Disclosure in public sector: an analysis of the level of disclosure in the annual reports of Brazilian federal government bodies in the year 2010

The present study analyzes the level of public transparency in the annual reports of federal public bodies and the incentives (political, institutional, governmental, social and financial) which can affect the disclosure of public information. It approached the Agency Theory and the need for public accountability in the disclosure of information, since government managers may provide incomplete information (agency conflict). Accordingly a greater transparency of public information may serve as a way of approaching the principal (citizens) and the agent (public officer). We carried out an empirical research, quantitative, which analyze the level of transparency presented in the 2010´s annual reports of 115 federal public entities. For this purpose, an index of federal public transparency was constructed, based on international studies, in order to verify the level of disclosure presented on the annual reports and the incentives that affect disclosure. The results indicate a moderate level of public transparency (48%), deficiency of compliance with mandatory disclosure (80%) and low adherence to voluntary disclosure practices (19%). Regarding incentives to disclosure, a positive relationship of the entity type, accessibility and personnel demographic with the public transparency index was observed, while public bureaucracy showed a significant relationship, but negative. Meanwhile the size, size of core management, budgetary revenues and federal dependency does not influence the disclosure of public information in the annual reports.

public transparency index; annual reports; governmental incentives.