Abstract
This paper has the purpose to investigate how, in the Brazilian Supreme Court, the Justice-Rapporteur has used his individual powers in a manner not authorized by the Constitution, to decide monocratically on injunctions, to control the timing of the process and to use the power to implement their own agenda. The research develops on the basis of a critical-methodological line, from the theoretical perspective of Richard Albert and Alec Stone Sweet, and of quantitative and qualitative research, in order to critically investigate how the use of this individual power by the Justice-Rapporteur occurs. In the end, it is concluded that the Brazilian Supreme Court practice, which has hypertrophied the individual power of its Justices, is approaching a true judicial constitutional dismemberment, above all by the way in which each Justice individually guards the collegiate competence and innovates in the legal order, often diverging from the Court’s own jurisprudence. In addition, Justices of Brazilian Supreme Court, by increasing their own power, have fragmented the power of the Court and altered the rule of recognition and the basic norm to enforce a monocratic decision modifying the constitutional right, violating the Constitution, which constitutes a juridical coup d’État.
Keywords:
Brazilian Supreme Court; Justice-Rapporteur; hypertrophic powers; constitutional dismemberment; juridical coup d’État