, uma vez que a reorganização do território envolvia mais do que simplesmente emancipar extensões de terras: significava proceder a alterações fundamentais no funcionamento do sistema político do país. Neste sentido, o processo de emancipação da quinta comarca de São Paulo, futura província do Paraná, é emblemático, por trazer à tona elementos importantes para o entendimento dessa dinâmica. Questões como a sobrevivência da nova unidade administrativa, a perda de população e renda por parte de São Paulo, as relações nem sempre pacíficas entre as províncias e a posição do governo central nesse contexto estiveram colocadas em foco todo o tempo.

Palavras-chave: Paraná; Parlamento; Império.

ABSTRACT

The creation of new provinces in the Empire of Brazil is rarely used as a tool for understanding the dynamics of politics and economy of this period. However, the analysis of the documents produced during the rich parliamentary debates about this question demonstrates the need to revise this practice, because territorial reorganization included more than political emancipation. It meant implementing some very important changes in the running of the country's political system. In this context, the emancipation of the fifth *comarca* of São Paulo, the future province of Paraná, is important because it highlights elements which help to understand these dynamics. Questions like the survival of the new province, the loss of population and revenue by São Paulo, the conflictual relations between provinces, and the official position of the central government, were in focus during all this process.

Keywords: Paraná State; Parliament; Empire.

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On 12 April 1843, Deputy Joaquim José Pacheco, a representative of São Paulo, presented to the Chamber of Deputies a request for information from the government. He asked that the House be sent all the documents and clarifications possible about the intention of the ‘peoples’ of the *comarca* (a, political, administrative, and judicial district) of Curitiba to be politically emancipated from São Paulo. Also requested was data about the population of that territory, its population and boundaries, with the intention of better informing the parliamentarians about the need to grant – or refuse – its elevation to the category of province (Anais, 12 April 1843, p.767).

This marked the start of the long and bitter debate about the creation of the province of Curitiba. It would take ten years for this decision making process to be completed, when the region – now with its name altered to Paraná – achieved its separation from São Paulo. In 1843, however, it was one of the principal themes of the parliamentary legislature, capable of mobilizing deputies completely, who took positions in favor of and against the measure, thereby forcing the Saquarema administration to clearly position itself on the question. As in the case of the *Comarca* of Rio Negro – whose political emancipation had been approved at the beginning of these discussions –, what was in play was more than the creation of a new administrative unit. Distinct projects of state, as well as the relationship between the center of power and the peripheral regions of the Empire, and also between the latter, were all debated.

However, more than this was involved. The 1843 debates about the elevation of Curitiba *comarca* provoked a situation of extreme tension in a legislature which, as mentioned, was marked by a large conservative majority. At stake was something which led parliamentarians aligned to this party to oppose the position assumed by the Saquarema group in relation to this question. A profound division opened in the São Paulo delegation in the Chamber of Deputies, however without removing from this the political force necessary to postpone the question indefinitely – going against the directives of the conservative cabinet.

Analyzing the debates about the political emancipation of the Fifth *comarca* of São Paulo signifies studying a moment in which the imperial representative system was fully functioning. In which, in the calculation of many parliamentarians, political alignment was reduced to a second level, being overlooked in favor of other interests and projects judged to be more important. In other words, it means analyzing a privileged theme to understand how the Brazilian state was being constructed in the middle of the nineteenth

century. This is because, with a still greater intensity in the case of the creation of the Province of Rio Negro, it was capable of causing behavior that appeared nothing like what was expected from an assembly formed by a virtual unanimity of members aligned with a political group which had a well-defined position about what was being proposed.

The context in which this process occurred also contributed to increase its importance. In this particular case, something that acquires greater importance is the fact that less than a year previously the *Paulista* liberals had been militarily defeated, after starting a reaction to the political movement known as *Regresso*. According to Divonzir Beloto, João da Silva Machado was given responsibility for the mission of 'pacifying' the *comarca* which, however, had still not rebelled. Sent to Curitiba at the beginning of 1842, he immediately established contacts with the local liberals. The motive was the possibility that this group was the most willing to support their fellow Sorocaba supporters and the *Farrapos*, as a possible strategy to put the central government in difficulty, then run by the *Squaremas* (Beloto, 1990, p.60-68).

Knowing that the emancipation of the *comarca* was one of the principal demands of this group, Machado quickly proposed an agreement. If the *comarca* remained calm and did not support either of the two armed revolts, the Baron of Monte Alegre (José da Costa Carvalho), who had just assumed the position of President of the Province of São Paulo, would personally intercede with the minister for its elevation to the status of province.

Actually, Curitiba *Comarca* did not offer any support to the armed movements, with the Sorocaba Rising being rapidly suppressed by the *legalista* forces. Nevertheless, this did not signify that the region was not agitated, nor that it did not threaten to support the *Paulista* liberals. According to correspondence sent by João da Silva Machado to the President of São Paulo:

I will report to Your Excellency with minute detail what has been occurring in this *comarca*. The news of the rebellion in Sorocaba spilt confusion here as it arrived jointly with the 1st Proclamation, order, and various letters. As a result nocturnal meetings were held, some wanting separation, nominating a president, others a provisional government with three members, others finally I do not know what. Until the Chamber met to empower the police. This was when fortunately those letters arrived which Your Excellency sent through the navy with such speed. With there being one for Lieutenant Colonel Miguel Marques dos Santos, who was here showed its contents to the Chamber, and in addition to the recommendation of the order, assured for them the separation of the *comarca*,

raising it to a province, they were satisfied and their mutiny ended... The decision of this man [Colonel Balduino] in favor of Legality disarmed the *luzida rapaziada* [gallant lads] of Ponta Grossa who had their heads raised and were willing to play all their cards and I know all those in the *comarca* and my friend Cunha, from Lapa, were afraid. So, the *comarca* was saved, which was so close to rebelling, but now it seems secure... I have given my word that Curitiba will have to be raised to a Province, and thus Your Excellency will not disappoint me.²

In turn, the Baron of Monte Alegre also fulfilled his promise, sending on 30 July 1842, an official letter to the Minister of the Empire, Cândido José de Araújo Viana, asking for the *Comarca* of Curitiba to be raised to provincial status. According to the president of São Paulo, one of the principal reasons which justified the adoption of this measure was based on

The danger that there would be, the longer these representations go unanswered; in the perpetual fears which the government has of each small commotion which appears in the Empire, whose movement the *comarca* agitates and follows, due to the dislike of not meriting the attention of their long manifested desires; in the proportions which this state of things offers every revolutionary or demagogue to involve in their plans of disorganization of a very interesting country at all times, and which still is on, much closer to what is in the province of Rio Grande do Sul.³

But it was not only the fear that the *comarca* would rebel which moved José da Costa Carvalho. Later in his letter, the president of São Paulo mentions that the region was already ready to be raised to a province, referring in support of this affirmation to its population, the ease with which its indigenous population could be civilized, and its general and provincial revenue. Furthermore, it was a frontier region, located far from the center of *Paulista* power, which made its administration difficult. In relation to the capital of the new administrative unit, Monte Alegre understood that it was located in the city of Curitiba, “located in the *Comarca* and for this reason, reachable by the other points in it” (Beloto, 1990, p.65-68). It is useful to perceive here that the arguments used until then by the president of the province of São Paulo would be used almost in their entirety by deputies defending this measure in the Chamber, around a year later.

The fact that the government needed to negotiate with part of the elite of Curitiba *comarca* – in the case the liberals from the region – shows the force that these groups could have if they were in a favorable situation Suddenly

placed between two embarrassments for the Saquarema administration, they won, with just the possibility of supporting these uprisings, the promise that one of their principal demands would be met. However, there was still the problem that in the logic of the imperial representative system, it was not enough for the central government to support a measure for it to be adopted. The approval of parliament was also needed, which did not fail to discuss the agreement made in Curitiba, almost always criticizing or denying its importance, as will be seen below.

THE PRESENTATION OF TWO COMPLEMENTARY PROJECTS: THE POLITICAL EMANCIPATION OF CURITIBA AND THE ANNEXATION OF SAPUCAÍ TO SÃO PAULO

Another deputy from São Paulo, Carlos Carneiro de Campos, was responsible for justifying a project to raise the *comarca* of Curitiba to the *status* of province in a session on 29 April 1843 – a little more than two weeks after the request for information made by Joaquim José Pacheco. In the reasoning he presented to justify his bill, Carneiro de Campos offered his colleagues what would come to be the basis of the arguments favorable to the adoption of this measure (Anais, 29 abr. 1843, p.982-984).

In first place, he used an idea which had been widely in the successful demand for the creation of the province of Rio Negro: the distance which separated the territory to be emancipated from the provincial capital. Although he saw this element as representing a serious obstacle to the proper administration of the region, he stated that for him, this in itself was not sufficient to justify the creation of a new administrative unit in the Empire. He said that was because although he was requesting measures that would reduce its losses, there were in the Empire various locations which were also far from any center of power, and which nevertheless were not in the case of being raised to the category of province. Other factors had to be added to this for a policy of such a size to be adopted. Which, in the understanding of the deputy, occurred in the case of the *comarca* of Curitiba.

In other words, the *comarca* had a sufficient population (around 60,000 inhabitants, according to Carneiro de Campos), a fertile territory capable of offering production more than sufficient to maintain the new administrative apparatus, and the potential for economic growth. Arguments which were undoubtedly quite differentiated, if taken along with those used to justify the

emancipation of the *comarca* of Rio Negro, a few weeks previously. There the great distance from the center of power was also an important factor, but the lack of a civilized population – with the consequent need to increase it –, and the progressive weakening of an already fragile economy, served to point towards the creation of the province as the most correct decision to be made.

However, after this distancing of the two cases, there rapidly emerged among Carneiro de Campos' justifications a new argument which brought them together again: the need to counter the disorders caused by armed movements. While in the justification of the creation of the province of Amazonas this measure was presented as capable of helping in the pacification of the areas hit by the *Cabanagem* and to avoid the repetition of this movement, in the case of the emancipation of Curitiba the element which gained force was its proximity to Rio Grande do Sul, large enough to result in, if nothing was done, the overflowing of its conflicts to other regions of the country:

I will finally note that the position of the *comarca* of Curitiba has always been sensitive to the existence of the disorders of Rio Grande; it has given care to the provincial and general administration of that part of the Empire. It has often been sought to introduce the ideas of the rebellion of Rio Grande in that place, also trying, fortunately unsuccessfully, to afflict the spirits of its inhabitants; thus, its proximity to the province of Rio Grande requires that the action of the government be better seated there, not only so that it can more effectively repel these attempts, but also so that the authorities of Curitiba can more immediately take advantage in favor of the public order of those resources found in the *comarca*. (Anais, 29 abr. 1843, p.983)

It was not enough to deploy a military force to the region. It was necessary to present the local elite with the means to use the resources available in the *comarca* and invest them 'in favor of public order,' which meant creating a police force, strengthening the national guard, and carrying out public works capable of facilitating the use of the fertile soil of the region, propelling the virtues of economic growth which the *comarca* possessed. In order to achieve these objectives, political emancipation emerged as a necessary condition, since it would give rise to a Legislative Assembly which, in accordance with the determinations of the Additional Act, would have the necessary autonomy to implement taxes and use the revenues from this for the development of the province.

However, this was not the only bill submitted by this parliamentarian. In a possible strategy to compensate São Paulo's loss of one of its most important

comarcas, Carneiro de Campos proposed that part of the territory of Minas Gerais be annexed to this province. As happened with other regions in the province, the *comarca* of Sapucaí was submitted to the spiritual authority of the *Paulista* bishop, thereby creating an overlapping of jurisdictional spheres which in the deputy's opinion needed to be resolved. Actually the problem was so serious that it had been the subject of a report presented in 1837 by the president of Minas, Antônio da Costa Pinto, to the provincial legislative assembly:

In the province there are 128 parishes; 93 are staffed, 33 have asked for parish priests; 93 form the bishopric of Mariana; one belongs to Rio de Janeiro; 4 to Goiás; 6 to Pernambuco; 9 to São Paulo; and 15 to the archbishopric of Bahia. It is worth reminding you gentlemen of the convenience of our diocese having the same limits as our province.⁴

Added to this was the idea that the region was closer to the capital of São Paulo than of Minas – Ouro Preto –, allowing Carneiro de Campos to justify his proposal (Anais, 29 abr. 1843, p.983). In this way he sought to minimize the opposition of the *Paulista* caucus to the emancipation of Curitiba, which he certainly knew was enormous. It was a strategy which nevertheless resulted in the postponement of this measure for ten years, by calling down on it the ill will of the *Mineira* caucus at the same time that he failed to convince the other *Paulista* deputies to accept the dismemberment of their province.

It was necessary to wait exactly one month until the elevation of the fifth *comarca* of São Paulo to enter into discussion. Rapidly two groups of deputies were formed who proposed to talk about the question. Eight spoke against the proposal in the first phase of debates – José Manoel da Fonseca, Joaquim Otávio Nébias and Joaquim Firmino Pereira Jorge, all deputies from São Paulo; Venâncio Henriques de Rezende, Francisco de Paula Cândido and João Antunes Correia, representatives of Minas Gerais; Joaquim Manoel Carneiro da Cunha, a deputy from Paraíba; and Ângelo Muniz da Silva Ferraz, elected for Bahia –, against three who spoke in favor – Carlos Carneiro de Campos and Joaquim José Pacheco, deputies from São Paulo, and Bernardo Jacinto da Veiga, representative of Minas Gerais. The latter also received support from a speech given by the Minister of the Navy, Joaquim José Rodrigues Torres. Voting indicated, however, that at least momentarily the majority of deputies were favorable to the approval of the project. Once again, the 1843 Conservative Congress found itself divided while debating the creation of a new province.

THE BEGINNING OF THE DEBATES AND THE SPLIT IN THE *PAULISTA* CAUCUS

The bill for the political emancipation of the *comarca* of Rio Negro, which had been debated at various moments between 1826 and 1843, received unanimous support from the representatives of the province to be dismembered – *Grão-Pará* or Greater Pará – and the parliamentarians who had presided it.⁵ Actually during the decision making process in the Chamber of Deputies, these deputies formulated and presented the bill twice – in 1826 and in 1839, offering their peers the greater quantity of arguments favorable to the measure, and to systematically refute the objections which emerged during the debates. In the case of the elevation of the *comarca* of Curitiba to a province, the exact opposite occurred. Although the bill was written and supported by some of the São Paulo representatives, other deputies from this province offered a very bitter resistance to its disposition. Which necessarily provokes the questioning about the reasons which explain this difference in behavior between the two groups directly affected by the proposals.

Some elements which can help to resolve this problem are present in the speeches of the parliamentarians involved in the debates. In the decision making process about the political emancipation of the Rio Negro *comarca*, there constantly appeared in the speeches of the deputies from Pará the idea that the measure was the best remedy for a series of problems afflicting the region. Among these were: the distance separating it from the closet center of power – Belém; the difficulty of administering the territory, as a result of this distance; the difficulty of pacifying the entire province, still the victim of the *Cabanagem* fighting; the emaciation of commerce, industry, and as a result of this the finances of the *comarca* – whose revenues did not reflect its economic potential; the lack of a population which could occupy it satisfactorily; and the need to strengthen the external frontiers of the region.

Some of these elements can also be applied in the case of Curitiba, albeit with contestations. In this case these included were the existence of external frontiers which needed to be strengthened, the distance which separated the *comarca* from the provincial capital, and the need to deal with an armed movement in the proximities of the region. However, others were offered in a form that was completely inverted in the *Paulista comarca*, even from the point of view of those who defended its emancipation. In addition to Carneiro de Campos, Joaquim José Pacheco, another *Paulista* representative favorable to emancipation, stated:

if memories or anything written about this is resorted to, it can be seen that the *comarca* has a sufficient population to be raised to a province. Those who propose this idea say that the *comarca* has 70,000 inhabitants or more; however, we can concede that it has 60, 50,000 souls, I understand that in this case the *comarca* should still be raised to a province. (Anais, 2 jun. 1843, p.474)

It is difficult to know for certain the real size of the population of the *comarca*, due to the well-known imprecisions existing in the surveys made at the time. However, Table 1 allows us have an approximate idea of their numbers, once care is taken to consider it only as an indicative tool, since the only sources which allowed its construction are subject to a series of factors which hinder their precision:

Table 1 – Population of Curitiba *comarca*, 1721-1854

Year	Population (number of people)
1721	3,400
1772	7,627
1800	21,843
1816	27,097
1822	32,678
1836	42,890
1847	47,950
1854	62,258

Source: Beloto, 1990, p.80.

In relation to the Curitiba economy, Pacheco again agreed with the opinion of Carneiro de Campos, offering precise numbers for this:

I am persuaded that we all know what is the general and provincial revenue of the *comarca* of Curitiba; the general revenue for the customs of Paranaguá is for some years 60:000\$ or more, and the provincial revenues cannot be ignored by any of the illustrious deputies from São Paulo who are opposed to the bill ... they must have seen that the *comarca* of Curitiba has earned annually in animal tolls from 100 to 120 *contos de réis*, and even now, with the disorders of Rio Grande do Sul, this tax has never been less than 70 to 80 *contos de réis*; this is the principal revenue of the *comarca*, and so we can consider that that *comarca* currently has a

revenue of 100 to 120 *contos*, with the expectation to earn much more. (Anais, 2 jun. 1843, p.474-475)

The veracity of these statements and the great importance of Curitiba *comarca* for the São Paulo province are indicated by the fact that they were not contested by opponents of emancipation, but rather were used to argue against the adoption of the measure. José Manuel da Fonseca, also a São Paulo deputy, and one of those most resistant to dismemberment, stated:

However, if you confess that Curitiba *comarca* prospers so much, that its revenues and its population have increased under the government it has, why change this government? ... I do not know, Mr. President, why we should prefer a large province to two small ones: São Paulo only in exceptional circumstances pays for its general expenditure: after subdividing the province, how will it do this? Will the new province do this? Having one province which costs the Treasury nothing, we would prefer two living at the cost of the Union, at the cost of the Treasury? (Anais, 30 maio 1843, p.414)

Fonseca was seconded by his colleague, also a São Paulo representative, Joaquim Otávio Nébias. According to this deputy, the provincial revenues had surpluses solely due to the money collected at the Rio Negro crossing, located on the frontier between Curitiba *comarca* and the province of Santa Catarina. Removing from *Paulistas* this source of revenue would therefore be disastrous, since the provincial tax collection was already continually falling, which meant that its administration had to constantly use reserve capital. Emancipating Curitiba in this way signified reducing São Paulo, according to this deputy, to a “mendicant province” (Anais, 31 maio 1843, p.440).

For the *Paulista* deputies opposed to the political emancipation of Curitiba, therefore, the province have a lot to lose with this measure. It would lose the transfer of provincial revenues generated from the collection of tolls from the transport of cattle and mules from Rio Grande do Sul to Sorocaba, collected on the Rio Negro crossing; it would lose part of its share of the general revenue, since it would no longer have the Paranaguá customs; and, as will be seen, it would lose part of its political prestige, if the reduction of its territory was followed by a reduction of its representation.

To have an idea of the importance of the revenues from the transport and commerce of mules, the following calculation made by Divonzir Beloto is useful:

in the *comarca*, the mule troops were entered into the Rio Negro Register, upon entering the province. However, the tax was effectively collected in Sorocaba. 3\$500 was paid per mule. Of this, 1\$000 was sent to Rio Grande do Sul. The remaining 2\$500 were provincial revenues. In 1838 32,747 mules were traded, resulting in revenues of 81:869\$950 from the provincial total of 292:701\$359, or 28%. (Beloto, 1990, p.69-70)

The following table, prepared using the São Paulo taxation data, allows a more precise vision of the importance of the do Rio Negro Register for the provincial economy:

Table 2 – Border charges in the province
of São Paulo, 1835-1836 – 1850-1851

Year	Crossing Charge	Rio Negro Register	Exit Tolls	Inheritance tax	Tax on the sale of slaves
1835-36	--	81:869\$950	31:351\$648	28:010\$910	16:475\$977
1836-37	132:236\$697	72:961\$780	49:282\$769	12:580\$340	10:197\$760
1837-38	141:515\$707	133:934\$576	78:597\$267	9:995\$409	5:125\$250
1838-39	67:688\$266	57:748\$671	100:396\$780	20:175\$845	16:727\$246
1839-40	115:325\$227	79:513\$690	93:189\$983	7:113\$828	14:253\$553
1840-41	23:263\$268	56:196\$562	66:999\$977	8:424\$524	18:087\$058
1841-42	129:076\$409	33:438\$480	45:624\$359	9:391\$917	17:710\$592
1842-43	--	52:796\$314	53:071\$675	6:842\$120	15:711\$131
1843-44	--	54:996\$878	58:955\$816	17:295\$790	17:917\$161
1844-45	71:102\$463	31:152\$122	83:107\$403	13:844\$215	19:991\$570
1845-46	182:718\$482	89:033\$000	90:555\$000	21:530\$000	36:195\$000
1846-47	181:883\$389	37:478\$932	96:809\$631	30:166\$390	24:689\$139
1847-48	151:461\$328	38:866\$787	79:954\$088	15:003\$858	21:838\$346
1848-49	109:313\$368	35:280\$560	57:089\$514	14:828\$466	18:936\$674
1849-50	161:035\$229	42:378\$388	81:224\$078	16:658\$583	97\$500
1850-51	148:461\$607	26:692\$533	123:842\$458	17:393\$992	21:931\$577

Source: Costa, 2001.

During the period covered by this data, it can be seen that the tax values from the Rio Negro register always oscillated between the second and third places in importance, reaching their apex in 1837-1838, when river crossing tolls came very close to being the highest source of revenues. However, after 1846 there was a brusque fall in revenue under this heading, which nonetheless did not lead it to lose its third position among the taxes analyzed. It is important to try to understand the reason for this fall, a question which this research cannot explain, since it is outside its scope. What I intend to show with this data is how much revenue São Paulo would lose from the emancipation of its fifth *comarca* and the ending of the transfer of the taxes charged in the Rio Negro Register. Undoubtedly, this fact was an important element in the calculation of the *Paulista* deputies involved in the discussion.

In relation to the dimension of the revenues from the Paranaguá customs, the analysis of Table 3 can provide quite a precise idea of this, as it was prepared with numbers referring to the trade of that port:

Table 3 – Exports and imports from the Curitiba *comarca*, via Paranaguá port, 1842/1843 to 1853/1854 (in thousands of réis)

Year	Exports	Imports
1842-1843	378,579	903,205
1843-1844	–	734,033
1844-1845	396,128	658,964
1845-1846	–	608,084
1846-1847	428,646	804,090
1847-1848	–	1,001,388
1848-1849	808,822	1,020,991
1849-1850	766,209	843,833
1850-1851	648,092	829,592
1851-1852	968,066	1,459,883
1852-1853	629,442	1,348,218
1853-1854	970,189	1,618,198

Source: Beloto, 1990, p.75.

The oscillation in the values related to exports from the *comarca* can, to a great part, be explained by the differences in quantity and in the value of its principal merchandise, erva-mate, as can be seen in Table 4:

Table 4 – *Erva-mate* exports, per *arroba* and price,
via Paranaguá Port, 1842/1843 to 1853/1854

Year	Exports (in <i>arrobas</i>)	Price
1842-1843	155,224	2\$054
1843-1844	141,577	2\$013
1844-1845	176,275	1\$954
1845-1846	150,359	2\$092
1846-1847	183,523	1\$939
1847-1848	283,847	1\$899
1848-1849	372,779	1\$899
1849-1850	351,805	1\$696
1850-1851	335,682	1\$664
1851-1852	473,982	1\$780
1852-1853	307,896	1\$711
1853-1854	466,022	1\$801

Source: Beloto, 1990, p.76.

In periods in which there was a fall in volumes exported and/or prices charged for each *arroba* of *erva-mate* – 1848 until 1851, a year which there was a brief rise, interrupted by a new decline until 1853 – the *comarca*'s export values suffered a corresponding fall, while there was an inverse movement when the product's trade recovered. This indicates the great importance which *erva-mate* had for Curitiba *comarca* and, consequently, for São Paulo, in the years preceding the creation of Paraná province.

This calculation, which seeks to take into account the losses the province would have suffered from dismemberment, apparently did not exist for the deputies from Pará. While Curitiba repeatedly emerged as one of the most important portions of the province of São Paulo, Rio Negro almost always appeared as a remote territory, difficult to administer and control, and with an economy which, although it possessed an enormous potential, was still somewhat incipient. According to these parliamentarians their province would lose nothing with dismemberment. Once, as we have seen, their representation in Parliament was not altered, which they made efforts to guarantee. This did not go unnoticed by José Manuel da Fonseca:

A notable contradiction! The *comarca* of Rio Negro must be a province: and why? Because it has decayed a lot. Curitiba *comarca* must be a province: and why? Because it is flourishing! Rio Negro *comarca* must be raised to a province because its revenues and population are falling, and because it is not well enlightened; Curitiba *comarca* must be raised to a province because it has a lot of revenues and population; it is enlightened, very prosperous!!! I lament that the mania of subdivisions of provinces, done at random, has been entering this house!!! (Anais, 30 maio 1843, p.414)

Nevertheless, what could appear to be a contradiction was explained by the political and administrative functioning of the imperial state. If the role of the provincial legislative assemblies is considered, as proposed by Miriam Dolhnikoff, the creation of a province signified the organization of an autonomous government with the capacity to raise the necessary funds to carry out the development of abandoned territories such as Rio Negro *comarca* (Dolhnikoff, 2005). At the same time, it was justified in the case of territories whose wealth and increase in population gave them the right to administer themselves, taking into account their specific interests, without being submitted to a distant government concerned with other interests, as was the case of São Paulo – whose government was more committed to the expansion of export agriculture than the production of *erva-mate* from Curitiba. In the case of rich regions, it involved meeting the demands of the elite of the territory to be politically emancipated due to what was considered the right to have their own government. In the case of poor regions, it involved the right of meeting the demands of the elite of a territory which had to support a region that had to be subsidized. Going beyond the discourse, the creation of a province and its own government signified, in the two cases, the creation of employment, an important coin of political exchange in the nineteenth century, and the political strengthening of the local elite, which came to have its own representatives in the parliament and, in this case, it did not matter whether the region was rich or poor. From the point of view of the dominant elites in the provinces which suffered dismemberment, the difference in posture between *Paulistas* and *Paraenses* is understandable, due to the differences of the regions to be dismembered. The autonomy conquered under the *Ato Adicional* (Additional Act) made the provincial coffers dependent on the production and circulation of merchandise, as well as other activities carried out in the territory under its jurisdiction. Coffers which financed investments in the province itself. For this

reason, for the *Paulista* elite the loss of Curitiba was unacceptable, since it was an important source of provincial taxes, while for the *Paraense* the loss of Rio Negro did not result in the reduction of provincial tax revenues, due to the previous abandonment of the region. There was also the problems of parliamentary representation. The low population of Rio Negro made it easier for the *Paraense* elite to demand the maintenance of the number of its deputies, creating new representative positions for the new province. However, populous Curitiba, if transformed into a province, would result in a significant loss of population to São Paulo, which feared having the size of its delegation reduced in the General Assembly.

This difference in the perception on the part of the deputies of two similar facts – the dismemberment of the provinces which it was proposed to represent –, is not enough to resolve our question. There also remained the doubts about why the *Paulista* delegation in the Chamber of Deputies was so profoundly divided that its members took diametrically opposing positions, at times based on the same arguments. In this case, the political trajectory of those involved offered elements which allow an explanation to be proposed.

The analysis of the careers of the two São Paulo deputies favorable to the emancipation of Curitiba, Carlos Carneiro de Campos and Joaquim José Pacheco, sheds light on some common points between the two. Both were born in Bahia, having arrived in São Paulo to study Law in Largo de São Francisco. In their judicial careers, Pacheco retired as a judge, while Carneiro de Campos exercised the position of dean of the faculty he had studied in. As politicians, Pacheco had a career which, it can be said, was more modest, being elected as a general deputy for São Paulo in five legislatures – sometimes as a replacement –, and was nominated president of the province of Sergipe, a position he held for almost seven months in 1839. Carneiro de Campos on the other hand was elected general deputy for São Paulo on four opportunities, being nominated Senator for the same province in 1857. Furthermore, he was appointed president of the province of Minas Gerais twice, Minister of Foreign Affairs another three, and Minister of Finance once. He also held the position of president of Banco do Brasil and was appointed to the Council of State. He died with the title of 3rd Viscount Caravelas. Both, therefore, marked their careers with passages in places other than São Paulo, becoming at a determined moment not only provincial politicians, but rather politicians of the Empire as a whole, a fact corroborated by the fact that they were born in a province different from the one they represented in Parliament.

In relation to the analysis of the trajectory of the three São Paulo deputies opposed to the dismemberment of the province, various points in common can also be perceived. José Manuel da Fonseca, Joaquim Otávio Nébias and Joaquim Firmino Pereira Jorge were all born in São Paulo. All graduated in law, with Fonseca doing so in Coimbra. All held the position of general deputy only representing their native natal – Fonseca once, Nébias seven times, and Pereira Jorge three. Fonseca was appointed senator in 1854, also for São Paulo. The only one to hold an extra-provincial position was Nébias, appointed as Minister of Justice for the 1870 conservative cabinet. All three, therefore, represented the province in which they were born, and in general did not exercise political positions elsewhere, with the sole exception of Nébias, who only left São Paulo to serve the imperial administration.

This difference in the careers of the members of the two groups helps to understand why Pacheco and Carneiro de Campos proposed the political emancipation of Curitiba, even though it harmed the province they represented, while Fonseca, Nébias and Pereira Jorge defended at any cost the integrity of their native land. This extract from a speech by José Manuel da Fonseca exemplifies the feeling which could also have moved his other two contemporaries:

I must confess to the Chamber (I do not know if this happens to everyone, though I believe what happens to me is natural for all) that my patriotism was not born in Brazil for the provinces, my patriotism is related to some place, even circumscribed, and from there it goes up, it extends to this whole; the Brazil which I adore... the place in which I was born, where my navel is, where I grew, where I played my childhood games, where all my interests are, and what is more, the people who are dearest to me, deserves the greatest love possible. (Anais, 18 ago. 1843, p.797)

It is possible to raise the hypothesis in this case that the distinct origins and trajectories of these deputies created different visions of the problem. In a parliament where deputies oscillated between representing national and provincial interests, representatives from regions different from those they represented could be willing to sacrifice some provincial interests, while those whose careers were also related to the representation of their native province transformed the interests of this into a higher priority.

INTERPROVINCIAL RELATIONS OF POWER: THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM OF THE EMPIRE PASSES THROUGH CURITIBA

More than the possibility of the creation of a new administrative units in the Empire, the debates about the bill presented by Carlos Carneiro de Campos were an excellent opportunity to discuss various constituent elements of the imperial political system. Among these, one which most mobilized the deputies was the relation of power between the provinces, more specifically between the province of São Paulo and the rest of the country, as well as with its larger and more power neighbor, Minas Gerais.

For the opponents of the political emancipation of Curitiba this measure was merely a strategy to punish São Paulo for the 1842 Revolt. According to this argument, dismemberment would have the dual advantage of showing the other provinces what would happen to those who ‘dared’ oppose the political order, at the same time that it would weaken *Paulista* unity to the point that it would be unable to repeat its error. José Manuel da Fonseca made the following accusation:

It is not distance, Mr. President, it is not revenue, it is not population, none of these things, which gave rise to the bill being discussed and to another two which are in the house, and which separate the north of São Paulo to be annexed to Rio de Janeiro! No, no; it is the revolution which disgracefully appeared in São Paulo last year which gave rise to all of this... some of my compatriots committed a similar error, similar imprudence... there could not be a greater disgrace for a province! It will lose all respect and consideration... (Anais, 9 ago. 1843, p.677)

According to the *Paulista* deputy, the entire process of debate which began with the presentation of the Carneiro de Campos bill, was a theater, a hoax to disguise the punishment of São Paulo province. The fact that it was being discussed without any official information about the *comarca* it was intended to dismember, the concern of the central government in defending the measure, even though it was not obliged to do it, and the existence of two other bills which involved the loss of the province’s territory,⁶ certainly contributed to this feeling. *Paulista* deputy, Joaquim Firmino Pereira Jorge, actually stated that he would vote against this bill with the sole intention of hindering the emergence and passing of others which intended to make ‘new cuts’ from São Paulo (Anais, 19 jun. 1843, p.676).

A central idea of the arguments of the *Paulista* deputies who were opposed to the creation of Curitiba province was the concept of *political consideration*. According to them, the 1842 Revolt – added to the punishment that it was intended to be imposed for the event – would lead to a political weakening of São Paulo, which would in this way no longer be one of the principal provinces of the Empire. The relationship between this territory and political power was direct. Pereira Jorge stated the following:

The noble deputy says that the question of the division of the territory should not be entered into. However, does part of the territory not bring with it part of the population, and does part of the population not bring with part of the revenue? Furthermore, will the province not lose in political consideration? I believe if we accept this coup and the others that have been proposed, and I cannot guarantee that they will not pass, because I see influential people interested in this, so I ask: will São Paulo province not lose much of its category? Will it not lose in consideration? (Anais, 2 jun. 1843, p.478)

Losing *political consideration*, in the view of these representatives, meant losing the power to defend their own interests in a political system which used representation as an important motor to make decisions and to formulate public policies. Removing part of the territory of São Paulo would cause the weakening of its political elites – the same ones who had provoked the 1842 movement –, making their future opposition to the decisions of the central government more difficult.

This was a strong argument among the São Paulo representatives, causing people born in other provinces, such as the *Mineiro* João Evangelista de Negreiros Sayão Lobato, Viscount Sabará, to enthusiastically support it. Holding a seat in the Chamber of Deputies on a provisional basis – he was elected as a replacement for São Paulo and substituted, during part of the debates, João Carlos Pereira de Almeida Torres, Viscount Macaé –, he formulated in very wide terms the problem of the weakening of the *Paulista* province:

it would be very good... if there were a new division of territory in Brazil, so that all provinces were represented in this house by an equal number of deputies. However, I ask, will this be possible? Of course not. Will passing the bill which raises Curitiba *comarca* to a province achieve this effect? Of course not; to the contrary, the opposite will appear; and why? Because São Paulo province, which is now among the most important, and for this to some extent has an equilibrium

with Pernambuco, Bahia, and Minas, will be reduced to a much lower scale, with a much smaller number of representatives. (Anais, 11 ago. 1843, p.703)

In this logic, the *political consideration*, or better the *political importance*, of a province can be understood as the amount of representation it had in the imperial parliament. The larger the number of representatives and, thus, the capacity of a determined provinces – and their political elites – to impose their interests in the parliamentary arena, the greater was their *political consideration*. Reducing the *importance* of São Paulo could prove disastrous, since it would increase still further the preponderance of some provinces over the rest.

According to this argument, provincial groups acted in Parliament according to the interests of the elites who elected them, converting the representative system into a struggle in which the number of deputies – and their capacity to weave alliances – determined the winners and losers. Representatives of the smaller provinces could only align themselves with one of the disputing sides in order to meet, in the best form possible, their most immediate needs. These units of lesser *political consideration* did not have sufficient power to influence the imperial policy in a decisive form.

There was another interpretation of the how the imperial representative system worked. Carlos Carneiro de Campos expressed this in the following terms:

the union of the Empire cannot be maintained by the dominion of one province over another. If I were persuaded that there would have to be political preponderance among provinces, I as a deputy should be the first to seek to undo this political preponderance... For this reason, if the idea of political preponderance was presented to combat the bill, I am thankful because it supports it: I do not want it, I want political equality: *I believe that we are here deputies of the Empire, and not of certain provinces* (applause). I cannot recognize as a benefit that certain provinces present themselves as causing fear or envy in others. (Anais, 19 jun. 1843, p.678, italics added)

General deputies, therefore, were not responsible for acting motivated by the interests of the provinces which elected them. In this way the dilemma about representing a specific region or an entire nation resurfaces. The debates about the emancipation of Curitiba show that there was still no consensus about which form of representation was most desired or which should in fact prevail. Those defending the measure showed the benefits it would bring for the entire country, such as the defense of external frontiers, greater support for the repression of the Farroupilha Revolt, and the greater development of a large region. On the other hand, those opposed thought predominantly in

terms of harm to the province of São Paulo, even this could occasionally have disastrous consequences for the Empire as a whole— such as the breaching of the parliamentary equilibrium and the increase in the expenditure of the General Treasury.

Independent of the interpretation given to the imperial political system, the fact is that, although ideally all deputies defended a wider territorial reorganization, capable of covering all of the Brazilian empire and equaling the *political consideration* of all provinces, in 1843 bills were discussed which aimed at only dismembering two specific *comarcas*. This did not go unperceived by parliamentarians such as Joaquim Otávio Nébias, who stated that although the Empire was badly divided, the *lightning bolt of division* had only fallen on the provinces of São Paulo and Grão-Pará – nevertheless, the latter was an exceptional case which was not to be taken in to account (Anais, 31 maio 1843, p.439).

However, if territorial division proposals represented a bolt of lightning, these were not scheduled to only fall on São Paulo and Grão-Pará. Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, then Minister of Justice in the Saquarema cabinet, had previously stated that the province of Minas Gerais should be subdivided into at least another three administrative units (Anais, 31 maio 1843, p.436-437). Nevertheless, this did not prevent the fact that only the bills about the political emancipation of Curitiba and Rio Negro were presented to the Chamber of Deputies, which led the deputy from Sergipe José de Barros Pimentel to question the attitude of the central government:

Mr. President, I have discovered in this project for the division of São Paulo an idea that means that I am opposed to it, and that it is not pleasant to those who like the morality of government actions. Having first hypothesized the idea of the division of Minas, the government took no steps to present a bill which we could discuss here; to the contrary, it was avid to fully support the idea of the subdivision of São Paulo; it thus should be now asked what was the reason which caused the government to support one and renounce the other? (Anais, 19 jun. 1843, p.664)

Circulating the corridors of the Chamber of Deputies was an argument that sought to explain this difference in the posture of the central government through the results achieved in recent elections. According to this idea, São Paulo was being divided because it had produced results unfavorable to the Saquarema cabinet, while Minas Gerais was being preserved for the opposite reason (Anais, 19 jun. 1843, p.671). Finally, the explanation which found the

greatest echo, principally among the *Paulista* deputies opposed to the emancipation of Curitiba, placed greater weight on the parliamentary strength of the Minas delegation, which doomed in advance any attempt at dividing the province to failure. Adding a dramatic content to this argument, achieving by resorting to an analogy with the geopolitical situation of the European continent, Joaquim Otávio Nébias stated:

I heard only the noble Minister of Justice [Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão] say that in his opinion the province of São Paulo should be divided in two, while Minas should be divided into three (applause); but they have insisted on the province of São Paulo and no one had the courage to touch the colossus of Brazil (applause); only the poor Poland (which is how I consider the province of São Paulo) is about to be strangled by Russia... (Anais, 31 maio 1843, p.436-437)

The image of the *Mineira* Russia interested in ‘strangling’ the *Paulista* Poland was strengthened, and the presentation of bills for the subdivision of Minas Gerais, with the consequent political weakening of this province, became the necessary counterpoint to the acceptance of the emancipation of Curitiba. To combat this tendency, the *Mineiro* deputy Francisco de Paula Cândido ironically stated the following:

The noble deputy also did not stop clamoring for the division of Minas! Always the division of Minas, Minas is not important. Well, those who so much bristled about the grandeur of Minas why do they not also call for it to be given a seaport? So there is a reason in fearing its preponderance: is by chance a seaport of little interest in the balance of provincial interests? Give it to Minas, and then project the division into as many thousand parts you want. (Anais, 14 ago. 1843, p.736)

The animosity between *Paulista* and *Mineiro* deputies grew rapidly in the wake of the demands of the former for the division of the province the latter represented. José Manuel da Fonseca, most committed to the opposition of the emancipation of Curitiba, sought to take advantage of the situation, by linking this discussion to the annexation of the *Mineira comarca* of Sapucaí by São Paulo. He formulated in this way a strategy which was capable of making the project completely lose the support it had found among the representatives of Minas Gerais. Later this resulted in the indefinite postponement of the bill presented by Carlos Carneiro de Campos, which would only be returned to seven years later in Senate and in a completely different context.

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NOTES

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² Correspondence of João da Silva Machado to the Baron of Monte Alegre, president of the province of São Paulo, 23 June 1842. In: BELOTO, 1990, p.63.

³ Letter from the Baron of Monte Alegre to Cândido José de Araújo Viana, Minister of the Empire, 30 July 1842. In: BELOTO, 1990, p.65.

⁴ Falla dirigida à Assembléa Legislativa Provincial de Minas Gerais na sessão ordinária do ano de 1837 pelo presidente da província, Antônio da Costa Pinto. Ouro Preto: Typ. Do Universal, 1837. p.IV-V.

⁵ This process is looked at in two articles: GREGÓRIO, 2011, and GREGÓRIO, 2011a.

⁶ Joaquim José Rodrigues Torres, future Viscount of Itaboraí, had spoken in the Chamber of Deputies to defend the emancipation of Curitiba *comarca*, although trying to emphasize the fact that neither he nor the government of which he was part were obliged to do this by any agreement supposedly negotiated with the elites of that place. In relation to the territory of São Paulo, what was involved at that moment were representations prepared with the aim of asking for the annexation of the *Paulista* municipalities of Areias and Bananal to the province of Rio de Janeiro.

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