A significant part of the contemporary philosophical and educational discussion considers the theory of recognition as a promising intellectual approach to philosophical and educational problems. In this sense, one cannot think about a just social order without the educational process of the human being supported by social and institutional structures of recognition. At present, the Frankfurter social philosopher Axel Honneth has stood out for presenting a theory of recognition with a strong Hegelian inspiration. However, in a recent work entitled Untiefen der Anerkennung (Depths of recognition), published in Germany in 2012, drawing inspiration from Frederik Neuhouser, Honneth considers Rousseau, not Hegel anymore, the pioneer of the theory of recognition. Critically opposing Honneth's interpretation, this essay has a double purpose: on the one hand, to show that, as Honneth rightly considers Rousseau a theorist of recognition, he should also regard him as a pioneer of the concept of social freedom; and, on the other hand, to justify that the profound intertwining present in the thought of the Genevan philosopher between the theory of recognition and the education of self-love can only be clarified on the basis of a theory of the virtuous education of the will. Moreover, when arguing for the virtuous education of the will in order to avoid the extension of perverted self-love, Rousseau not only addresses a fundamental problem of the human social condition, but also lays the foundations for a critical evaluation of the contemporary educational scenario. Such scenario dangerously reduces large and complex educational issues to mere learning problems.
Self-love; Recognition; Education; Will; Virtue