In developing a theory of the struggle for recognition, Axel Honneth intended to elucidate the way in which theoretical concepts would be able to point out practical "motivations" that lead subjects and social groups to act politically. In this article, we will evaluate the solution offered by Honneth to the relationship between theory and praxis from two criticisms raised by Nancy Fraser: against the empirical scope of the concept and against the centrality of presumed moral psychology. Then we will show that Honneth has sought to account for such criticism at the cost of abandoning the notion of "struggle" as a constitutive element of recognition in order to elaborate a socially justified "theory of justice". Finally, we will conclude that the use of the concept of recognition must be linked to the notion of "struggle" and the social conflicts which it was originally intended to explain, insisting on re-politicization of the theory for recognition.
struggles for recognition; theory of justice; social movements; critical theory; Axel Honneth; Nancy Fraser