Decision-Making Process in the Executive: an Analysis of CAMEX in Coalitional Presidentialism

Abstract

Introduction:

Who wins more in foreign trade policy? This paper analyses the decision-making process of the Chamber of Foreign Trade (Camex), within Brazilian coalitional presidentialism. Ministers from different parties with divergent preferences must decide on several proposals of foreign trade policy. Our central hypothesis was that the larger the ideological distance between one minister’s party and the president’s party, the less the success in Camex.

Materials and Methods:

Using content analysis to examine Camex’s Council of Ministers meeting records between 2001 and 2010, we collected 292 proposals of trade defense and tariff modifications submitted by ministers to Camex. We then used data on ministerial partisanship and ideological position from parties in Congress. We then employed logistic regression and rare event logit (ReLogit) techniques to verify whether ideological distance matters for ministerial success.

Results:

Despite some statistical caveats, our results confirm the central hypothesis, with a negative and significant impact of the ideological distance on the success of ministers. Regression models have to account for punctual oppositions of Camex’s members over some ministers’ proposals.

Discussion:

Therefore, Camex can be considered an institutionalized body of control of the president over the cabinet, in addition to the further presidential accountability tools.

Keywords:
Coalitional Presidentialism; Political Institutions; Executive Branch; Camex; Foreign Trade