The paper analyses the reasons for the recurrent failure of tax reform in Brazil. The analysis show that the current explanations provided by the political literature (ingovernability, federal veto, opposition from business community, lack of political will of the government) are not enough to explain such failure. The issue of the political strategy for the reform is the hypothesis discussed in the paper. The widespread dissatisfaction with taxes in Brazil induces the government to propose comprehensive reforms altering many aspects of the intricate tax structure of the country. Such proposals have been generating multidimensional conflicts, i.e. many concurrent political divisions. With the purpose of providing elements for comparison, the judicial and the administrative reforms were analyzed, as well as were minor changes in the tax system. The results showed that the tax reforms imposed concentrated costs on a greater number of actors, favoring the formation of a veto coalition.
Federalism; Tax reform; Judicial reform; Administrative reform; Political system
