Abstract
Alvin Plantinga (1993aPlantinga, A. (1993a). Warrant: The Current Debate, Oxford: Oxford University Press ., 1993bPlantinga, A. (1993b). Warrant and proper function. New York: Oxford University Press., 2000Plantinga, A. (2000). Warranted Christian belief. New York: Oxford University Press .) argues that de jure objections to theism depend on de facto objections: in order to say that belief in God is not warranted, one should first assume that this belief is false. Assuming Plantinga’s epistemology and his de facto/de jure distinction, In this essay, I argue that to show that belief in miracles is not warranted, one must suppose that belief in miracles is always false. Therefore, a person who holds a skeptical position regarding miracles must choose either to find evidence that all of the supposed miracles are false, or admit that one is assuming an areligious commitment as a starting point.
Keywords:
Miracles; De Jure objections; Epistemic Warrant; Religious Epistemology; Alvin Plantinga