In the context of Career Audit of Receita Federal was used for about nine years, the system of variable remuneration linked to the assessment of individual performance and the achievement of fundraising goals. From 2008, this remuneration system was replaced by the mode of compensation for pecuniary benefit, set in a lump sum, without bonuses or rewards. The new model marks the end of the performance goals for individual and institutional remuneration. Given this reality, the research aims to answer the following question: What effect will the model change of variable compensation to pay for subsidy issue in organizational commitment in the context of career federal tax audit? The overall objective is to investigate the relationship of organizational commitment in models of variable pay and allowance. For this purpose, are considered two different times so pay: under the regime of variable pay, linked to individual performance and the achievement of organizational goals, and the second time in the form of pay for the subsidy, without any link with organizational goals or individual performance. The research is quantitative and descriptive as to the purposes, using a survey as a method of data collection, with 142 members of the Audit Career RFB located in the 3rd Region Fiscal. The data analysis was performed using non-parametric statistical inference, based mainly on tests of univariate analysis of variance. The results indicate a high degree of organizational commitment on the part of respondents, lack of effect on this commitment to change the system of remuneration that crossed the category and show that auditors and analysts have a preference for fixed-fee model. There was also a perception of negative change in work with the change in the compensation, indicating the need to examine in future studies, such as organizational resistance variables mediate the process of change in pay systems.
Organizational commitment; Compensation Scheme; Public Career; Variable Pay; Pay-for allowance
