ABSTRACT
Frege presents the eponymous distinction of "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (USB) as a correction to the theory of identity he held in the Begriffsschrift.1 1 The translation of 'Sinn' and 'Bedeutung' raises a number of philosophical and stylistic complications. To avoid them I shall adopt the expedient of incorporating Frege's terms untranslated and unitalicized into the vocabulary of this paper. I extend that practice to quotations from translations of Frege's works written in 1891 (the year in which he explicitly formulates the Sinn-Bedeutung distinction) and after, but not to those from his earlier writings. A similar approach has been taken by other writers (Taschek (1992) and Beaney (1997)), who interestingly limit it to 'Bedeutung'. His retrospective assessment has prompted different reactions from commentators. Many have simply taken him at his word.2 2 Dummett ((1981a) 279, 544) is the most significant representative of this group of interpreters. Others, who have lingered over the relevant texts, have encountered a difficulty: in the Begriffsschrift Frege appears to raise the same problem with which he begins USB and to respond to it in words that are strikingly similar to those found in the later work.3 3 My use of the phrase 'theory of identity' is designed to do justice to this overlap between the texts (in both of which the word 'identity' figures prominently), while allowing that the content of the theory in each work remains to be determined and may not be the same. Thus, a number of important scholars have been led to argue that Frege misrepresents his earlier view: contrary to what he says in USB, the Begriffsschrift already contains the distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung.4 4 Angelelli ((1967) 39 - 40) is, I believe, the first to defend that position. He says of Frege's Begriffsschrift view: "This is already sense and reference: only the famous terminology "Sinn" and "Bedeutung" is lacking here. The point is not trivial, since Frege himself in this respect has done injustice to his text of 1879." His interpretation is endorsed by Bynum ((1972) 66) and Mendelsohn (1982) 283 n. 8. (Mendelsohn argues that USB differs from the Begriffsschrift in extending the distinction from names and definite descriptions to sentences.) More recently, Thau and Caplan ((2001) 197)) have held that the distinction, though not labeled as such, is present in the Begriffsschrift (but see 171, n. 22 for a more qualified assertion). Despite seeming to say that Frege does not distinguish between Sinn and Bedeutung in the Begriffsschrift, Bar-Elli's ((2006) 357, 366)) view is that its domain of application is limited there to singular terms occurring in identity-statements whereas in USB it is applied to all expressions in all sentential contexts. Not all those who have set USB side by side with the Begriffsschrift have concluded that Frege is wrong in finding his later view to be different from his earlier one. For example, Makin ((2000) 81 - 105, esp. 91 - 93 and103 - 105) offers a rich, textually informed argument that the germ of the Sinn-Bedeutung distinction is present in the Begriffsschrift but does not emerge fully formed until USB. One finds a similar, though less developed, view in Grossmann (1969) 23, 155; see also Grossmann (1961) 27 - 29. Despite their obvious differences, the logic of both interpretations requires that the two works be responsive to the same problem. In this paper I challenge that fundamental premise.5 5 Compare Makin ((2000) 82)): "Despite [the Begriffsschrift and USB] presenting different solutions, the problem they both confront is exactly the same." Grossmann ((1969) 155) also sees the connection between the two works in that way. If I might be allowed to express my thesis tersely but suggestively: the problem of the Begriffsschrift is epistemological; that of USB, ontological.6 6 Dickie (2006) holds that the Begriffsschrift and USB respond to different epistemological problems: the first concerns the acquisition of knowledge; the second, the making of inferences (see 274 for a concise statement to this effect). She thus sees greater continuity than do I. The two problems and Frege's solutions to them shall be explained in what follows.
Keywords:
Frege; Sinn; Ontology