The Distribution of Capital between the Left Hand and the Right Hand of the Brazilian Bureaucracy

ABSTRACT

Introduction

Building on Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical formulations on the State, this work examines data from more than two hundred civilian careers of the Brazilian Federal Executive Branch to understand how the distribution of different types of capital occurs in the Brazilian bureaucracy.

Methods

The Principal Components Analysis (PCA) method was used in a career’s database built from data extracted from the Integrated System of Human Resources Administration (Siape). Results: Results show that careers associated with the bourdieusian notion of the right hand of the State are more valued and more restricted, such as economics, management, finance and control, and those associated with the left hand of the State are less valued and less restricted, such as health, education and social assistance;

Discussion

revealing an unequal distribution of capital in the Brazilian bureaucracy that can interfere in the odds that each kind of bureaucrat holds at the permanent struggle to indicate what is and speak in the name of public interest.

KEYWORDS:
State; bureaucracy; bureaucratic elites; Public Interest; Inequality