This article analyzes the particularities of the public utilities 'modern' regulation scheme, which became predominant during the privatization processes of the last quarter of the twentieth century. In contrast with the institutional framework characteristic of the period of state provision ('endogenous' regulation), the regulatory agencies emerge as the neuralgic element of the new scheme. However, as the Argentine experience demonstrates, these organisms have been endowed with ambiguous regulatory capacities and inappropriate institutional frameworks, and therefore their actual regulatory capacity has been seriously damaged. As a consequence of both this unclear definition of missions and functions and the theoretical imprecision present in this matter, this article attempts to delimitate the extent of involvement of the different actors' scheme: providing companies, regulatory agencies, state powers (Executive and Legislative branches), and both users and consumers. To this respect, the article focuses on the most appropriate institutional frameworks for the development of effective regulatory capacities for the agencies. The analysis is illustrated with examples drawn from the Argentine experience of privatization, at the national and sub-national levels, considering the electricity and the drinking water and sewer systems.
regulation; regulatory entities; public utilities; Argentina
