Abstract
This paper defends a constructive interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason, which is built in analogy with an experimental construction that Kant believes to characteristic of chemistry. I also argue for a way to reconcile the methodological perspective of the constructivist method with that of transcendental reflection. I therefore provide a constructive explanation for what Kant describes as being pure reason and the argument of the transcendental deduction. I propose to frame the different perspectives in such a way that the experimental construction is the ratio cognoscendi of pure reason, while pure reason is the ratio essendi of the experimental construction. O’Neill (1989O’Neill, Onora, (1989): Constructions of Reason, Cambridge University Press., 2015_____. (2015): Constructing Authorities, Cambridge University Press.) is one of the most important scholars that have argued for a constructivist reading of the Critique of pure reason (CPR). In this paper I develop and explore new aspects of this line of interpretation. One of the main criticisms raised against constructivist readings of Kant’s philosophy is an alleged commitment to subjectivism or voluntarism (cf. Kleingeld & Willaschek 2019Kleingeld, Pauline & Willascheck, Marcus (2019): Autonomy without Paradox: Kant, Self-Legislation and the Moral Law, in: Philosophers’s Imprint v.19, n.6, pp.1-18.). This concern led some scholars to rename their position as constitutivist instead (Korsgaard 2009_____. (2009): Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, Oxford.; Sensen 2013Sensen, Oliver (2013): Kant's Constructisivm, in: Bagnoli, Carla (ed.): Constructivism in Ethics, Cambridge University Press, pp. 63-81., 2017_____. (2017): Kant's Constitutivism, in: E. Schmidt and R. dos Santos (eds.), Realism and Antirealism in Kant's Moral Philosophy (New Essays), Berlin, pp. 197-220.; Formosa 2011Formosa, Paul (2011): Is Kant a Moral Constructivist or a Moral Realist?, in: European Journal of Philosophy 19(3), pp.1-27.). Constitutivism, is intended to be a sort of constructivism capable of avoiding voluntarism. However, it becomes difficult, sometimes, to differentiate between the constitutivist and foundationalist positions, which are based on transcendental reflection and imply a sort of realist perspective on reason. The same preoccupation applies to the constructivist interpretation of the CPR. In order to deal with this issue, the following questions must be addressed: how can constructivism justify the necessity and universality of transcendental principles of pure reason without compromising the normative and procedural aspects of the construction? How to reconcile arguments based on the analysis of representations and faculties with a constructivist procedure? Or even, how may transcendental reflection, as a view of the possibility of a priori cognition, be rendered compatible with a constructive procedure? This paper is divided into three sections, followed by brief final remarks. The first section outlines the main characteristics of constructivism and relates them to Kant’s positions about the nature of philosophy and its method. The second part argues for a type of experimental constructivism that might serve as a guiding analogy to understand the method underlying the CPR. Thirdly, I will show how the transcendental subject and pure reason are derived from this experimental construction. The conclusion briefly points out some advantages of this position.
Keywords:
Constructivism; Chemical Experiment; Kant; Pure Reason