The (In)Tolerance in the Application of Penalties in the Brazilian Public Administration

ABSTRACT

Objective:

the option to enter into a contract for goods and services has been used by the public sector since ancient times, and to improve the productivity of these contracts, the actors involved have resorted to different forms of incentives. In Brazil, the only form of incentive formally admitted is a sanction, but empirical evidence suggests that some types of breaches of contracts have been overcome through negotiation. We intended to identify which factors influence management’s (in)tolerance regarding misconduct in the execution of government contracts/purchases.

Methods:

this was based on multiple case studies, the authors’ reflexivity, and abductive logic for the analysis of interviews with experts in the area, analysis of publications in official journals, internet information, and internal documents in 14 government institutions.

Results:

we present a list of factors that are (in)tolerable by the administration in managing contracts/purchases and their underlying reasons. As a theoretical contribution, this study expands the existing public administration literature by including, innovatively, tolerance theory and misconduct and relating them to administrative contract management.

Conclusions:

having as foremost concern to improve the productivity of administrative contracts, this study clarifies that tolerating can be legitimate and offers measures that can be taken to inhibit the occurrence of misconduct in government procurement and contracting, based on the recommendations of the servants involved in the management of administrative contracts. Still, a research agenda makes proposals for analysis of new factors and explanations eventually not captured in this study.

Keywords:
public administration; administrative sanctions; misconduct; organizational tolerance