ABSTRACT
Introduction:
We analyze the deliberative process that defines the rules for the regionalization of the special protection services of social assistance. These services deal with situations such as domestic violence and child labor. They are the object of an effort to build the tripartite management model involving the Union, states, and municipalities under the Unified Social Assistance System. We discuss how the power of the agenda is distributed and how bargaining develops between the representatives of these three entities in a cooperative space called the Tripartite Interagency Commission.
Methods:
This is a case study on the deliberative process that approved a regulatory framework for special protection in 2013. The records of the Commission’s meetings and the text of the approved rule were treated using content analysis techniques.
Results:
We have verified the wide prevalence of the federal government in the definition of the Commission’s agenda, indicating that there is an asymmetric cooperation. But there are also situations in which the Commission becomes a more cooperative space, ensuring stability and reciprocity in the relationship between the three entities.
Discussion:
We support, with new evidence, assumptions from the literature on intergovernmental relations that highlight the federal government’s ability to exercise greater power in arenas of this type, as well as the cooperative role of states and municipalities.
Keywords
federalism; intergovernmental relations; interorganizational relationships; social assistance; Unified System of Social Assistance