Abstract.
In this paper, I clarify the nature of the most fundamental moral commitments that lie at the basis of contemporary discussions on the ethics of migration, some of which are explicitly adopted by both supporters and critics of the open borders proposal. I argue that it is impossible to provide a rational justification for these principles themselves, but that this situation does not imply that moral relativism is a plausible position. Understanding the unique nature of our commitment to fundamental ethical values and principles (which I here call ‘fundamental-and-groundless’ principles) does not imply that moral relativism is a plausible position, but quite the opposite, namely that we should become aware that both moral relativism and moral skepticism are absurd positions. This result has consequences on the ethics of migration, inasmuch as it blocks any attempt at justifying anti-immigrant positions which appeal to moral relativism.
Keywords:
Ethics of migration; open borders; moral skepticism; moral relativism