Abstract
This paper focuses on the Brazilian Supreme Court's performance in disagreement with what the Constitution and the rules of the constitutional process establish and also with what is expected from a Supreme Court. To do so, it analyzes three cases: (i) the naturalization of individual precautionary measures in ADI; (ii) the (im)possibility of conciliation and transaction of the constitutionality in ADI; and (iii) the blatant silence of the Plenary of the Court. Such a scenario raises questions of whether it is possible to propose a path of normative correction for Justices’ decisions and whether it is possible to point out a democratic-institutional justification that qualifies the Court's performance. Confronting these questions, this paper proposes that respect for the constitutional procedures, not for mere formal observance but because based on a deliberative conception of democracy, can reorient the performance of the Justices, qualify the Court’s performance and mitigate the impasses that have characterized the STF nowadays.
Keywords:
Brazilian Supreme Court; Rules of constitutional process; Individual precautionary measures; Transaction of the constitutionality; Silent plenary; Deliberative democracy