Learning by Proustian Signs in a Philosophy of Difference ^{1 2 3}

Abstract

This article proposes to examine the phenomenon of learning through the externality of the serial relations, in order to stress the didactic field beyond the teaching phenomenon, intentional teaching, which takes place in very characteristic and delimited circumstances - which are called school education. Enveloped in this problem of the phenomenon to learn, we will search the book Proust and the signs, in the attempt to catch there as the proustian signs open us differently to the infinitesimal learning by the material and spiritual repetitions differing in the time.

Keywords
education; learn; proustian signs; Deleuze

Resumo

Este artigo propõe perscrutar pela exterioridade das relações seriais o fenômeno aprender, no sentido de tensionar o campo didático para além do fenômeno instrução, ensino intencional, que se realiza em circunstâncias bem características e delimitadas – as quais são denominadas de ensino escolar. Envolto nesse problema do fenômeno aprender, revistaremos o livro Proust e os signos, no intento de aí flagrar como os signos proustianos nos abrem diferentemente à aprendizagem infinitesimal pelas repetições materiais e espirituais, diferindo no tempo.

Palavras-chave
educação; aprender; signos proustianos; Deleuze

Initial Words

Why should we call on Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) to dedicate himself to think about education, since he tends not to think directly about problems related to education unless in a very marginal way? And by means of a bizarre, hermetic, difficult, erratic philosopher, a nomad to his own philosophy?

Now, education, given its nature, brings and expresses problems for us regarding various ways of socializing and training people for the becoming in ways that are not obliterated and diminished - or even eliminated - an existing singularity in the becoming in every being who is currently alive. Education, as a reality to which it is attached, is open and multiple, and therefore it is necessary to look for thoughts that are loyal to the becoming, with the ability to think differently without representing it a priori, due to the fact that the becoming in its pure form is rebellious to the mediating links of representation, as we do not re-present, whereas its chaotic nature does not provide an image that is kept for us in quiescence to be re-recognized. Education, therefore, seeks to socialize and train people for the future, whose daytime toil can be based on the famous phrase of Agostinho de Hipona, collected by Xavier Zubiri (2005): We will seek, what is sought for by those who have not yet found it⁴. To examine how education is a reality, in order to be able to socialize and train people for the becoming, an never-ending toil, like reality, education is never finished, because both - we repeat: reality and education - are open and multiple.

Deleuze is one of the philosophers who made us think and create concepts that are attached to the question of difference, and, thus, with the ability to free thought from its re-cognitive function and to make it a creative power that is so necessary for the educational problem.

Education takes care of multiple beings, and therefore it is unequivocal, in other words, it expresses a single voice for the entire multiplicity of beings, so that everyone speaks the same way, but with their own difference. Therefore education, in its univocity, does not exclude multiplicity. This is the true nature of education. And this is what Deleuze helps us to understand, because his great objective is to free the difference from the ancient representation meshes. The change, when subjected to the rules of identity and similarity, loses it force when entangled with the rigid representation meshes, which obey rigid criteria of logical and representative reasoning.

For Deleuze (1988), when the change is subjected to the demands of representation, it cannot be thought of in itself. The change in itself seems to exclude any relationship of different with different, a relationship that would make it conceivable. It seems, too, that it only becomes conceivable when tamed, that is, when submitted to quadruple subjection to representation: identity in concept; opposition in the attribute; analogy in judgment; similarity in perception. This is the classical world of representation, whose definition is given by means of four dimensions that measure or coordinate it, as was well shown by Foucault (1990).

In this sense, Deleuze affirms that all and any other difference that is not rooted in these principles will be excessive, uncoordinated, inorganic: too big or too small, not only to be thought of, but, to be. The difference, when not thought about, dissipates in the not being. Thus, the necessity of extending the representation to the too big and the too small a difference, making it infinite. But, even making representation infinite - efforts which in this sense had peaks with Leibniz and with Hegel - what is revealed is only a fundament that refers to the excess and the deficiency of the difference to the identical, to the similar, to the analogous, to the opposite, that is, to the adequate reason not to let any more escape. Thus, the difference continues to be marked by the curse. These exercises did no more than to discover subtler and more sublime ways to make the difference atone for itself or to submit it, to rescue it under the categories of representation. Therefore, Deleuze defends, that it is necessary to think of the being as based on the question of difference, more specifically by means of the ontology of pure difference.

Just as pure difference is singular, we cannot confuse generality with repetition. Deleuze wants to show that when science speaks of repetition, it is speaking merely about transition from one order of generality to another order of generality.

On the supposition that it is considered that there is only general science and that there is only repetition science, for Deleuze then there is a need to set up, in and by, multiplicity of living things so as to learn to repeat how to go from a state of general differences to a singular difference, from exterior differences to internal difference - to sum up, repetition as a differentiator of difference⁵ (Deleuze, 1988,). Note that this notion of singular and individual difference is not synonymous. Thus, in repetition, it is not the individuals that return, but the singularities - these essentially virtuous elements, which precede the existence of the beings themselves. The singularities are true transcendental events. But are far from being individual or personal for Deleuze (1974, p. 105-106)⁶

… the singularities preside over the genesis of individuals and people: they divide themselves up in a potential that does not contain even the individual Ego (Moi) per se, nor the personal I (Je), but produces them, updating, performing, the figures of this update do not seem at all like the potential carried out. It is only a theory of singular points that feels apt to overtake the synthesis of individuals and the analysis of individuals as they are (or as they make themselves to be) in consciousness. We cannot accept the alternative that at the same time completely compromises psychology, cosmology and theology: or singularities that are already taken within individuals and people or the undifferentiated abyss. When the teeming world of anonymous singularities and impersonal nomads, pre-individual, is opened we finally step on to the transcendental field⁷.

It was by means of the theoretical contributions of Gilbert Simondon in L’Individu et sagenèse physico-biologique (2005) that Gilles Deleuze can think and outline the main characteristics of this inherent world - as empirical - of the transcendental field. According to Deleuze, it was Simondon who introduced the first rationalized theory of impersonal and pre-individual singularities. When proposing explicitly, based on these singularities, to make the genesis not only of the individual but also of the cognizant subject, Simondon conceived a new conception of transcendental. And the five characteristics through which Deleuze sought to define the transcendental field - potential field energy, internal resonance of series, topological surface of membranes, organization of meaning, status of challenging – were all analyzed by Simondon. However, if on the one hand, these five main characteristics of the Deleuzian transcendental field depend closely on Simondon’s reflections present in his book L'Individu et sagenèse physico-biologique (2005), on the other hand, Deleuze (2006) diverged from the conclusions that Simondon reached.

While both consider that there is a relationship between individuation and differentiation; for Deleuze individuation is intensive, as all the differences are borne by the individual, but not even because of this are they individuals. And such a divergence becomes even more pronounced when Deleuze substituted the little "transcendental field" for the concept "magnetism plane." "Plane" and no ,longer "field": because the subject is not supposed to be out of the field or on the limit of a field that opens on its own as per the model of a field of perception, on the contrary, the subject established himself on the data, or, more exactly, on the plane.

This article intends to examine the serial deleuzeana statement - which could be expressed as: I feel that I became another, therefore I was, therefore it was me (Deleuze, 1974, and Deleuze; Guattari, 2010)⁸ - or learning phenomenon, in the sense of stressing the didactic field beyond the instruction phenomenon, intentional education, which is carried out under very characteristic and delimited circumstances – which are called school education. It is not a question of outlining an instruction theory, but rather of bringing forth that the learning phenomenon is “an infinite task” (Deleuze, 1988,) and linked to intensive states of an anonymous force⁹. (Deleuze, 2002 ,)

At this moment, we have a feeling, in view of the turmoil of data to which we are exposed, that there is something important to be extracted from the chaos, but we are repelled by the customary forms of its attribution, at the same time that we surmise that the conditions of an immanent discernment do not occur of their own accord, they depend on a special act. We lack a plan that recovers chaos, conditions that allow us to connect these data and find meaning in them, rather in the form of a problem than in an interpretation. And you never “know in advance how someone is going to learn - what love makes someone good in Latin, in what ways one is a philosopher, in which dictionaries you learn to think” ¹⁰ (Deleuze, 1988).

With Deleuze, we consider that perhaps thinking begins with the establishing of such a cut or the establishment of such a plan. The immanence plane is the condition under which meaning takes place, chaos itself being the no-sense that inhabits the very depth of our life. But how can we avoid this thinking for us, to think what it is to learn? Thinking-learning - is that the formula?

Without claiming to analyze the vast literature on Proust, added to the perception that the book Proust & Signs by Deleuze was widely read, it seems, unless mistaken, that the problem of the learning phenomenon around the Proustian signs did not provoke any effect, because people continue to speak only of memory when they refer to À la recherché du temps perdu. Surrounding this problem of the learning phenomenon, we will especially review the book Proust & Signs, in an attempt to capture the emphasis of the signs - which Deleuze sought to rectify because they had been forgotten by Proust's readers and commentators -, in order to evoke how Proustian signs open us up differently to infinitesimal learning through material and spiritual repetitions which differ in time.

The Signs, in the Deleuzean reading of Proust

The learning proposed by Proust and clearly presented by Deleuze is anchored in the signs (and it is understood that it is not possible to evade them), since all learning is learned by signs. However, what is a sign for Deleuze, in his reading of Proust's work In search of Lost Time?

Usually, signs are considered to be representative elements that are expressed in two aspects: signifier and signified; thus, it is a matter of linguistic signs. However, to understand Proustian signs as linguistic signs is to incur a dissonance with the piece of work.

Likewise, it is not possible to consider the signs as images, or any other form of agencying. Proustian signs are not material, but they can be emanated or produced by objects and subjects. When Deleuze affirms that the signs of art are immaterial, while the other signs are still sensitive, he is not referring to their physical materiality, but to the objects that emit them and their corresponding explanation. A sign can be a flavor, a movement, a sound, it can be an expression and a gesture; in short, signs are not necessarily visible, although they are perceptible. In Proust's words: “a sensation (taste of moistened dumpling, metallic noise, irregular paving) radiating from a narrow area around me, was born in me,”¹¹ (Proust, 1983, emphasis added).

The sign, according to Deleuze, is formed by two parts: it designates an object and, at the same time, it means something different (Deleuze, 2010, p. 26). In this perspective, it is inferred that the sign is a proposition and, simultaneously, an attribute; it designates an object and, in parallel, it is an attribute of that object. Without being the quality of a body, the attribute is a becoming, it is never something; it is always before and after, between the past and the future. Synchronously, the transubstantialization of an object/sign into another sign/object takes place in two ways, contrary to common sense, which moves in just one telos, because the sign is an event. And the event is the unlimited becoming, that is, it is that which has both meanings, it is what has just happened and what will happen, but never what happens¹² (Deleuze, 2015 ). Thus, the sign is also an event, emerging from the chance of the meeting of two bodies.

And the anguish of the pure event is, precisely, that it is something that has just happened and that will happen, at the same time, never something that finishes. The X that we feel that this has just happened is the object of "novelty"; and the X that will always happen is the object of the “story”. The pure event is a story and a novelty, never up-to-date. It is in this sense that events are signs

(Deleuze, 2015)¹³.

Not speaking of a sign, but in signs - from which it can be deduced that they are multiple and variable - Deleuze indicates four types of signs that belong to specific worlds: mundane signs, loving signs, sensitive signs and signs of art. Time in Proust, as per Deleuze’s reading, is essential for learning and for signs, after all, what is sought is always the truth, which is always the truth of time, never discovered, always produced (Deleuze, 2010, pp. 16 and 139). Time in Recherché is by no means linear, it refers to temporal fragmentation; therefore, time lost is not the only time structure to be investigated, but also time lost, as well as in search of time regained and time that is rediscovered.

The sign is revealed, for example, in the beloved's attempt to cover up a lie. In the case of loving signs, they are never declared, they emerge as if betraying their own lies. It is, for example, blushing in the face of fraud, corresponding to the redness of the face to a sign that, when perceived, is gone, appearing as a surface effect, fleeting and temporary (Deleuze, 2015, p.6).

For introductory purposes, we will briefly introduce each group of signs, which will be explained further on, due to the delimitation of what becomes learning. Each type of sign has a privileged timeline and a faculty chosen to interpret it, that is, to explain it. Let us start with mundane signs: they are interpreted by involuntary intelligence, that is, that which starts to function due to the coercion of the sign. They are expressed by the changes, by the rules and laws of the salons that are not rigid, on the contrary, they suffer alterations, as do their legislators:

But - in contradiction to this permanence - the old mundanities found everything different in society, where one received people who were once unacceptable… And the most interesting thing about these transformations in the salons was coming from lost time, affiliating themselves with a phenomenon of memory¹⁴

(Proust, 1983 ).

The mundane signs refer to the changes perceived by the features on a long forgotten face and to the rules and laws of the salons, existing in Proust's contemporaneity, visited before by different people. Despite having lost time that transforms bodies and rules as their main temporal structure, mundane signs also fit in the time that is lost, “wasted” time, that is, in the search for its truth, one ends up discovering that they themselves were empty. Therefore, the only possible truth is the learning process itself that allows the learner to mature - in fact, the only one that changes at the end of the interpretation of these types of signs is the learner - and his explanation, namely, the meaning itself, which is addressed to himself, valid for his own action (Deleuze, 2010, p. 81). Exemplary cases are the mimics of Mrs. Verdurin: but, since the accident of the jaw, she had given up the trouble of laughing out loud and instead indulged in a conventional mimicry that meant, without fatigue or risk, that she laughed too hard¹⁵ (Proust, 1981). Not that the character actually laughed, just pretended to laugh, which constitutes an empty sign with no meaning beyond itself.

The loving signs are also deciphered by the involuntary intelligence awakened by jealousy and lying signs, and their primary timeline is the lost, visible time, when viewed on the face of the beloved, youth that is gone and cannot return. The explanation of these signs is always late because it is attainable when you no longer love one another, it happens when the self to which the sense corresponds has ceased to exist. The meaning appears when there is no longer harmony with the subject who suffered with jealousy, or with lies (Deleuze, 2010).

The loving signs are participants, similarly, in the time that is lost, time spent, for example, with a woman who does not have the physical forms preferred by the one who loves her: Saying that I spoiled whole years of my life, that I desired death, that I had my greatest love, for a woman I didn't like, who was not my type!¹⁶ (Proust, 1981, p. 316).

It can be said that the truth inscribed in the signs of love and in the mundane signs takes on the features of a serial law for love, as Proust explains: Thus my love for Albertina, even in its differences, was already inscribed in my love for Gilberta¹⁷ (Proust, 1983). In contrast, the majority of groups is marked by the similarity between the terms (people) that make up a group: as for the princess, she burst out laughing, because Swann's spirit was extremely appreciated in her circle¹⁸ (Proust, 1981).

The third type of sign are the sensitive ones, and they can be said to be more noble because they are less material, they belong to time that is rediscovered within lost time, they provoke a glimpse of eternity by making distant moments spatially and temporally contiguous, which is valuable for leading way to time regained of art (Deleuze, 2010, p. 52). It is in them that the two powers of the essence, difference and repetition, remain together, that is, the two faculties evoked to interpret them: imagination and involuntary memory (Deleuze, 2010, p. 50). A famous case of a sensitive sign and the awakening of the involuntary memory is that of madeleine:

I took a spoonful of tea to my lips where I had allowed a piece of the madeleine to soften. But at the same moment that that sip, wrapped in the cake crumbs, touched my palate, I shivered, aware of the extraordinary thing that was happening to me. A delightful, isolated pleasure had invaded me, with no idea of its cause. … all this that takes shape and solidity, came out, city and gardens, from my cup of tea¹⁹

(Proust, 1981).

These Proustian experiences, linked to literary systems, have two series, that of an old present (Combray, as was lived) and that of a present time. Remaining in a first dimension of the experience, there is a similarity between the two series (the Madeleine, the morning meal), and even an identity (the taste as a quality that is not only similar, but identical at both moments). However, the secret is not there. Taste only has power because it involves something = x, which is no longer defined by an identity: taste involves Combray just like itself, a fragment of pure past, in its double irreducibility to the present that was (perception) and to the current present, in which it could be revised or reconstructed (voluntary memory).

Other sensitive signs have their meaning interpreted by figures of imagination and by desire, by an impression caused even by a movement and the view of a landscape:

At the curve of a path, I suddenly felt that peculiar pleasure that was unlike any other when I saw the two towers of Martinville ... Without confessing that what was hidden behind the towers of Martinville must have been something like a beautiful sentence, since it had appeared in the form of words that pleased me²⁰

(Proust, 1981).

Therefore, it becomes possible to say that there are two types of sensitive signs: the memory that manages to resurface through involuntary memory and the search undertaken for hidden truths (Deleuze, 2010, p. 50).

The fourth and final type of sign corresponds to those of art, which are paramount and reveal the final learning. It is only in the signs of art that the essence gains freedom and presents the unity of an immaterial sign and an entirely spiritual sense²⁴ (Deleuze, 2010). This category reveals the original and unprecedented time regained, and has pure thinking as its interpretive faculty. That is, it is in its becoming that time triggers subversions, by messing with the order of things, making pure difference emerge through the logic of the event. Thus, pure thinking is anchored in the immanence of believing in this world-here, a world that contains divergence, heterogeneity, incompatibility.

The signs of art have the capacity to generate a repetition of the way of being in the past. If all the past is preserved in itself - this is the point that Proust takes up again, re-read Bergson - there is the question of how to save it for us. How to penetrate this in-itself without reducing it to the old present it was or the current present in relation to what is past? These are the signs of art that allow us to save the being in itself from the past by repetition. It is not a question, then, of being merely at the mercy of reminiscences, in the sense that they designate a passive synthesis or an involuntary memory that differs in nature from any active synthesis of voluntary memory. The Proustian formula rediscovered by Deleuze - a little time in a pure state - designates, in the first place, the pure past, the being itself of the past, that is, the erotic synthesis of time, but designates the pure and empty form of time more deeply, the last synthesis, that of the death instinct that leads to the eternity of the return in time. À la recherché experimentation brought the creation of a new concept to light, expressed in defining that this new concept is the coexistence of three (and not two) periods of time.

Learning for Proust and according to Deleuze

Learning, for Deleuze, is being sensitive to signs, it is considering that things, people, objects, material or immaterial, emit signs that need to be deciphered, and learning is knowing how to decipher these signs (Deleuze, 2010, p. 4). Let us, however, proceed with caution, as it is not enough to interpret. In other words, it is not enough to explain the meaning and the sign, it is necessary to arrive at the final revelation that comes through art. Learning is related, above all, to the essences. Inverting Plato, for Deleuze, the essences form an ontology of flows, the strength of which is to make impersonal singularities emerge from the background, dethroning the old belief in subjects a priori and enabling shams, due to their disjunction, to affirm differences and allow contagion of the heterogeneous. Learning through essences, then, is to immanate thought to be affected by instances that create new senses, by bringing up the base and making the thousand voices, which inhabit this world-here.

The apprentice does not choose which signs he will be able to interpret or not, he may well go through all the worlds of signs, but he may also take the opposite path, stopping at just one, be a genius in the interpretation of one world and ill-fated in others. An exemplary case presented by Deleuze, in agreement with Proust, is the physician Cottard, sensitive to the signs of the disease and an expert physician, however, without any sensitivity to apprehend and interpret the mundane signs present, such as the rules in the salons of Verdurin (Deleuze, 2010, p. 5).

Deleuze affirms that vocation is always a predestination in relation to signs²² (2010). From this perspective, the learner does not choose what he is going to learn, nor how, far from this, he is chosen by the essences that surround him, thus they are involved in the student who is predestined to them. It is the essences that sensitize them to the corresponding signs, hence it is not possible to measure the value of learning before its end, only assigning value afterwards, never before finishing it.

At this point, the first divergence between didactics and Proustian learning emerges. In general, for didactics, teaching must have a relevant and intentional content, because the value of what will be taught is known before the action of teaching. It can be seen that they are paths that are contrary to the teaching of signs, which are the result of chance that they teach only through coercion, violence that selects specific faculties and makes them work in an involuntary sense (Deleuze, 2010, p. 94).

It is inferred that each apprentice, even being an indeterminate subject, to whom singularities are combined and completed in such a way that, in each world of essences, these combinations can be different, proposing different solutions to the same problems presented in all these worlds. This conception derives from the monads, by Leibniz (1983, p. 103-115), in which each one has singularities, as they are organized and determine the individuals, who converge on themselves, that is, they form monads whose autonomy of the interior contains an interior without exterior. This is the process of individuation, so that each world can only be expressed by these individuals (Deleuze, 2015, pp. 118-119).

Each subject expresses the world from a certain point of view. But the point of view is the difference itself, the internal and absolute difference. Each subject expresses, therefore, an absolutely different world and, undoubtedly, the expressed world does not exist outside the subject that expresses it (what we call the outside world is only the illusory projection, the unifying limit of all these expressed worlds), but the expressed world is not to be mistaken with the subject: based on it we can distinguish exactly how the essence distinguishes itself from existence and even from its own existence. It does not exist outside the subject that expresses it, but it is expressed as the essence, not of the subject itself, but of Being, or of the region of Being that reveals itself to the subject²³

(Deleuze, 2010).

For Deleuze, then, individuals are participants in “incompatible” worlds, full of chances that escape determinations, and the incompatible world is rejected by Leibniz insofar as it brings contingencies. The singularities, that is, essences, points of view, ideas, are individual and individualizing, giving shape to many worlds revealed to the artist who, in turn, more than creating them, make them transparent (Deleuze, 2015, p. 118; Deleuze , 2010, p. 41).

Having clarified what is an apprentice, let us move on to the teaching. Teaching does not go by truths and objective matters, through the great knowledge stored and passed on by great specialists. Proust expresses great admiration for Bergotte and Elstir, however, it is these same “superior men” (in the sense of men specialized in certain types of knowledge) that frustrate him (Deleuze, 2010, p. 29) for communicating certain knowledge to the protagonist, whose truth, as an effect, immobilized him for learning, preventing him from following the trail of signs, disappointments and conquests through which he is headed. It is noted here that, in didactics, it is said that the teacher is a subject capable of evaluating what will be taught, but in Proust, the reverse is true: the mentors capable of teaching are precisely those who have nothing to offer. Thus, another important divergence emerges between what is considered to be teaching, for several authors in the field of didactics (Comenius, 1966; Flitner, 1935; Alian, 2012), and learning, in the reading of Proust, according to Deleuze (2010, p. 29): the teacher at Recherché does not recognize himself as a teacher, nor does he know that he is, as it is not an identity, as occurs in didactics.

The first step in learning is the chance of an encounter, the emission of a sign that arises from the encounter between two bodies, between the object or person that emits the sign and the sensitive subject who perceives it: Do not look for the two stones which you stumbled on in the patio. But the fortuitous, inevitable way why the sensation had arisen was precisely proof of the truth of the past that was resurrected²⁴ (Proust, 1983). Thus, the chance of the encounter causes the subject to awaken to a hitherto hidden truth, as stated by Deleuze:

The truth depends on an encounter with something that forces us to think and look for what is true. The chance of encounters, the pressure of coercion, are Proust's two fundamental themes. For it is precisely the sign that is the object of an encounter and it is that which exercises violence over us. The chance of the meeting is that it guarantees the need for what is thought”²⁵

(Deleuze, 2010).

Necessity and truth are fundamental. What initiates the search is the enigma of the sign, the truth that it hides leads to the need to interpret it, to remove the thought from the simple representation. When faced with the sign, the subject tends to search the object for the secret sought. Therewith, the second step is born: disappointment. Disappointment is indispensable, because if the object does not carry the truth, the subject is led to compensate frustration with interpretations of less profound signs (Deleuze, 2010, p. 33).

The development of the sign and the sense is not carried out either by the object nor by the sensitive subject that apprehends them: surpassing them, it is the essence that annuls both. Each world of signs maintains a relationship with the essences, the goal is always to achieve them; however, such a relationship is only revealed in art: starting from the work of art retrospectively, one realizes that the essence was already in all other signs always taking on a more general form.

The essence in Proust refers, according to Deleuze, to Platonic ideas, so that they gain a reality which is independent of the subject, being, in this sense, pre-existing, preceding the subjects and artistic revelations, and, in view of that, it is not true to take on essences or signs as psychological states (Deleuze, 2010, p. 41).

The two powers of essence are difference and repetition, forces that remain in all worlds, and to better understand what the world of arts and essence is, we need to understand how the latter presents itself in each case and, finally, how it achieves its total freedom (Deleuze, 2010, p. 47).

The most general form of essences is the laws of emptiness. As already mentioned, worldly signs are marked by their emptiness. Valuing their actions, they are perceived by the repetitions of gestures and words, hence, in this case, the essence is not individual or individualizing, but general, as it is not presented by just one individual, but by the group and is usually demonstrated by the most talkative subjects. The value of this category lies in the unconsciousness of the elements of the group that express themselves without thinking beforehand, simply obeying the established precepts and meeting the need for the apprentice to mature, and without them it would not be possible to reach the other levels (Deleuze, 2010, p. 81 ).

Love teaches, and, unlike what Cordeiro (2007) proposes, then love experiences are among the most fruitful in learning. Love is not explained by the lover, nor least by the circumstances experienced. According to Deleuze, there would be an original difference that precedes the love series, constituting the same essence that animates the series and is diversified in the loved ones: It is the essence that is in itself the difference, however, not having the power to diversify and to be diversified, without the ability to repeat itself, identical to itself ²⁶ (Deleuze, 2010, p. 46). In each successive love, the law of lying is reestablished, of the worlds involved in the beloved, each love has different terms, several different loves for different people who form series. On the other hand, the essence diversifies a loved one as if it took on several aspects and formed a new series in itself.

As the essence is a previous law and it does not lack subjects as it is a precedent, due to performing the articulation of several independent experiences, Proust's love experiences with Albertina and Gilberta are connected to the love experiences of Swann and Odette, always repeating themselves and, at the same time, always with contrasting differences (Deleuze, 2010, p. 67).

Because it involves unknown worlds, the loved one emits signs that betray the truth and awaken the suffering resulting from jealousy, and, due to the sensitivity brought on by the suffering, intelligence in its involuntary form seeks the truth. The law in this series is the realization that one is being deceived, preceding the breakdown of the relationship and allowing the joy of discovering this painful law to emerge. It is intelligence, in its involuntary form that allows the transformation of suffering into joy.

In this category, the essence does not have the autonomy to submit to external contingencies, always being chosen by chance meetings and choices of the partners, for which one and the other embody specific essences, which will be sensitive, leaving aside thousands of other essences and possible series (Deleuze, 2010, p. 72). In addition to the lying signs, love seeks to silence and hide the homosexual series present in the beloved. For women, the Gomorra series, for men, the Sodom series, a world inaccessible to the one they love, and it is the homosexual series that also arouse jealousy, for covering up the secret of such worlds (Deleuze, 2010, p.76 ).

As already mentioned, the next group is more noble, although it is still a level below art due to the excess of materiality: these are sensitive signs, reminiscences or desires. The use of memory is specific to this group, and it is worth noting that memory is only valid while involuntary, as this faculty is requested by the sensitive sign itself.

The complexity of such signs lies in the spatial contiguity that results from a contraction of time. At first, it suggests an association because voluntary memory is still in operation, which separates the two moments - despite being similar to the sensation of one and the other. The material distance that this cognitive faculty emphasizes does not allow one to arrive at the truth hidden by the sign, thus, it does not reveal the essence. An example resides in the author's own voluntary recollection of Combray, the aforementioned city, in which, in the book, Proust had lived part of his childhood:

As if Combray consisted only of two floors connected by a narrow staircase, and as if it was never more than seven o'clock at night. In fact, I could answer, to anyone who asked me, that Combray comprised other things more and existed at other times. But as what I then remembered would be provided to me solely by voluntary memory, the memory of intelligence, and since the information it gives us about the past does not retain any of this, I would never have remembered to think of the rest of Combray

(Proust, 1981 , p. 44).

Voluntary memory observes and makes up the recollection of the past as a distant present, what Bergson calls recollection memory. The survival of the past is known, however, it is unable to explain how the past survives in itself (Deleuze, 2004, p. 30).

In order to be able to remember, Deleuze affirms that the past is that in which we suddenly put ourselves to remember²⁷ (2004), the past has not ceased to be, only its usefulness is abandoned by the conscious. What the philosopher defends is the coexistence of the past with the present, and the present itself enters the scene, then, with memory-contraction. The present would be just the contraction of the past, as well as the past, the distension of the present (Deleuze, 2004, p. 31). Only the present exists in time and brings together, absorbs the past and the future, but only the past and the future insist on time and divide each present to infinity²⁸ (Deleuze, 2015, p. 6).

By contraction, it is possible to establish the resonance of a past sensation with a current sensation, which is to say that this memory does not take possession directly from the past: it recomposes it with the present. ... the past, as it is in itself, coexists, does not follow the present that it was²⁹ (Deleuze, 2010, pp. 54-55).

Only the memory in its involuntary exercise is able to involve two different moments, but with similar sensations, so that memories that have hitherto been forgotten or, at least, asleep, resurface. Voluntary memory is provoked by the sign and brings to the present an image of eternity, a sensation so vivid that it seems situated outside time, that it is only betrayed by the materiality of the present:

… The taste of the cookie making the past permeate the present to the point of making me hesitant, without knowing which of the two I was in; in fact, the being that in me then enjoyed that impression and enjoyed its extratemporal content, divided between the old and the present day ... managed to locate in the only environment where it could live, to enjoy the essence of things, that is, outside of time. … In this case, as in all precedents, the common sensation sought to recreate the old place around itself, while the current one that replaced it was opposed with all resistance of its matter to this immigration…³⁰

(Proust, 1983, pp. 124 -126).

The two potentialities of the essence are presented as the repetition of the same impression; however, the essence is expressed through the Combray ideal: namely, it is the difference itself that returns, it is this essence that relatively implies the flavor of the muffin and the qualities of the city, resulting in a local essence. Again, Deleuze states that the essence is still material and, in this case, because it depends on external eventualities, subjecting itself to the experiences to make the association, being chosen rather than the one it chooses; the matters in which it is incarnated do not achieve full involvement (Deleuze, 2010, p. 61).

It is important to talk about the time that is rediscovered in the reminiscences, as it draws two separate moments closer in time and space, resulting in an ideal and different impression from what we had. The time regained in reminiscences allows us to see, for just a fleeting moment, eternity, translated as the world of essences.

In the field of the signs of art - literature, painting, music, theater - the essences gain total autonomy and make the choice of the subject that they will individualize; and, once chosen, the subject is involved by them: it is not the subject that explains the essence, it is rather the essence, which means to get involved, get entangled in the subject³¹ (Deleuze, 2010).

The signs of art are immaterial. What is this? Each artistic sign is emitted by more spiritualized means, by colors, by notes - as is the case of the small musical phrase revealed by Vinteuil (this is a composer very sought after by Swann due to a peculiar musical arrangement, full of signs) -, by gestures, by the very formation of phrases. The “inspired” artistic works, or rather, animated by the essences, do not lack senses to be engendered - from where it is possible to infer that this, for example, is the characteristic of the body without organs presented by Deleuze at the end of the work.

Proust has many moments of disappointment with the absence of skills such as knowing how to listen, see and even describe things and landscapes, which, at first, he believes are necessary to create his work. As elucidated earlier, these are objective skills that entrust the object, with the matter seen, the truth that is sought, at a production level that remains linked to life and not to essences, granting the value that only pure thought holds to voluntary intelligence and even to thought, as re-cognition. For this reason, the chance of encountering the signs is crucial. Without the unexpected, intelligence would remain forewarned and would not give way to its involuntary practice.

A cloud, a triangle, a steeple, a flower, a pebble, a sense that perhaps there was, under these signs, something different that he should try to discover, an idea translated like hieroglyphs, which were supposed to represent only material objects. Certainly difficult to decipher, but that only allowed us to read the truth. Because the truths that are directly and clearly apprehended by intelligence in the world in broad daylight light are in any case more superficial than those that life communicates to us in absentia in a physical impression since it has entered through the senses, but from which we can extract the spirit³²

(Proust, 1983, p. 129).

Pure thinking is the only faculty capable of interpreting the essence. Despite all the complexity, it is with this point that Deleuze maintains close communication with the other pieces of work of his authorship used in the study in question; it is not a question of mimicry, but because, as the author himself said, in the world of essences, all the series that are formed (Deleuze, 2015) are not communicable, so that the only form of communication is through works of art.

It can be inferred that the world of essences is composed of incompatible worlds that are unable to communicate. However, for Deleuze, each work of art is elaborated by essences implicated in the subject (artist), who is the bearer of immaterial signs (Deleuze, 2010, p. 35), so that no more is known than the world that can be expressed. Each artist reveals a world that is his alone, that individualizes him based on his own essences. It so happens that one work radiates with another transversely; that is, there is a unity between works by different authors because a work of art causes a difference, evokes another and, in repetition, triggers the difference differently, spilling out the update through events (Deleuze, 2010, p. 160).

This repetition is a spiritual repetition, since it is elaborated in the being itself from the past; it is also a repetition of the Whole, at different coexisting levels. They are essences that gain a spiritual reality, which is not visible. And who best expresses this world with the following words is in fact Proust:

And the pleasure that the music gave him and that soon was going to create a real need in him, was in fact, in such moments, similar to the pleasure that he would feel when trying out perfumes, when coming into contact with a world which we were not made for, which seems not to have a form to us because our eyes do not perceive it, meaningless because it escapes our intelligence, and we only reach it by a single sense. ... Swann was not mistaken, therefore, in believing that the sonata phrase really existed. Humans from this point of view, however, belonged to an order of supernatural creatures that we have never seen, but who, despite this, we recognize as being elated when some explorer of the invisible manages to capture one of them, to bring them, from the divine world to which he has access, to shine a few moments above ours. That was what Vinteuil did with the short sentence³³

(Proust, 1981, pp. 203 and 292).

The essences are expressed by the pieces of work that are revealed to the subject; however, they are incarnated in the work of art through less crude materials, so that the artist is able to communicate it: it incarnates in the material, but these materials are so ductile and shredded that they become entirely spiritual. These materials are undoubtedly the color to the painter, like Vermeer's yellow, the sound to the musician and the word to the writer³⁴(Deleuze, 2010).

Literature offers great interest as it appears to be more sublime by the author's own intellect, but, in fact, it is the result of an inner search, of suffering, such as the value that Albertina (one of Proust’s romantic partners in Recherché) gains in the eyes of the lyrical self, after he discovers that the suffering she caused, the time he lost with his love and spent in love led to the work he composed.

Especially when I asked Mme de Cambremer how I could prefer Albertina's company to that of a notable man like Elstir. Even from an intellectual point of view, I guessed that she was mistaken, but I did not know that the error came from ignorance of the lessons from which the man of letters learns his trade… The woman we cannot do without, makes us suffer, she would wrench from us, as no intellectual man would, a whole range of deep, vital feelings… Making me waste my time, distressing me, Albertina would have been more useful to me, from a literary point of view³⁵

(Proust, 1983).

What we assume to be inferior is richer in signs and therefore offers more learning. The work of art is made up of the learning obtained from suffering:

a man with sensitivity could, even if he had no imagination, write admirable novels. The suffering that others caused him, his efforts to avoid it, the conflicts that he had with cruel people, all interpreted by intelligence, would provide material for a book³⁹

(Proust, 1983).

Art gains relevance, firstly, for being the revelation of essences, but also for carrying with it two essential elements: the time regained and pure thought. After all, thinking about Deleuze is never a natural exercise, and perhaps that is why his philosophy communicates so much with Proust’s. So much so, that in the words of the philosopher himself, it is Marcel Proust who forms a new image of thought that, with signs and essences, confronts philosophy in its assumptions (Deleuze, 2010, pp. 88-89), such as the false belief that the human being is inclined to think, and, voluntarily to seek what is true, which through methods is possible to achieve. For Deleuze (1974), we need to be violently shaken by the intensities in order to have the courage, commenting Lucretius, to determine what is truly infinite and what is not, to distinguish the true and the false infinite.³⁷ At this point, there is a further divergence not only with the so-called rationalists, but with the didactics, as there is no method capable of teaching someone how to think.

Thinking is something that is created within the thought itself, wresting all its inertia, so that it is duress. It is this that emerges as pure thought, whose very explanation is the essence, it leads the subject to think about it, it is never available for voluntary efforts: they only let themselves think when coerced to do so³⁸(Deleuze, 2010, p. 94). It wraps itself around signs in such a way that it forces us to think and untangle it by way of meaning: only in this way does it necessarily become thought³⁹(Deleuze, 2010, p. 95).

Time regained is only accessible by the arts, because the time of the essences is creation and escapes all linearity, it is the composition of a non-visible world that belongs to the essences. The beginning of time itself that does not need to separate past, present and future, it is only considered rediscovered because it is the artist who rediscovers it in the very essences that surround it, so it is always a beginning of the world, from an individual point of view which is only expressed by the individual without depending on him (Deleuze, 2010, p. 44).

All other effects produced by the signs of life can be elicited by art. In the last volume of the Time Regained series, the protagonist simultaneously experiences several sensations, such as the reminiscence of madeleine, but none of them come due to sensitive signs, far from it, they are evoked by literature (Deleuze, 2010, p. 145).

What is discovered at the end of the work is that the arts are machines, including Proust's work, worlds full of signs that awaken those who are sensitive to them, animated by essences. The works, in Proust's own words, when referring to his own work, are glasses, that is, they allow each reader to see themselves better, so that is why it is a machine that needs to work: each reader could see the effects, be attentive to the signs.

Finally, we enter into a final question: would Proust be a teacher and, thus, could this learning be taught? For all the readings carried out and for all the effort expressed here, we believe that Marcel Proust is not a teacher, because one cannot teach how to think, nor how to recognize signs. As Leonardo Maia explained, all learning is the result of each individual's experiences, it cannot depend on methods, as each one is sensitive to specific signs, and encounters are never a premeditated chance (Maia, 2014, p. 374).

Why does anyone learn? Maia says that one learns when one loses direction, when one is interrupted by an unforeseen event that confuses us, hence the need to remember, to seek guidance for this new learning in the lived experiences, there is no a priori determined end to be reached.

In order to make a counterpoint to the learning by the Proustian signs, we will return to Clarice Lispector's book, An Aprenticeship or The Book of Delights, whose protagonist Lóri follows the same learning path as her romantic partner Ulysses. A brief comparison is necessary here in order to establish a contrast of the learning present in this book by Clarice Lispector with the reading of Proust performed by Deleuze. The learning in which Lóri embarks is the search of being, to give up a personal identity, such as the name itself, which, however, is not distinguished.

In some moments, Lispector refers to Lóri not as an specific individual, but as "the woman", without a name or any identity besides being a woman, besides being a living being, distinguished by her learning of being, of discovering herself and discovering that things exist emancipated from the functions that the human being attributes to them (Lispector, 1982, p. 83). Her research into the non-human world, in order to get in touch with the living neutral of things, which although they were not thinking, were alive, she would walk through tents and it was difficult to approach any, so many women were moving with bags and carts⁴⁰ (Lispector, 1982). It proposes an interconnected world that configures a unity that transcends both animated and non-animated things; the god in which Lóri comes to believe is an impersonal whole in which everything takes part, rather than a divinity, it is a harmonious whole. In this realism, every thing in the fair was important in itself, linked to a set - but what was the set⁴¹ (Lispector, 1982).

Clarice Lispector's theme is the same as Marcel Proust's, and both are deeply philosophical; however, it is not the same learning. The hero Ulysses believes that Lóri is following the same steps as he is, without realizing that “the woman” had surpassed him, reaching her being without being lost:

Minutes later she said:

- I still don't find an answer when I ask myself: who am I? But I think I know now: deep down I am the one who has her own life and also your life. I drank our life.

- But that is not asked. And the question must have another answer. Do not be so strong asking the worst question of a human being. I, who am stronger than you, cannot ask myself "who I am" without getting lost. And her voice sounded like that of a lost man⁴²

(Lispector, 1982).

Because they are the same steps and the same ends, they differ from Proust, in that, for the French author, the individual does not choose the essence that he will involve, whereas, in Lispector's narrative, the two characters go through the same symptoms, allowing the recognition of the stage of learning in which it is. For Proust, the work and the value of what will be learnt are not known because they are unique and unprecedented learning (Maia, 2014, p. 379). Ulysses sees himself as Lóri's teacher, the one who leads: another divergence with Recherché, since the learning there unveiled has no previously established student or teacher.

It is, therefore, two different ways of thinking-learning. Incidentally, the apprentice will know that there is a reality that is not up to date, that the signs are willing, that we have suffered their violence; however, no teacher can say what is the art that the apprentice can embody, not even what will be the loves that will take him to the love series preceded by the essences. Perhaps it is possible to infer that if the author of Recherché is not a teacher, but that he even still has the strength to affect bodies by sensitivity, since his work will only be communicated to those who are sensitive to it.

Final considerations

Based on the reading of the series In search of lost time, namely, In Swann’s Way and Time Regained, by Marcel Proust, and also in comparison with the work of Gilles Deleuze’s Proust and the signs, it is possible to note that learning in Deleuze is something out of school, it does not demand the restriction of the school environment - although it can incite it due to the countless relationships, people, signs and essences that it can contain - because learning begins in life, in loves, in suffering, in disappointments, in environments governed by group rules, a space for coexistence, and even at times when Cordeiro (2007) says there is no intention to teach, because it is where / when more is taught about life, about art, about enigmatic truths of the signs.

Therefore, following this reasoning, there is no teacher as an objective identity in Proust, teachers are all those who offer signs to be interpreted. An element that is implicit and little emphasized by Proust himself is the relationship with the other, which becomes more emphatic in Lispector, because you do not learn anything alone, in other words, you only learn from the other, but not like the other, an aspect that Deleuze emphasizes when he affirms that You never learn by doing it like someone, but by doing it with someone⁴³ (2010). And that other one can be a mother or a circle of friends.

The value of learning is never determined before, it always comes later, when one understands the presence of the essence that was involved in the sign and the subject. Learning in Deleuze is learning to seek the truth by the necessity caused by the sign, it is to consider absolutely all matter of life or the immateriality of art as a carrier of signs that hide the truth, but radiate instabilities whose link of thought with individuation produces learning. All time is relevant, even the time that is lost, an enterprise with no apparent value, such as loving people who lie and cheat, time spent with society and its rules, being accepted by them, time spent with other more important things, such as working or dedicating yourself to people with more depth (Deleuze, 2010, p. 19).

One does not learn an identity in Proust. One learns that the essences involved in the signs give “[something] to think about” (Deleuze, 2010, p. 89). In other words, they force one to truly think, to put thought in motion, corroborating, as Deleuze says, that we should be Egyptologists, to stick to symbols rather than words loaded with explicit meanings (2010, p. 100). One cannot teach someone how to interpret signs, just allude to their reality and hope that each one, in their individuation, will have their own experiences in deciphering the enigmas. Perhaps this is why didactics fails to establish, as a standard, a sequence of how to do something so that learning is always carried out, and thus repeated as positivist science intends.

• 2
  Standardization, preparation and text review: Luan Maitan – [e-mail]
• 3
  English version: Deirdre Giraldo: [e-mail]
• 4
  Translation from Portuguese of: “Busquemos como buscam os que ainda não encontraram, e encontremos como encontram os que ainda buscarão”. (Xavier Zubiri, 2005, p. 6).
• 5
  Translation from Portuguese of: “a repetição como passagem de um estado das diferenças gerais à diferença singular, das diferenças exteriores à diferença interna – em suma, a repetição como o diferenciador da diferença” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 136).
• 6
  Please note that the references with page numbers in the text and in the footnotes all refer to the Protuguese version.
• 7
  Translation from Portuguese of: … as singularidades presidem à gênese dos indivíduos e das pessoas: elas se repartem em um potencial que não comporta por si mesmo nem Ego (Moi) individual, nem Eu (Je) pessoal, mas que os produz atualizando-se, efetuando-se, as figuras desta atualização não se parecendo em nada ao potencial efetuado. É somente uma teoria dos pontos singulares que se acha apta a ultrapassar a síntese das pessoas e a análise do indivíduo tais como elas são (ou se fazem) na consciência. Não podemos aceitar a alternativa que compromete inteiramente ao mesmo tempo a psicologia, a cosmologia e a teologia: ou singularidades já tomadas em indivíduos e pessoas ou o abismo indiferenciado. Quando se abre o mundo pululante das singularidades anônimas e nômades impessoais, pré-individuais, pisamos, afinal, no campo do transcendental. Deleuze (1974, p. 105-106)
• 8
  Translation from Portuguese of: “sinto que me torno outro, logo eu era, logo era eu!” (Deleuze, 1974, p. 360 e Deleuze; Guattari, 2010, pp. 21-30)
• 9
  Translation from Portuguese of: “é uma tarefa infinita” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 271) e ligado aos “estados intensivos de uma força anônima” (Deleuze, 2002, p. 132).
• 10
  Translation from Portuguese of: “se sabe de antemão como alguém vai aprender – que amores tornam alguém bom em Latim, por meio de que encontros se é filósofo, em que dicionários se aprende a pensar” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 270)
• 11
  Translation from Portuguese of: “nascia em mim, irradiando de uma estreita zona em meu derredor, uma sensação (sabor do bolinho umedecido, ruído metálico, pavimentação irregular)” (Proust, 1983, p. 126, grifos nossos).
• 12
  Translation from Portuguese of: “o que acaba de se passar e o que vai se passar, mas nunca o que se passa” (Deleuze, 2015, p. 9).
• 13
  Translation from Portuguese of: E o angustiante do acontecimento puro está, justamente, em que ele é alguma coisa que acaba de ocorrer e que vai se passar, ao mesmo tempo, nunca alguma coisa que se passa. O X de que sentimos que isto acaba de se passar é o objeto da “novidade”; e o X que sempre vai se passar é o objeto do “conto”. O acontecimento puro é conto e novidade, jamais atualidade. É neste sentido que os acontecimentos são signos (Deleuze, 2015, p. 66).
• 14
  Translation from Portuguese of: Mas – em contradição com essa permanência – os velhos mundanos achavam tudo diferente na sociedade, onde se recebia gente outrora inadmissível … E o mais interessante nessas transformações dos salões era provirem do tempo perdido, filiarem-se a um fenômeno da memória (Proust, 1983, pp. 186-187).
• 15
  Translation from Portuguese of: “mas, desde o acidente da mandíbula, havia renunciado ao trabalho de dar gargalhadas de verdade e, em vez disso, entregava-se a uma mímica convencional que significava, sem fadiga nem riscos, que ela ria a mais não poder” (Proust, 1981, p. 176).
• 16
  Translation from Portuguese of: “E dizer que eu estraguei anos inteiros de minha vida, que desejei a morte, que tive o meu maior amor, por uma mulher que não me agradava, que não era o meu tipo!” (Proust, 1981, p. 316).
• 17
  Translation from Portuguese of: “Assim meu amor por Albertina, até nas suas divergências, já se inscrevia em meu amor por Gilberta” (Proust, 1983, p. 148).
• 18
  Translation from Portuguese of: “quanto à princesa, pôs-se a rir às gargalhadas, porque o espírito de Swann era extremamente apreciado em seu círculo” (Proust, 1981, p. 284).
• 19
  Translation from Portuguese of: Levei aos lábios uma colherada de chá onde deixara amolecer um pedaço da madalena. Mas no mesmo instante em que aquele gole, de envolta com as migalhas do bolo, tocou o meu paladar, estremeci, atento ao que se passa de extraordinário em mim. Invadira-me um prazer delicioso, isolado, sem noção da sua causa. … tudo isso que toma forma e solidez, saiu, cidade e jardins, da minha taça de chá (Proust, 1981, p. 47).
• 20
  Translation from Portuguese of: Na curva de um caminho, senti de súbito, aquele prazer peculiar que não se assemelhava a nenhum outro ao avistar as duas torres de Martinville … Sem confessar-me que aquilo que estava oculto atrás das torres de Martinville devia ser algo como uma bela frase, pois que aparecera sob a forma de palavras que me causavam prazer (Proust, 1981 pp. 156-157).
• 21
  Translation from Portuguese of: “unidade de um signo imaterial e de um sentido inteiramente espiritual”(Deleuze, 2010, p. 39).
• 22
  Translation from Portuguese of: “vocação é sempre uma predestinação com relação aos signos” (Deleuze, 2010, p. 4).
• 23
  Translation from Portuguese of: Cada sujeito exprime o mundo de um certo ponto de vista. Mas o ponto de vista é a própria diferença, a diferença interna e absoluta. Cada sujeito exprime, pois, um mundo absolutamente diferente e, sem dúvida, o mundo expresso não existe fora do sujeito que o exprime (o que chamamos de mundo exterior é apenas a projeção ilusória, o limite uniformizante de todos esses mundos expressos), mas o mundo expresso não se confunde com o sujeito: dele se distingue exatamente como a essência se distingue da existência e inclusive de sua própria existência. Ele não existe fora do sujeito que o exprime, mas é expresso como a essência, não do próprio sujeito, mas do Ser, ou da região do Ser que se revela ao sujeito (Deleuze, 2010, pp. 40-41).
• 24
  Translation from Portuguese of: “Não procurara as duas pedras em que tropeçara no pátio. Mas o modo fortuito, inevitável por que surgira a sensação constituía justamente uma prova da verdade do passado que ressuscitava” (Proust, 1983, p.130).
• 25
  Translation from Portuguese of: A verdade depende de um encontro com alguma coisa que nos força a pensar e a procurar o que é verdadeiro. O acaso dos encontros, a pressão das coações são os dois temas fundamentais de Proust. Pois é precisamente o signo que é objeto de um encontro e é ele que exerce sobre nós a violência. O acaso do encontro é que garante a necessidade daquilo que é pensado” (Deleuze, 2010, p.15).
• 26
  Translation from Portuguese of: “É que a essência é em si mesma diferença, não tendo, entretanto, o poder de diversificar e de diversificar-se, sem a capacidade de se repetir, idêntica a si mesma” (Deleuze, 2010, p. 46).
• 27
  Translation from Portuguese of: “o passado é isso em que nós nos colocamos de súbito para nos lembrar” (2004, p. 30),
• 28
  Translaion from Portuguese of: “Só o presente existe no tempo e reúne, absorve o passado e o futuro, mas só o passado e o futuro insistem no tempo e dividem ao infinito cada presente” (Deleuze, 2015, p. 6).
• 29
  Translation from Portuguese of: “o que vale dizer que essa memória não se apodera diretamente do passado: ela o recompõe com os presentes. … o passado, tal como é em si, coexiste, não sucede ao presente que ele foi” (Deleuze, 2010, pp. 54-55).
• 30
  Translation from Portuguese of: … o sabor do bolinho fazendo o passado permear o presente ao ponto de me tornar hesitante, sem saber em qual dos dois me encontrava; na verdade, o ser que em mim então gozava dessa impressão e lhe desfrutava o conteúdo extratemporal, repartido entre o dia antigo e o atual … conseguia situar no único meio onde poderia viver, gozar a essência das coisas, isto é, fora do tempo. … Neste caso, como em todos os precedentes, a sensação comum buscara recriar em torno de si o lugar antigo, enquanto o atual que o substituía opunha-se com toda resistência de sua matéria a essa imigração … (Proust, 1983, pp. 124-126).
• 31
  Translation from Portuguese of: “não é o sujeito que explica a essência, é antes a essência que implica, se envolve, se enrosca no sujeito” (Deleuze, 2010, p. 41).
• 32
  Translation from Portuguese of: Uma nuvem, um triângulo, um campanário, uma flor, um seixo, sentido que talvez houvesse, sob esses sinais, algo diferente que devia procurar descobrir, uma ideia traduzida à maneira dos hieróglifos, que se suporiam representar apenas objetos materiais. Decifração sem dúvida difícil, mas que unicamente nos permitia ler a verdade. Porque as verdades direta e claramente apreendidas pela inteligência no mundo da plena luz são de qualquer modo mais superficiais do que as que a vida nos comunica à nossa revelia numa impressão física já que entrou pelos sentidos, mas da qual podemos extrair o espírito (Proust, 1983, p. 129).
• 33
  Translation from Portuguese of: E o prazer que lhe dava a música e que em breve ia criar nele uma verdadeira necessidade, assemelhava-se com efeito, em tais momentos, ao prazer que sentiria ao experimentar perfumes, ao entrar em contato com um mundo para o qual não fomos feitos, que nos parece sem forma porque nossos olhos não o percebem, sem significado porque escapa à nossa inteligência, e nós só o atingimos por um único sentido. … Swann não se enganara, pois, em crer que a frase da sonata realmente existia. Humana sob esse ponto de vista, pertencia, no entanto, a uma ordem de criaturas sobrenaturais que nunca vimos, mas que apesar disso reconhecemos enlevados quando algum explorador do invisível chega a captar uma delas, a trazê-las, do mundo divino a que ele tem acesso, para brilhar alguns instantes acima do nosso. Era o que fizera Vinteuil com a pequena frase (Proust, 1981, pp. 203 e 292).
• 34
  Translation from Portuguese of: “ela se encarna na matéria, mas essas matérias são dúcteis tão bem malaxadas e desfiadas que se tornam inteiramente espirituais. Essas matérias sem dúvida são a cor para o pintor, como o amarelo de Vermeer, o som para o músico e a palavra para o escritor” (Deleuze, 2010, p. 44).
• 35
  Translation from Portuguese of: Sobretudo ao perguntar-me à Sra de Cambremer como podia eu preferir a companhia de Albertina à de um homem notável como Elstir. Mesmo do ponto de vista intelectual eu a adivinhava enganada, mas não sabia que o erro lhe provinha da ignorância das lições com as quais aprende seu ofício o homem de letras … A mulher de quem não podemos prescindir nos faz sofrer, arranca-nos, como não faria nenhum homem intelectual que nos interessasse, toda uma gama de sentimentos profundos, vitais … Fazendo-me perder tempo, afligindo-me, Albertina me terá sido mais útil, do ponto de vista literário … (Proust, 1983, pp. 150 e 152).
• 36
  Translation from Portuguese of: um homem dotado de sensibilidade poderia, ainda que não tivesse imaginação, escrever romances admiráveis. O sofrimento que outros lhe causassem, seus esforços para evitá-lo, os conflitos que daí lhe resultariam com pessoas cruéis, tudo isso interpretado pela inteligência, forneceria matéria para um livro (Proust, 1983, p. 146).
• 37
  Translation from Portuguese of: “determinar o que é verdadeiramente infinito e o que não é, distinguir o verdadeiro e o falso infinito”. Deleuze (1974, p. 279),
• 38
  Translation from Portuguese of: “só se deixam pensar quando somos coagidos a fazê-lo” (Deleuze, 2010, p. 94).
• 39
  Translation from Portuguese of: só desse modo torna-se necessariamente pensada (Deleuze, 2010, p. 95).
• 40
  Translation from Portuguese of: Sua pesquisa do mundo não humano, para entrar em contato com o neutro vivo das coisas que, estas não pensando, eram, no entanto, vivas, ela passeava por entre barracas e era difícil aproximar-se de alguma, tantas mulheres trafegavam com sacos e carrinhos” (Lispector, 1982, p. 136).
• 41
  Translation from Portuguese of: “Nesse realismo cada coisa da feira tinha importância em si mesma, interligada a um conjunto – mas qual era o conjunto” (Lispector, 1982, p. 137).
• 42
  Translation from Portuguese of: − Não encontro ainda uma resposta quando me pergunto: quem sou eu? Mas acho que agora sei: profundamente sou aquela que tem a própria vida e também a tua vida. Eu bebi a nossa vida.
  − Mas isso não se pergunta. E a pergunta deve ter outra resposta. Não se faça de tão forte perguntando a pior pergunta de um ser humano. Eu, que sou mais forte que você, não posso me perguntar “quem eu sou” sem ficar perdido. E sua voz soara como a de um perdido (Lispector, 1982, p. 173).
• 43
  Translation form Portuguese of: “Nunca se aprende fazendo como alguém, mas fazendo com alguém (Deleuze, 2010, p. 21).

Referências

• Alain. (2012). Considerações sobre a educação seguidas de pedagogia infantil Tradução de Lília Ledon da Silva. São Paulo: É Realizações.
• Comenius. (1966). Didática magna: tratado da arte universal de ensinar tudo a todos Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian.
• Cordeiro, Jaime. (2007) Didática São Paulo: Contexto.
• Deleuze, G. (1988). Diferença e repetição Tradução de Luiz B. L. Orlandi e Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro: edição Graal.
• Deleuze, G. (2010). Proust e os signos (2aed.). Tradução de Antonio Piquet e Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro: Forense Universitária.
• Deleuze, G. (1974). Lógica do sentido Trad. Luiz Roberto Salinas Fortes, São Paulo: Perspectiva.
• Deleuze, G. (2006). Gilbert Simondon: O indivíduo e sua gênese físico-biológica. InG. Deleuze. A ilha deserta: e outros textos Edição preparada por David Lapoujade; organização da edição brasileira e revisão técnica Luiz B. L. Orlandi. São Paulo: Iluminuras.
• Deleuze, G. (2002). Espinosa: filosofia prática Trad. Daniel Lins e Fabien Pascal Lins. Revisão técnica: Eduardo Diatahy Bezerra de Menezes. São Paulo: Escuta.
• Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (2010). O anti-Édipo: capitalismo e esquizofrenia 1 Trad. Luiz B. L. Orlandi. São Paulo: Editora 34.
• Flitner, W. (1935). Pedagogía sistemática Trad. José Ferrater Mora. Barcelona; Madri; Buenos Aires; Rio de Janeiro: Labor.
• Foucault, M. (1990). As palavras e as coisas: uma arqueologia das ciências humanas Trad. Salma Tannus Muchail; revisão Roberto Cortes de Lacersa. (5aed.) São Paulo: Martins Fontes.
• Leibniz, G. W. (1983). A monadologia, In Newton, I. Princípios Matemáticos; Óptica; O peso e o equilíbrio dos fluídos; Leibniz, Gottfried. A monadologia; Discurso de Metafísica e outros textos Traduções de Carlos Lopes de Matos … (et al.). (2a ed.). São Paulo: Abril Cultural, (coll. Os Pensadores).
• Lispector, C. (1982). Uma aprendizagem ou O livro dos Prazeres (15ª ed.). Rio de Janeiro: Editora: Nova Fronteira.
• Maia, L. (2014). A interpretação deleuziana de Proust: aprendizado e subjetividade. InDeleuze Hoje Org: A. B. Azevedo… [et al.]. Editora: Fap-Unifesp. São Paulo.
• Proust, M. (1981). No Caminho de Swann (6a ed.). M. Quintana (Trad.). Rio de Janeiro: Editora Globo.
• Proust, M. (1983). Tempo Redescoberto (7a ed.). L. M. Pereira (Trad.). Rio de Janeiro: Editora Globo.
• Simondon, G. (2005). L`Individuation à La lunière des notions de forme et d´information France: Jérôme Million.
• Zubiri, X. (2005). ¿Qué es investigar? The Xavier Zubiri Review, 7, 5-7.

1

Responsible Editor: Alexandre Filordi de Carvalho. https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4510-9440

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  28 May 2021
• Date of issue
  2021

History

• Received
  06 Sept 2018
• Reviewed
  22 June 2019
• Accepted
  18 Mar 2020