Abstract
The traditional concept of separation of powers teaches that Legislative branch is the locus of political decisions in society by excellence. However, judicial review has ascended obstinately, being seen as an essential and needful aspect to contemporary constitutional democracies. In Brazil, Supremo Tribunal Federal is expressly consecrated guardian of the Constitution, getting the final say on institutional dialogues faced with other branches of the state. For many it is a victory for the guarantee of fundamental rights. For others, it is merely a Pyrrhic victory: it looks like an achievement, but its costs outweigh its gains. Adept of this premise, Jeremy Waldron develops an extensive criticism to judicial review of legislation, with foundation in his ideal conception of legislative institutions. Therefore, it is questioned: is it possible to extract contributions to Brazil's political and legal context from the study of Waldron's theory? Opening with this problematic, the present research aims to study and present Waldron's theory and to speculate possible contributions.
Keywords:
judicial review; constitutional jurisdiction; institutional dialogues; separation of powers; Jeremy Waldron