The objective of this article is to circumscribe the concept of subject that emerges from neuroscientific theories of the mind. We approach three key authors from the field of neuroscience: Francisco Varela, Humberto Maturana, and Gerald Edelman. Based on an analysis of their work, we conclude that a given concept of subject, founded on an entirely materialist view of the mind, emerges as an advantageous substitute for what we could call a "psychological" concept, based principally but not exclusively on psychoanalysis. We discuss the hypothesis that the current success of the "neuroscientific" vision of human beings, while in fact pointing to some degree of break with the so-called "modern paradigm", may also be interpreted as the radicalization of given characteristics and contradictions present in the constitution of this paradigm itself and, consequently, that of the modern person.
Neuroscience; modern person; mind