Economia de custos de transação e indicações geográficas: uma análise sistemática da literatura

Meirelles, Franklin de Souza; Giraldi, Janaina de Moura Engracia; Campos, Rodolfo Paião de

Franklin de Souza Meirelles

Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto (FEA-RP), Programa de Pós-graduação, Universidade de São Paulo (USP), Ribeirão Preto (SP), Brasil. E-mails: franklinmeirelles@gmail.com; jgiraldi@usp.br; rodolfo.decampos@usp.br

http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7147-5685

Janaina de Moura Engracia Giraldi

Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto (FEA-RP), Programa de Pós-graduação, Universidade de São Paulo (USP), Ribeirão Preto (SP), Brasil. E-mails: franklinmeirelles@gmail.com; jgiraldi@usp.br; rodolfo.decampos@usp.br

http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3086-7134

Rodolfo Paião de Campos

Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto (FEA-RP), Programa de Pós-graduação, Universidade de São Paulo (USP), Ribeirão Preto (SP), Brasil. E-mails: franklinmeirelles@gmail.com; jgiraldi@usp.br; rodolfo.decampos@usp.br

http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2788-8604

Costs	Benefits
Establishment of legal framework	Market Access
Definition of geographic boundaries	Increase in sales
Establishment of standards and criteria	Increase in value/profitability
Local information mechanisms	Quality/authenticity guarantee
Certification and control costs	Traceability
Marketing and promotion costs	Complementary effect in the region
Investments in production structure	Land value growth
Adaptation to specifications	Induction to tourism
Commercial/technological limitations	Growth in employment rates
Costs of protection mechanisms	Sociocultural valorization
Administrative and bureaucratic costs	Local governance

	[“geographic indication]”	[“transaction cost”]*
Scopus	1.665	17.715
Web of Science	1.277	13.898

No.	Author	Title	Product	Type of study	InOrdinatio	Year of Publication	Fi	Ci
1	Ghazoul et al. (2009)Ghazoul, J., Garcia, C., & Kushalappa, C. (2009). Landscape labelling: a concept for next-generation payment for ecosystem service schemes. Forest Ecology and Management, 258(9), 1889-1895. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foreco.2009.01.038 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foreco.2009....	Landscape labelling: A concept for next-generation payment for ecosystem service schemes.	-	Theoretical Proposition	1100.176	2009	176	113
2	Cañada & Vázquez (2005)Cañada, J., & Vázquez, A. (2005). Quality certification, institutions and innovation in local agro-food systems: Protected designations of origin of olive oil in Spain. Journal of Rural Studies, 21(4), 475-486. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2005.10.001 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2005....	Quality certification, institutions and innovation in local agro-food systems: protected designations of origin of olive oil in Spain	Olive Oil	Case study	1010.104	2005	104	108
3	Jena & Grote (2010)Jena, P. R., & Grote, U. (2010). Changing institutions to protect regional heritage: a case for geographical indications in the Indian Agrifood Sector. Development Policy Review, 28(2), 217-236. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2010.00482.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7679.20...	Changing Institutions to Protect Regional Heritage: A Case for Geographical Indications in the Indian Agrifood Sector	Rice and Tea	Case study	690.061	2010	61	71
4	Traversac et al. (2011)Traversac, J. B., Rousset, S., & Perrier-Cornet, P. (2011). Farm resources, transaction costs and forward integration in agriculture: Evidence from French wine producers. Food Policy, 36(6), 839-847. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2011.07.007 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2011.0...	Farm resources, transaction costs and forward integration in agriculture: Evidence from French wine producers	Wines	Case study	540.102	2011	102	55
5	Quiñones-Ruiz et al. (2016a)Quiñones-Ruiz, X. F., Penker, M., Belletti, G., Marescotti, A., Scaramuzzi, S., Barzini, E., Pircher, M., Leitgeb, F., & Samper-Gartner, L. F. (2016a). Insights into the black box of collective efforts for the registration of Geographical Indications. Land Use Policy, 57, 103-116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2016.05.021 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2...	Insights into the black box of collective efforts for the registration of Geographical Indications.	Coffee, olive oil, beans, and cider	Case study	530.115	2016	115	49
6	Quiñones-Ruiz et al. (2016b)Quiñones-Ruiz, X. F., Penker, M., Belletti, G., Marescotti, A., & Scaramuzzi, S. (2016b). Why early collective action pays off: evidence from setting Protected Geographical Indications. Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems, 32(2), 179-192. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1742170516000168 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1742170516000...	Why early collective action pays off: evidence from setting Protected Geographical Indications.	Beans and cider	Case study	360.053	2016	53	32
7	Fernández-Barcala et al. (2017)Fernández-Barcala, M., González-Díaz, M., & Raynaud, E. (2017). Contrasting the governance of supply chains with and without geographical indications: complementarity between levels. Supply Chain Management, 22(4), 305-320. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/scm-05-2016-0161 http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/scm-05-2016-01...	Contrasting the governance of supply chains with and without geographical indications: complementarity between levels.	Meat and meat products	Case study	260.115	2017	115	21
8	López-Bayón et al. (2018)López-Bayón, S., González-Díaz, M., Solís-Rodríguez, V., & Fernández-Barcala, M. (2018). Governance decisions in the supply chain and quality performance: the synergistic effect of geographical indications and ownership structure. International Journal of Production Economics, 197, 1-12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2017.12.022 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2017.12...	Governance decisions in the supply chain and quality performance: The synergistic effect of geographical indications and ownership structure.	Wines	Descriptive Analysis	220.185	2018	185	16
9	Fernández-Olmos et al. (2009)Fernández-Olmos, M., Rosell Martínez, J., & Espitia-Escuer, M. (2009). The relationship between product quality and transaction costs with vertical coordination in DOC [Qualified Designation of Origin] Rioja winegrape industry. Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research, 7(2), 281. http://dx.doi.org/10.5424/sjar/2009072-419 http://dx.doi.org/10.5424/sjar/2009072-4...	The relationship between product quality and transaction costs with vertical coordination in DOC Rioja winegrape industry	Wines	Case study	180.036	2009	36	21
10	Perito et al. (2017)Perito, M., de Rosa, M., Bartoli, L., Chiodo, E., & Martino, G. (2017). Heterogeneous organizational arrangements in agrifood chains: a governance value analysis perspective on the sheep and goat meat sector of Italy. Agriculture, 7(6), 47. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/agriculture7060047 http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/agriculture706...	Heterogeneous Organizational Arrangements in Agrifood Chains: A Governance Value Analysis Perspective on the Sheep and Goat Meat Sector of Italy.	Meat	Case study	140.028	2017	28	9
11	Rodrigo et al. (2015)Rodrigo, I., Cristóvão, A., Tibério, M. L., Baptista, A., Maggione, L., & Pires, M. (2015). The Portuguese Agrifood Traditional Products: main constraints and challenges. Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural, 53(Suppl.1), 23-32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1234-56781806-94790053s01002 http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1234-56781806-...	The Portuguese agrifood traditional products: Main constraints and challenges	Agri-food Products	Exploratory Research	140.016	2015	16	11
12	Fernández-Olmos et al. (2016)Fernández-Olmos, M., Dejo-Oricain, N., & Rosell-Martínez, J. (2016). Product differentiation strategy and vertical integration: an application to the DOC Rioja wine industry. Journal of Business Economics and Management, 17(5), 796-809. https://doi.org/10.3846/16111699.2013.815130 https://doi.org/ https://doi.org/10.3846...	Product differentiation strategy and vertical integration: an application to the DOC Rioja wine industry	Wines	Case study	120.037	2016	37	8
13	Muller et al. (2021)Muller, P., Böhm, M., Csillag, P., Donati, M., Drut, M., Ferrer-Pérez, H., Gauvrit, L., Gil, J. M., Hoang, V., Malak-Rawlikowska, A., Mattas, K., Napasintuwong, O., Nguyen, A., Papadopoulos, I., Ristic, B., Stojanovic, Z., Török, Á., Tsakiridou, E., Veneziani, M., & Bellassen, V. (2021). Are certified supply chains more socially sustainable? A bargaining power analysis. Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, 19(2), 177-192.	Are Certified Supply Chains More Socially Sustainable? A Bargaining Power Analysis	-	Theoretical Proposition	120.021	2021	21	3
14	La Sala et al. (2017)La Sala, P. L., Faccilongo, N., & Fiore, M. (2017). Integrated management of the PGI “Matera” Bread chain. World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and Sustainable Development, 13(5/6), 665-683. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/wremsd.2017.086336 http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/wremsd.2017.08...	Integrated management of the PGI 'Matera' Bread chain	Bread	Case study	110.016	2017	16	6
15	Martino et al. (2019)Martino, G., Toccaceli, D., & Bavorova, M. (2019). An analysis of food safety private investments drivers in the Italian meat sector. Agricultural Economics, 65(1), 21-30. http://dx.doi.org/10.17221/352/2017-agricecon https://doi.org/ http://dx.doi.org/10.17...	An analysis of food safety private investments drivers in the Italian meat sector	Animal protein	Case study	100.022	2019	22	3
16	Mwakaje et al. (2018)Mwakaje, A. E. G., Bosselmann, A. S., Hansted, L., Nyunza, G., & Maganga, F. (2018). Using geographical indications for signalling quality and reducing transaction costs of marketing Uyui honey from Tanzania. Forests, Trees and Livelihoods, 27(2), 118-138. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14728028.2018.1445040 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14728028.2018....	Using geographical indications for signalling quality and reducing transaction costs of marketing Uyui honey from Tanzania	Honey	Case study	90.026	2018	26	3
17	Wang et al. (2021)Wang, H., Anh, D. T., & Moustier, P. (2021). The benefits of geographical indication certification through farmer organizations on low-income farmers: the case of Hoa Vang sticky rice in Vietnam. Cahiers Agricultures, 30, 46. Retrieved in 2022, August 30, from https://www.cahiersagricultures.fr/articles/cagri/full_html/2021/01/cagri200231/cagri200231.html https://www.cahiersagricultures.fr/artic...	The benefits of geographical indication certification through farmer organizations on low-income farmers: The case of Hoa Vang sticky rice in Vietnam	Rice	Case study	90.019	2021	19	0
18	Camanzi et al. (2018)Camanzi, L., Bartoli, G., Biondi, B., & Malorgio, G. (2018). A Structural-Functional Theory approach to vertical coordination in agri-food supply chains: Insights from the “Gran Suino Italiano” Inter-branch Organisation. Economia Agro-Alimentare, 2, 169-180. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/ecag2018-002003 http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/ecag2018-00200...	A structural-functional theory approach to vertical coordination in agri-food supply chains: Insights from the “Gran Suino Italiano” inter-branch organisation	Meats	Case study	80.009	2018	9	2
19	Beaupain & Joliet (2011) Beaupain, R. & Joliet, R. (2011). Corporate drivers of market liquidity on the Warsaw stock exchange. Économie internationale, 125, 83-104. https://doi.org/10.3917/ecoi.125.0083 https://doi.org/10.3917/ecoi.125.0083...	Corporate drivers of market liquidity on the warsaw stock exchange	-	-	50.016	2011	16	6
20	Yarbrough & Yarbrough (2003)Yarbrough, B. V., & Yarbrough, R. M. (2003). Homogeneity and heterogeneity within and across boundaries and shorelines: ensemble of darwin’s finches and human transaction types. Journal of Bioeconomics, 5, 165-191. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1025808008983 http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:102580800898...	Homogeneity and Heterogeneity Within and Across Boundaries and Shorelines: Ensemble of Darwin’s Finches and Human Transaction Types	-	Theoretical Essay	-69.975	2003	25	2
21	Mendes & Troskie (2001)Mendes, E. J., & Troskie, D. P. (2001). Changing the rules: an incentive for differentiation? Agrekon, 40(4), 593-608. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03031853.2001.9524976 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03031853.2001....	Changing the rules: an incentive for Differentiation?	-	Theoretical Proposition	-79.976	2001	24	3
22	Minford, P. (2002) Minford, P. (2002). Coûts et avantages de l’UEM pour le Royaume-Uni, le “cinquieme test”. Économie Internationale, (3), 115-143.	Coûts et avantages de l'UEM pour le Royaume-Uni, le “cinquieme test”	-	-	-99.984	2002	16	0

Author	Number of publications
Fernandez-Olmos, M. / Rosell-Martinez, J.	3
Belletti, G. / Dejo-Oricain, N. / Fernandez-Barcala, M. / Gonzalez-Diaz, M. / Marescotti, A. / Martino, G. / Penker, M. / Quinones-Ruiz, X.F. / Scaramuzzi, S.	2
Anh, D.T / Baptista, A. / Bartoli, G. / Bartoli, L. / Barzini, E. / Bavorova, M. / Bellassen, V. / Biondi, B. / Böhm, M. / Bosselmann, A. / Camanzi, L. / Chiodo, E. / Cristóvão, A. / Csillag, P. / De Rosa, M. / Donati, M. / Drut, M. / Espitia-Escuer, M.A. / Faccilongo, N. / Ferrer-Pérez, H. / Fiore, M. / Garcia, C. / Gauvrit, L. / Ghazoul, J / Gil, J. / Grote, U. / Hansted, L. / Hoang, V. / Jena, P.R. / Kushalappa, C.G. / La Sala, P. / Leitgeb, F. / Lopez-Bayon, S. / Maganga, F. / Maggione, L. / Malak-Rawlikowska, A. / Malorgio, G. / Mattas, K. / Mendes, E.J. / Moustier, P. / Muller, P. / Mwakaje, A / Napasintuwong, O. / Nguyen, A. / Nyunza, G. / Palenichak, O. / Papadopoulos, I. / Perito, M.A. / Perrier-Cornet, P. / Pircher, M. / Pires, M. / Raynaud, E. / Ristic, B. / Rodrigo, I. / Rousset, S. / Samper-Gartner, L.F. / Solis-Rodriguez, V. / Stojanovic, Z. / Tibério, M.L. / Toccaceli, D. / Török, Á. / Traversac, J.B. / Troskie, D.P. / Tsakiridou, E. / Veneziani, M. / Wang, H.Y. / Yarbrough, B.V. / Yarbrough, R.M.	1

No.	Content analysis in brief summary
1	The study does not specifically focus on GIs, nor does it rely on TCE as a main theory. Basically, it is a study with a proposal to create a new method of PES (Payment for Environmental Services), defined by the authors as “Landscape Labeling”. The authors’ motivation lies in the analysis of collective units, rather than individual units. The study therefore focuses on the role of institutions for collective property rights, the current that is addressed by Ostrom (2008)Ostrom, E. (2008). Institutions and the environment. Economic Affairs, 28(3), 24-31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.2008.00840.x http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0270.20... . In this sense, GIs are cited as an example of geographic area generating collective differentiation, while transaction costs are seen as the main barrier for smaller producers to participate in PES schemes. With the proposal presented by the authors, the reduction in the number of units reduces the number of transactions and, consequently, the costs.
2	It addresses GIs as a certificate of quality for olive oils in Spain. As such, GIs reduce transaction costs between producers and distributors, allowing producers to access the market regardless of production size and, consequently, gains in scale.The study contributes to the literature on GIs as it suggests space for innovation in quality-certified chains. This way, even though GIs are based on the aspect of tradition, innovations in labels and traceability, there is still a way to go in terms of capturing value by making extra investments in these aspects of innovation.
3	Case study with two Indian Geographical Indications (rice and tea). The authors used the concepts of the New Institutional Economics to analyze GIs as intellectual property rights and institutions, in addition to characterizing GIs as a mechanism for reducing transaction costs, since they reduce the informational asymmetry of quality between producers and consumers.
4	It analyzes the governance structures of producers and wine in France according to the degree of specificity of the assets involved (training of the workforce, reputation via brand and certification), observing a greater tendency of vertical integration, with the distribution stages being carried out by the producers themselves in situations where the specifics were greater.
5	It studies the collective efforts of producers and associations in the establishment and monitoring of GIs. By carrying out case studies (an Italian GI and an Austrian GI), the authors sought to analyze the institutional context of the GI, the efforts, risks, and benefits involved in the registration and the result of the process. In this sense, the non-monetary costs of establishing standards and criteria, cited by Giovannucci et al. (2009)Giovannucci, D., Josling, T. E., Kerr, W. A., O’Connor, B., & Yeung, M. T. (2009). Guide to geographical indications: linking products and their origins (summary). SSRN Electronic Journal, 1736713, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1736713 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1736713... , become evident.The conclusions point to a relationship between collective effort from the beginning and success in registration (mainly in the standardization of the product/production process) and use of GIs. The authors point out as a gap for future studies the understanding of possible ways to organize the interaction between heterogeneous groups of producers, seeking unity in the decisions and applications of GIs.
6	It focuses on the collective actions of producers whose products have been certified with GI in the European Union. The authors carried out five case studies, in which they sought to identify the time and effort required in the registration process, as well as the actors involved, and the results obtained according to the degree of involvement of these actors.The analyses carried out after qualitative interviews with various actors in the chains of the five products point to a greater collective effort in the design of the GI strategy and in the definition of product specifications, as well as a better use of the GIs by the chains that invested collective efforts in the most demanding phases.
7	Explores chain governance with certified-by-origin products. Among other points, the authors identified that in transactions involving products with GIs, the level of coordination is high even in cases where there is no vertical integration, since the search for quality standards makes relationships more short-term oriented. The study empirically explains how asset specificity affects transaction costs and, consequently, organizational arrangements (Williamson, 1991Williamson, O. (1991). Comparative economic organization: the analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(2), 269. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2393356 http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2393356... ). The authors concluded that the importance of other links in agricultural chains in the development of GIs is related to the fact that the search for competitiveness of products depends exclusively on private levels of governance, since the public sector is exclusively responsible for certifying that the indicated prerequisites are effectively met.
8	It verifies the relationship between governance decisions and quality in the agri-food sector. For this, they evaluated the correlation between a quality dependent variable and GI independent variables (PDO or PGI) and the type of wine producing company (private or cooperative). The results indicate that in the most restrictive type of GI, in this case the PDO, private companies have a greater correlation with the quality of the wine, when compared to PGIs and cooperatives, respectively. While the explanation for the results obtained in the GIs lies in the greater coordination, the incentives explain the results obtained in the type of company. The authors recommend, as future studies, the analysis of the correlation between quality and the existence of certification of origin (as opposed to comparing the two types of GI). This study empirically proves several points brought by TCE. First, the PDOs, as they are more restrictive, tend to signify the existence of more specific assets. Such assets increase transaction costs (Williamson, 1985Williamson, O. (1985). The economics institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.), which results in a greater need for coordination (Williamson, 1991Williamson, O. (1991). Comparative economic organization: the analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(2), 269. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2393356 http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2393356... ).
9	It analyzes the relationship between the need for product quality assurance and the governance model, concluding again that vertical integration is the most used model by producers in regions with registration of origin.
10	It relates value propositions with different governance mechanisms in the sheep chain in central Italy. At work, ECT is approached through the analysis of governance in existing arrangements (Williamson, 1991Williamson, O. (1991). Comparative economic organization: the analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36(2), 269. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2393356 http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2393356... ), while GIs are used as a strategy for value proposition, via quality differentiation. As a complement, the authors insert the existence of resources on the part of producers to also relate aspects of the Resource-Based View (RBV). Data were collected via survey and analyzed using cluster analysis, generating three distinct groups of rural producers. The results indicate that producers who are involved in GI certification in the region (almost 22% of respondents) sell their products via specialized wholesalers in the certified product chain, in contrast to other non-certified producers. The role of the GI in defining the institutional arrangement is, therefore, the greatest contribution of the study.
11	It develops a study with the objective of understanding the reasons why Portuguese producers enjoy, to a lesser extent, when compared to other European countries, mechanisms for the protection of traditional agri-food products. Transaction costs appear as one of the causes for the low adherence of producers to certification mechanisms. The authors observed that the cost-effectiveness of adhering to such mechanisms discourages producers, since the difference in marketing prices is not that significant, while there are considerable transaction costs involved in the certification process.
12	It seeks to understand which aspects are analyzed by organizations for verticalization decision-making. Among the most relevant analysis variables, the need to mitigate opportunisms, contingencies for unpredictable situations and opportunities for product differentiation stand out.
13	It seeks to relate food quality assurance mechanisms (Food Quality Schemes - FQS) with the bargaining power of actors in food chains. GIs are addressed in the study as examples of FQSs, while transaction costs are analyzed from the perspective of asset specificity, which are a source of bargaining power for players in agrifood chains. The results indicate that FQSs are mechanisms of sustainable social advantages, since they allow a better distribution of bargaining power along the chains, as well as reduce opportunistic behaviors in these, with transaction costs being one of the factors responsible for the balance of power.
14	It analyzes an Italian bread chain with a Geographical Indication record to evaluate an information system that helps the management of players throughout the system. The experiment carried out by the authors observed a significant reduction in transaction costs along the chain (wheat production, flour production to bread production, an element registered with the GI), a consequence of the efficient use of information. The study contributes, therefore, with the proof that the reduction of uncertainties results in the reduction of transaction costs (Williamson, 1985Williamson, O. (1985). The economics institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.).
15	It analyzes necessary investments in a certain chain, conceptualizing such investments with specific assets. Although some specificities observed in the present study are the result of investments to be made by producers, there are specificities arising from the GI concept itself (related to location and procedural) that are considerably relevant both for understanding the feasibility of adhering to the mechanism (objective of the study) and for governance structures in chains.
16	This is a study with a hypothetical GI of honey from an important producing region in Tanzania, to verify the hypothesis that the registration of the product tends to reduce transaction costs both in the local and international markets, especially due to the reduction of information asymmetry related to product quality. Using primary data (quantitative surveys with producers, honey players, and consumers), the authors compared transaction costs, defined by uncertainty, opportunism, transaction frequency and asset specificity, in the marketing of honey with and without GI. The results indicated a reduction in transaction costs in the search for information on quality, bargaining power, competition between producers and uncertainty related to quantity and cooperation between players. Again, the reduction of uncertainty as a factor in reducing transaction costs (Williamson, 1985Williamson, O. (1985). The economics institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press.) was observed in an empirical study.
17	This study adds an Asian case to the literature by relating producer organization (collective action) and financial results obtained by small rice producers in Vietnam. As a result, the authors observed that GIs work as a reducer of transaction costs in market access for small producers, although the mechanism is not yet sufficient to raise the income of these small producers to the same level as large producers, even if they are not users of signs of origin.
18	Analyzes, in a specific GI of Italian ham/salami, the PDO registered as “Gran Suino Italiano”. The study sought to identify challenges faced by pig producers in their relationship with processors, from the perspective of Transaction Costs (contractual relationships and verticalization) and the Theory of Contracts. The main result of the study demonstrates the perception of producers that current contracts with processors are incomplete, informal and individual, generally resulting in losses for producers, especially with regard to the evaluation of the animal carcass, a determining variable for the definition of the price from processors to producers.
19	It uses the mechanism of GIs to illustrate the need for institutional adaptation for transactions that cross geographic boundaries. The authors approach the negotiations that involve the international protection of products of origin, such as Roquefort and Champagne, based on the TRIPS Agreement, seeking to analyze such negotiations from the perspective of institutional infrastructures.
20	It presents an essay that relates NIE to GIs. According to the authors, GIs, if well developed and instituted, reduce the transaction costs of the systems in which they are involved. This is because, once the GIs are established, there is a certain control over the geographic brand, changing economic incentives and reducing uncertainties and opportunistic behavior by agents. In addition, the costs of complying with participation contracts in the region also tend to be reduced, since it is possible to exclude/penalize producers who do not comply with the rules, which are fully transparent through legislation. Another relationship between the themes is the establishment of the property rights of the applicant associations for the geographic names. In this sense, the study empirically contributes to the contractual theories developed by Barzel (1997)Barzel, Y. (1997). Economic analysis of property rights. New York: Cambridge University Press..

[1] Source: elaborated by the authors, based on Giovannucci et al. (2009)Giovannucci, D., Josling, T. E., Kerr, W. A., O’Connor, B., & Yeung, M. T. (2009). Guide to geographical indications: linking products and their origins (summary). SSRN Electronic Journal, 1736713, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1736713
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1736713...

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Economia de custos de transação e indicações geográficas: uma análise sistemática da literatura

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