Avellaneda, Claudia N.; Gomes, Ricardo Corrêa

doi:10.1590/1984-9240831

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Sumário

Articles • Organ. Soc. 24 (83) • Oct-Dec 2017 • https://doi.org/10.1590/1984-9240831 copiar

Capacidade gerencial dos prefeitos e o desempenho de municípios brasileiros

Autoria SCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

Resumo

Nós testamos a influência da capacidade gerencial no desempenho organizacional empregando dados em painel de 827 (dentre 853) cidades brasileiras do Estado de Minas Gerais num período de seis anos (2005-2010). A comparação dentro do país e dentro do estado é um controle para potenciais variáveis institucionais, históricas e culturais. Capacidade gerencial local é avaliada em termos do nível educacional e experiência do prefeito (experiência em cargos públicos e reeleição), o desempenho municipal é operacionalizado em termos de arrecadação de IPTU per capta e arrecadação de IPTU em relação ao total da Receita. O estudo compreende os quatro anos da administração 2005-2008 e os dois primeiros anos da administração 2009-2012. Após testar os efeitos dos fatores políticos, econômicos e ideológicos e controlando outros fatores relacionados ao município, nós descobrimos, ao contrário de nossas expectativas, que a capacidade gerencial do prefeito falha em explicar a variância da arrecadação de IPTU. Fatores políticos (suporte legislativo e ciclo eleitoral) parecem ser bem mais fortemente correlacionados com arrecadação de IPTU. Especificamente, nos municípios em que o prefeito goza de apoio partidário na Câmara dos Vereadores a arrecadação de IPTU é maior. Além disso, ao comparar com os três primeiros anos da administração, o último ano as prefeituras tendem a reduzir a arrecadação de impostos.

Palavras-chave
Desempenho de organizações públicas; Prefeituras municipais; Minas Gerais; IPTU

Group of inhabitants	N. ofmunicipalities	N. of municipalities in the region
Group of inhabitants	N. ofmunicipalities	North	North-East	Center-West	South-East	South
Up to 10,000	2,661	183	662	267	812	737
10,000-20,000	1,292	100	557	104	326	205
20,000-50,000	1,033	115	416	65	289	148
50,000-200,000	448	42	132	26	170	78
200,000-500,000	93	8	15	3	47	20
500,000 and more	35	2	12	2	17	2
Total	5,562	450	1794	467	1,661	1,190

Region	Population	% pop.	N. ofmunicipalities	GDP per head^* * Figures in Brazilian real.
North	14,623,316	8%	450	7,620
Northeast	51,534,406	28%	1,794	4,440
Southeast	77,873,120	42%	467	13,210
South	26,733,595	15%	1,661	13,000
Central	13,222,854	7%	1,190	11,260
Brazil	183,987,291	100%	5,562	9,910

Federal transfers		State transfers		Local revenue
• 22.5% of income tax • 25% of tax on industrial products (IPI) • 50% of rural property tax • 70% of tax on gold and financial operations (Gold/IPF)		• 25% of value-added tax (ICMS) • 50% of vehicle registration tax (IPVA)		• Service tax (ISS) • Urban property tax • Frontage tax • Property transfers (ITBI)

Variables	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Dependent variable
Tax property collection/capita	12.72	21.05	0	319.39
Tax property as percentage of total revenue	0.95	1.37	0.00'	14.27
Support from above
Mayor-governor party alignment	0.42	0.49	0	1
President-mayor party alignment	0.13	0.33	0	1
Horizontal support
City council support (%)	2.51	1.329	0	100
Support from below
Margin of victory	17.58	19.01	0	100+
Socio-economic factors
Municipal GDP/capita*	8,477.55	10,333.7	1,428.88	239,773.6
Government ideology
Leftist government	0.19	0.39	0	1
Managerial quality
Mayor's education	5.03	1.97	1	7
Mayor's age	48	10	23	85
Mayor's public experience	0.23	0.42	0	1
Mayor's second term	0.27	0.45	0	1
Controls
Royalties	319,835	2.14e+06	0	4.99e+07
Number of properties	5299	11722	263	195786
Total grants	1.33e+07	2.94e+07	2.27e+06	8.43e+08
Total spending	823.62	672.91	1.93	5651
First administration year	.3	.46	0	1
Second administration year	.3	.46	0	1
Third administration year	.3	.46	0	1

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
PropertyTax Collection/cap	1
Tax Property/Total Revenues	0.87	1
Governor-Mayor Party Alignment	-0.04	-0.03	1
President-Mayor Party Alignment	0.08	0.04 -0.17		1
City Council Support	-0.06	-0.02	0.01	0.02	1
Margin of Victory	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	0	0.17	1
Leftist Government	0.09	0.07	-0.26	0.31	-0.12	-0.04	1
GDP/cap	0.22	0.12	0	0.02	-0.07	-0.01	0.03	1
Mayor's Education	0.15	0.18	-0.03	0.1	-0.04	0.04	0.09	0.09	1
Mayor'sAge	0.1	0.14	0.03	-0.07	-0.05	-0.06	-0.1	0.03	-0.17	1
Mayor's Public Experience	0.03	-0.02	0.05	-0.04	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.06	-0.05	0.03	1
Mayo r's Secon d Term	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.18	0.16	-0.04	0.02	-0.01	0.08	0.38	1
Royalties (Ig)	0.12	0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.06	0	0.05	0.13	0.07	0.02	0.07	-0.01	1
Numberof Properties (In)	0.48	0.61	-0.02	0.04	-0.12	-0.07	0.1	0.15	0.29	0.13	-0.03	-0.04	0.12	1
Lag Expenditures (In)	0.46	0.32	0.01	0.04	-0.04	-0.01	0.04	0.23	0.12	0.09	0.07	0.03	0.1	0.49	1
Total Grants(ln)	0.47	0.42	0.03	0.02	-0.17	-0.01	0.1	0.36	0.21	0.11	0.12	0	0.22	0.7	0.51	1
First Administration Year	-0.03	-0.01	-0.06	0	-0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.05	-0.01	0.02	0.09	1
Second Administration Year	0.07	0.01	-0.06	0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.02	0.09	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.03	0.11	0.01	0	-0.01	-0.43	1
Third Administrtation	0	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.08	-0.01	-0.01	-0.06	-0.04	-0.11	-0.01	-0.01	-0.1	-0.33	-0.33	1

	(1) Random-effects	(2) Fixed-effects	(3) Arellano-Bond
Lag property tax collection/cap			-0 42^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;
			(0.06)
Governor-mayor party alignment	-0.37	-0.21	-0.33
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)
President-mayor party alignment	-0.44	-0.61	-1.83
	(0.85)	(0.81)	(1.59)
City council support	0.67^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	0.63^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	0.44^* * p < 0.1
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.23)
Margin of victory	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Leftist government	0.32	0.44	0.30
	(0.56)	(0.55)	(0.55)
GDP/cap	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Mayor's education	0.12	0.14	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Mayor's age	0.02	0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Mayor's public sector experience	-0.65	-0.71	-0.74
	(0.54)	(0.55)	(0.61)
Mayor's second term	0.08	0.31	0.65
	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.64)
Royalties (ln)	0.07	0.10	-0.07
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.06)
Number of properties (ln)	6.48^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	-7.68	-51.88^ p < 0.05;
	(0.96)	(8.63)	(20.19)
Lag expenditures (ln)	4 47^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	8.53^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	-1.53
	(1.26)	(1.52)	(1.38)
Total grants (ln)	-0.85	-5.48^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	10 42^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;
	(1.48)	(1.85)	(3.60)
First administration year	2 32^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	1 46^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	5.69^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;
	(0.33)	(0.27)	(0.58)
Second administration year	4 73^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	4 34^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	5.39^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;
	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.69)
Third administration year	3.01^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	2 20^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	4 95^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;
	(0.34)	(0.26)	(0.66)
Constant	-103.94^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	18.72	284.93^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;
	(15.39)	(48.02)	(99.33)
Observations	4,632	4,632	2,936
R-squared		0.08
Arellano-Bond test AR(1): p > z			0.90
Arellano-Bond test AR(2): p > z			0.62
Sargan test, p > X²			0.22
Number of municipalities	827	827	810

	(1) Random-effects	(2) Fixed-effects	(3) Arellano-Bond
Lag property tax collection/cap			0 42^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;
			(0.06)
Governor-mayor party alignment	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
President-mayor party alignment	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
City council support	0 02^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	0.02^ p < 0.05;	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Margin of victory	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Leftist government	0.00	0.01	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
GDP/cap	0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Mayor's education	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Mayor's age	0.00^ p < 0.05;	0.00^* * * p < 0.1	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Mayor's public sector experience	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Mayor's second term	0.01	0.01	0.05^ p < 0.05;
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Royalties (ln)	-0.01^* * * p < 0.1	-0.01	-0.01^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Number of properties (ln)	0 92^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	-0.11	-0.29
	(0.06)	(0.31)	(0.44)
Lag expenditures (ln)	-0 17^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	-0.05	0.14^** * * p < 0.1
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Total grants (ln)	-0.10	-0.10	-0.14
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.12)
First administration year	0 14^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	0 14^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	0 14^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Second administration year	0 11^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	0 11^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	0.09^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Third administration year	0.10^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	0.09^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	0.08^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Constant	_-2 46^* Robust standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.01;	3.95^ p < 0.05;	2.81
Observations	4,632	4,632	3,689
R-squared		0.07
Arellano-Bond test AR(1): p > z			0.03
Arellano-Bond test AR(2): p > z			0.70
Sargan test, p > X²			0.20
Number of municipalities	827	827	818

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