The Politics of Agribusiness in Brazil: Business Power and Political Success during the 55th Legislature (2015-2019)^*

Abstract

This paper addresses two central issues during the 55^th legislature (2015-2019). First, the relationship between the instrumental and structural power of agribusiness and different aspects of parliamentary behavior, namely membership in standing committees and the introduction of legislative bills. Second, the level of success achieved by agribusiness in relation to the legislative production of the National Congress. Concerning the first question, we employed binary logistic regression to demonstrate that deputies who received the most campaign financing from agribusiness (an indicator of instrumental political power), and whose voters were highly dependent on agribusiness as a source of employment (an indicator of structural political power), were more likely to secure seats in the Committee on Agriculture, Livestock, Food Supply, and Rural Development (CAPADR). We also employed negative binomial regression to demonstrate that deputies whose constituents were more dependent on jobs created by the sector (structural political power) introduced a greater number of bills favorable to the sector, while introducing fewer bills contrary to its interests. Regarding the second issue, we utilized statistical techniques such as the chi-squared test and the analysis of adjusted residuals to compare the stance of the Agricultural Parliamentary Front (APF) with the decisions of the National Congress on bills concluded during the 55^th Legislature. Our findings suggest that agribusiness attained success in the vast majority of decisions resulting in new laws, although many bills supported by the sector had different outcomes. In summary, the 55^th Legislature demonstrated a high degree of receptiveness to the interests of agribusiness. However, while the interests of agribusiness wield considerable influence in the Brazilian Congress, this influence is far from all-encompassing.

Campaign financing; lobbying; agribusiness; Chamber of Deputies; 55^th legislature

The political activity of the business community has been a longstanding classic theme within the social sciences in Brazil (MANCUSO, 2007a). Since the redemocratization period, the Legislative Branch has emerged as a central arena for the political activities of the business class in the country (DINIZ and BOSCHI, 2000). In this study, our goal is to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on this subject, focusing specifically on two primary topics: 01. the correlation between business interests and parliamentary behavior, and 02. the degree of success attained by the business community in relation to the legislative outcomes within the National Congress.

We explore both dimensions by examining the political actions of the agribusiness sector during the 55^th legislative term (2015-2019), which represents the most recent legislative period at the time of finalizing and submitting this article. Agribusiness stands as a pivotal sector in the Brazilian economy (CEPEA, 2018; CONCEIÇÃO and CONCEIÇÃO, 2014), thus warranting an investigation into its political behavior within the National Congress – an area that has received limited attention in previous research (SILVA, 2019; TAGLIALEGNA and CARVALHO, 2006).

Agribusiness interests and parliamentary behavior

To address the first issue, we position our analysis within the ongoing debate in Political Science concerning the basis of the political power of the business community, which can be characterized as either instrumental or structural (COEN, GRANT and WILSON, 2010; HACKER and PIERSON, 2002). The instrumentalist perspective associates business power with a diverse array of resources or tools employed to influence the behavior of politicians (HAGGARD, SCHNEIDER and MAXFIELD, 1997; SCHNEIDER, 2010). Our study specifically explores the use of a particular instrument of political action by agribusiness entrepreneurs: financial contributions to electoral campaigns.

From a structuralist perspective, business power primarily derives from its economic importance, whether serving as a source of employment for constituents or generating tax revenue to sustain government activities. Therefore, economically pivotal business sectors hold a privileged political position (LINDBLOM, 2001, 1977; LINDBLOM and DAHL, 1976) due to the structural dependence of both the State and society on these sectors (PRZEWORSKI and WALLERSTEIN, 1988). Consequently, even in the absence of significant mobilization through conventional political instruments such as electoral contributions and lobbying, politicians tend to accommodate business interests. In this article, we use the importance of the agribusiness sector as a source of jobs for the parliamentary electorate as an indicator of its structural power.

A significant portion of the literature that examines the relationship between campaign financing and parliamentary behavior predominantly focuses on the voting patterns of legislators on projects of interest to their financial backers. Originating primarily in the USA and drawing on the American experience as a reference point, this body of literature has yielded inconclusive findings. On one hand, scholars such as Bradley Smith (1995a) and Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, and Snyder Jr. (2003) found little to no impact of electoral donations on the voting behavior of parliamentarians. On the other hand, authors such as Stratmann (2005) identified a substantial influence of electoral financing on voting decisions. In between these two extremes, some studies have presented conflicting or mixed findings (FIGUEIREDO FILHO, 2009; SMITH, 1995b).

However, the literature on the voting patterns of Brazilian parliamentarians during plenary sessions suggests that, in this final stage of the decision-making process, other factors play a more decisive role in shaping the behavior of parliamentarians. These factors include the voting guidelines provided by party leaders, divided between opposition and support for the government (FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 2001). Given this insight, our study aims to evaluate the impact of electoral contributions from the agribusiness sector on two distinct aspects of parliamentary behavior, situated in the initial stages of the legislative process: 01. membership in the parliamentary committee handling matters related to the sector, and 02. the introduction of legislative bills that either align with or contradict the interests of the agribusiness sector.

Brazilian Political Science has long dedicated efforts to studying the standing committees in the Chamber of Deputies (PEREIRA and MUELLER, 2000; SANTOS, 1998). It is the task of party leaders to appoint members of their parties to these standing committees. This selection process primarily considers the size of the party or coalition bloc formed at the beginning of the legislature, following the rule of proportionality outlined in the Internal Regulations of the Chamber of Deputies. Additional factors that may influence the appointment process include the interests, prestige, expertise, and electoral constituencies of the parliamentarians themselves (MÜLLER, 2005; RICCI and LEMOS, 2004; SANTOS, 2003).

The electoral financing received by parliamentarians is another potentially relevant factor for their appointment to standing committees. This factor has been extensively explored in international literature (FOUIRNAIES, 2018; FOUIRNAIES and HALL, 2018; LOUCKS and BENNETT, 2011; ROMER and SNYDER JR., 1994; STRATMANN, 2005; TAYLOR, 2003). However, it has received less attention in the national literature, with few exceptions such as Santos (2016) and Santos et al. (2021; 2019).

Our study hopes to contribute to this discussion by specifically focusing on the correlation between electoral donations from agribusiness to federal deputies of the 55^th legislature and their inclusion in the Committee on Agriculture, Livestock, Food Supply, and Rural Development (CAPADR). The CAPADR is a standing committee of the Chamber of Deputies responsible for addressing issues of interest to the agricultural sector. We analyze the impact of electoral contributions while controlling for the significance of agribusiness in generating employment for the constituents of parliamentarians.

The introduction of legislative bills is a crucial aspect of parliamentary work, closely monitored by representatives of business interests, who classify the presented bills as either favorable or unfavorable to the sectors they represent (MANCUSO and PRADO, 2022). In the international literature, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez has emphasized the significant influence of business interests, through the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), on the legislative output of state legislators in the USA by comparing the importance of electoral financing with other factors as determining mechanisms for the exercise of this influence (HERTEL-FERNANDEZ, 2019; 2014; HERTEL-FERNANDEZ and KASHIN, 2015).

Within the national literature, scholars such as Cruz (2015), Carvalho (2017), and Mancuso et al. (2020, 2019) have explored the correlation between electoral financing from various sectors of the business community and legislative output in the Brazilian parliament, particularly during the 54^th legislature. Carvalho (2017) found no discernible impact of electoral donations from private health plan companies on the introduction of bills favorable to the sector by Brazilian deputies. Conversely, Cruz (2015( and Mancuso et al. (2020, 2019) observed that federal deputies who received the most funding from agribusiness and industry, respectively, tended to legislate more in favor of these sectors.

Our present study aims to offer further insights into this issue by examining the correlation between electoral contributions from agribusiness and the introduction of bills either favorable or unfavorable to the sector by federal deputies during the 55th legislature. Once again, we will assess the influence of electoral donations while considering the impact of agribusiness on the employment of the workforce comprising the deputies’ electorate. After all, the structural dependence on agribusiness may also prompt legislators to propose more favorable bills to the sector and fewer bills conflicting with its interests.

The introduction of legislative bills represents just one aspect of parliamentary work that can be leveraged to advocate for the interests of specific economic sectors, such as agribusiness. In our concluding remarks, we will delve into other dimensions of parliamentary activity that warrant further examination in future studies. However, the introduction of legislative bills remains a vital component of parliamentary behavior, especially considering our exclusive focus on bills deemed significant by the Agricultural Parliamentary Front (APF), which then mobilizes its staff to conduct technical assessments of such bills and determine whether the agribusiness lobby should adopt a favorable or opposing stance¹.

The political success of agribusiness

The agribusiness sector is deeply interested in ensuring its allies occupy seats in the CAPADR and introduce bills that benefit the sector. However, the ultimate goal of agribusiness is to effectively advance its agenda within the National Congress. In this article, we posit that the Agricultural Parliamentary Front (APF) identifies the legislative agenda of agribusiness. The APF then signals bills favorable to the sector for approval and bills contrary to the sector that need to be opposed before becoming legal standards². Drawing from Mancuso and Gozetto (2018), we define political success as the alignment between parliamentary decisions and the stance of agribusiness on the bills in the congressional agenda.

Therefore, in this article we aim not only to measure the effect of the instrumental and structural power of agribusiness on the behavior of individual parliamentarians, but also to evaluate the overall level of political success attained by the agricultural sector during the 55^th legislature. As such, we contribute to the broader scholarly efforts to gauge the political success of agribusiness itself (SILVA, 2019) or other business sectors such as industry (Costa and Borck, 2019; Mancuso, 2010, 2007b; Mancuso and Prado, 2022; Santos, 2011) in previous legislatures. Through this sectoral analysis, we aim to enrich the broader research agenda on the political influence of the Brazilian business community (MANCUSO, 2007a).

To achieve the stated objectives, this article consists of four sections. The next section examines the agricultural sector as a political actor. The third section outlines our research methodology and hypotheses. The fourth section presents and discusses our findings. The final section contains the concluding remarks.

Agribusiness as a political actor

Although agriculture has historically been intertwined with Brazil’s economic and political development (CARVALHO, 2019; FURTADO, 2007), our understanding of its political activities since the country’s redemocratization remains limited (IGLECIAS, 2007; TAGLIALEGNA and CARVALHO, 2006). Beyond its economic significance for the Brazilian economy (CEPEA, 2018; CONCEIÇÃO and CONCEIÇÃO, 2014), recent studies have highlighted the pivotal role of organizations representing this sector, particularly the National Confederation of Agriculture (CNA in the Portuguese acronym), as central actors in the network of organizations revolving around the National Congress (CESÁRIO, 2016; RESENDE, 2018). Consistent with these findings, other studies have emphasized the sector’s high capacity for lobbying in both national and international decision-making bodies (IGLECIAS, 2007; TAGLIALEGNA and CARVALHO, 2006). In the National Congress, the success rate of agribusiness during the 54th legislature was on par with that of the industrial sector: 59% of the bills of interest to the sector were processed in accordance with its preferences (SILVA, 2019).

The committed efforts of parliamentarians and representatives aligned with the agricultural sector’s interests in the Federal Legislative Branch have been notable since the National Constituent Assembly of 1988, particularly through the coordination facilitated by the Democratic Association of Ruralists (União Democrática Ruralista in Portuguese), an association of major rural landowners founded in 1985 (BRUNO, 2015; ORTEGA, 2005; VIGNA, 2007). The Agricultural Parliamentary Front (APF) initially emerged as an informal group of parliamentarians in the legislature immediately after the National Constituent Assembly, as a result of the intense mobilization and interest articulation during that period. Since the economic liberal reforms in the 1990s, when the corporatist structure began to coexist with other interest representation mechanisms (DINIZ and BOSCHI, 2004), the APF has experienced substantial growth, eventually surpassing the size of the largest parties in the Brazilian congress by the time of the 53^rd legislature (2007-2011) (BRUNO, 2015; VIGNA, 2007).

The institutional expansion of the Front reached a significant milestone with the establishment of the ‘Instituto Pensar Agropecuária’ (IPA) in 2011, a civil association comprising organizations representing the interests of agribusiness. Founded by the APF in collaboration with national agribusiness associations, the IPA coordinates the formulation and implementation of a legislative agenda for agriculture in the National Congress (SILVA, 2019).

This transformative process led to the emergence of a representation dynamic distinct from the corporatist model, integrating associations that had been prominent in the political landscape in the past, such as the National Coffee Council and the Brazilian Rural Society. Alongside corporatist organizations such as the National Confederation of Agriculture, and the state-level federations of São Paulo, Paraná, and Mato Grosso, as well as national associations representing specific crops (potatoes, tobacco, cotton, corn, soybeans, sugar, animal protein), the processing industry (including dairy, cold storage, vegetable oil, fish, biofuels, beer), and inputs (such as biotechnology, plant defense, and animal health). Presently, the IPA brings together more than 40 regional or national agribusiness organizations.

While recognizing the broader trend to enhance pluralistic dynamics in interest representation since the establishment of the New Republic (ARAGÃO, 1994), agribusiness shifted its focus from the Executive Branch to the National Congress, driven by the economic liberalization of the 1980s and 1990s and the sector’s integration into international markets (SILVA, 1996). Moreover, the liberalization of international trade in agricultural products, facilitated by the Uruguay (1986-1993) and Doha (2001-present) Rounds, spurred political activities within the agribusiness sector. This enabled Brazilian producers to tap into new markets while simultaneously encountering heightened competition on the international stage (IGLECIAS, 2007).

In both cases, productivity has become a crucial factor in the success of agribusiness. As a result, Ribeiro da Silva (2019) noted significant mobilization efforts by the sector within the National Congress aimed at changing key regulations affecting producers in this market. These regulations include the use of pesticides and biotechnology, environmental protection and land use, labor regulations, and rural credit. A significant portion of these issues relates to production costs, while the rest addresses the modernization of production methods.

On the other hand, the public policy communities operating behind the scenes of these regulations are rife with divergent interests, albeit asymmetrical in terms of their influence. This dynamic has been explored by Resende (2018) when delving into the extremely vast network of interest groups operating in the Chamber of Deputies, and by Borges et al. (2021) when analyzing the behavior of the National Confederation of Agricultural Workers (CONTAG) in the National Congress. Thus, while the agribusiness sector seeks changes in regulations, it also holds concerns that other actors may initiate changes that could adversely affect the competitiveness of their products on the international stage, leading to the predominance of a damage containment strategy.

Methodology and hypotheses

Business interests and parliamentary behavior

As we have discussed, this article delves into two significant yet relatively understudied dimensions of parliamentary behavior during the 55^th legislature: membership in standing committees and the introduction of legislative bills. The objective is to examine the potential impact of business interests, specifically those of agribusiness, on both aspects of the behavior of federal deputies. Drawing from existing literature, we have incorporated two distinct and complementary indicators of the political power of agribusiness into our analysis: 01. electoral campaign financing, considered here as an indicator of the sector's ‘instrumental’ political power, and 02. the importance of the agricultural sector as a source of jobs for the potential electorate of parliamentarians, seen as an indicator of the sector’s ‘structural’ political power. We controlled for the impact of these variables alongside other potentially relevant factors to elucidate the two behaviors, as outlined below.

CAPADR membership

We employed a logistic regression model to investigate the allocation of CAPADR seats among federal deputies during the 55^th legislature. The dependent variable is ‘CAPADR membership’, which represents a dummy variable. Deputies who were members of the committee during the legislature were assigned the value ‘01’, indicating their roles as president, vice-president, full member, or substitute member. Conversely, all other deputies were assigned a value of ‘0’. We extracted the data on committee membership from the annual activity reports published by the CAPADR, obtained through the official online website of the Chamber of Deputies.

The main independent variables in the model are twofold. First, we incorporated electoral financing provided by the agricultural sector to federal deputies elected in October 2014. The independent variable ‘sector financing’ encompasses electoral contributions made to deputies by companies falling under section A (agriculture, livestock, forestry production, fishing, and aquaculture) of the Brazilian National Classification of Economic Activities (CNAE). For ease of interpretation, we scaled electoral contributions by dividing by 100,000. Therefore, each unit of this variable corresponds to 100 thousand Brazilian reais in electoral donations from the agricultural sector. We sourced the data from the Electoral Data Repository of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE). Thus, we aimed to test the following hypothesis:

H1: There is a positive and statistically significant association between electoral financing granted by companies in the agricultural sector to federal deputies and the membership of these deputies in the CAPADR.

Secondly, we incorporated the weight of agribusiness as a source of employment for the potential electorate of deputies into the model. We operationalized this variable as follows: initially, we calculated two proportions – the proportion of each municipality in the deputy’s received votes³ and the proportion of formal jobs in the agricultural sector in each municipality⁴, based on the same CNAE categorization used to identify the sector in electoral donations (section A). Subsequently, we multiplied these two proportions together, generating a proxy for the weight of the sector in the parliamentarian’s electorate on a municipality-by-municipality basis. Finally, we aggregated the products to derive a proxy for the weight of the agricultural sector in the parliamentarian’s electorate, now at the state level. Through this operationalization, we sought to test the following hypothesis:

H2: There is a positive and statistically significant correlation between the weight of the agricultural sector in the electorate of federal deputies and the participation of these deputies in the CAPADR.

It is worth noting that the correlation between the main independent variables is very weak (Pearson’s correlation coefficient = 0.130), suggesting that incorporating both explanatory variables in this model, as well as in the subsequent models discussed, does not pose a statistical issue.

A federal deputy's membership in a standing committee in Congress could also be influenced by other factors. Therefore, our study incorporated four control variables into the model to ensure proper control over the effect of the main independent variables.

The parliamentarian’s profession is one of the factors that could influence the allocation of seats in the standing committees of the Chamber of Deputies. Our focus here is on the parliamentarian’s professional background and the correlation between this background and their membership in standing committees. We thus created the dummy variable ‘rural profession’ based on the occupations declared by federal deputies to the Electoral Court when registering their candidacies or when preparing their biographies for the Chamber of Deputies⁵.

We also incorporated the parliamentarian’s affiliation with the Agricultural Parliamentary Front (APF) in our analysis as an indicator of the deputy's interest in public policies for agribusiness. We created the dummy variable ‘APF membership’ based on the list of deputies who registered with the APF during the 55^th legislature. The data is available on the online website of the Chamber of Deputies.

The third control variable concerns ideology. We determined the ideology of political parties using data from the Brazilian Legislative Survey (PLB), which assesses party ideology through surveys with parliamentarians. Utilizing data closest to the 2014 elections, we conducted a cluster analysis (employing the k-means clustering method, with k=3) and classified the groups into the three traditional ideological blocs: left, center, and right, with the left as the reference group⁶.

Finally, we incorporated the size of the party in terms of seats secured in Congress as a control variable. According to the Internal Regulations of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, the composition of the committees must reflect a proportional representation of parties and parliamentary blocs (or coalitions) within the House, as much as possible⁷. To calculate this variable, we used the proportion of elected federal deputies, by political party, in the 2014 elections. Table 01 provides a summary of the model variables:

Table 01
Logistic regression model for CAPADR membership

Variable	Variable name	Type	Source
Dependent	CAPADR membership	Binary	Chamber of Deputies
Independent	Electoral donations from the agricultural sector (100,000)	Continuous	TSE
	Weight of the agricultural sector (%)	Continuous	RAIS and TSE
Control Variables	Rural profession	Binary	TSE and Chamber of Deputies
	Agricultural Parliamentary Front	Binary	Chamber of Deputies
	Left	Binary	PLB
	Center
	Right
	Party size (%)	Continuous	Chamber of Deputies

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

Legislative bills favorable and contrary to agribusiness

We used a negative binomial regression model to analyze the introduction of legislative bills by federal deputies during the 55^th legislature. We chose this regression type because the dependent variable is a count – namely, the number of bills introduced by deputies throughout the legislature that either align with or oppose the interests of the agribusiness sector⁸. To categorize the bills, we referred to the APF’s stance on legislative bills, available on the organization's website (https://fpagropecuaria.org.br/) under the tab ‘Legislative Services – Chamber Guidelines’. If the APF expressed a favorable stance on the bill (with or without reservations), we considered the bill aligned with the interests of agribusiness. Conversely, if the APF’s stance was contrary (with or without reservations), we interpreted the bill as diverging from the interests of the agricultural sector.

The two main independent variables in this model remain the same as in the previous model. Therefore, our hypotheses are as follows:

H3: There is a positive (negative) and statistically significant correlation between the electoral financing granted by the agricultural sector to federal deputies and the number of legislative bills favorable (contrary) to the sector's interests introduced by the deputies.

H4: There is a positive (negative) and statistically significant correlation between the weight of the agricultural sector in the electorate of federal deputies and the number of legislative bill favorable (contrary) to the sector's interests introduced by the deputies.

In this case, we incorporated five control variables, three of which were also included in the previous model.

The first control variable is ‘rural profession’. We posit that a parliamentarian's prior professional experience in the agricultural sector could indicate expertise and a potential interest in this field. Consequently, we anticipate that individuals with backgrounds in rural professions may introduce more legislative bills favoring the agricultural sector and fewer bills that are detrimental to it.

The second variable is membership in the APF. We presume that parliamentarians who are members of the Front are likely to introduce more bills in favor and fewer bills against this business sector.

We also incorporated party ideology as a factor that could explain parliamentary behavior concerning the content of introduced bills. The significance of ideology in the behavior of Brazilian parliamentarians has been extensively studied, as discussed by Scheefer (2016). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that parliamentarians affiliated with left-wing political parties, which are traditionally more critical of agricultural interests, will introduce fewer legislative bills aligned with the agricultural sector and more bills diverging from this sector compared to parliamentarians from centrist and right-wing parties.

The two new control variables are CAPADR membership and tenure (in years of service) in the 55^th legislature.

The connection between parliamentary output and agricultural interests can also be affected by a deputy's membership in the CAPADR, the standing committee responsible for handling agricultural matters. The direction of the impact of this variable is ambiguous, as the committee can attract deputies who are both inclined to support the sector’s interests and those more predisposed to oppose them. The variable ‘CAPADR membership’ remains the same as in the previous model, but now functions as a control variable.

The final factor we integrated into our model is the length of service of the federal deputy in the 55^th legislature. This control variable is important because the number of bills introduced by parliamentarians that favor or oppose the agricultural sector tends to be influenced by their tenure in the legislature. We calculated the continuous variable ‘years in office’ using information provided by the Chamber of Deputies, which we obtained through a request submitted via the ‘Contact Us’ section on the House's website. The original data was given to us in days in office. To streamline our analysis, we converted the days into years by dividing the number of days by 365. For instance, a deputy who served for 1.461 days had 04 years in office, while a deputy with 183 days in office had 0.5 years of service. The variables included in this model are summarized in Table 02:

Table 02
Negative binomial regression model: introduction of bills

Variable	Variable name	Type	Source
Dependent	Bills favorable to agribusiness	Count	Chamber of Deputies and APF
	Bills contrary to agribusiness	Count
Independent	Electoral donations from the agricultural sector (100.000)	Continuous	TSE
	Weight of the agricultural sector (%)	Continuous	RAIS and TSE
Control ‍	Rural profession	Binary	TSE and Chamber of Deputies
	Agricultural Parliamentary Front	Binary	Chamber of Deputies
	Left	Binary	PLB
	Center
	Right
	CAPADR Membership	Binary	Chamber of Deputies
	Tenure (years)	Continuous

Source: Elaborated by the authors.

The political success of agribusiness

To measure the political success of agribusiness in the 55^th legislature, we employed Mancuso's (2007b) method for categorizing legislative outcomes. This approach has been used in several studies (COSTA and BORCK, 2019; MANCUSO, 2010; MANCUSO and PRADO, 2022; SANTOS, 2011; SILVA, 2019) and is detailed in Table 03.

Table 03
Measurement and categorization of lobbying success

Impact on the status quo	Stance of the interest group
	Favorable	Against
Change (New legal regulations)	Success (Gain)	Non-success (Loss)
Preservation (Bills archived, rejected, returned, withdrawn, ineffective, etc.)	Non-success (Frustration)	Success (Relief)

Source: Mancuso (2007b).

This methodology identifies two possible outcomes in the concluding stage of a bill’s legislative process. First, outcomes that change the status quo occur when bills are translated into new laws (or become moot by the enactment of new laws). Second, outcomes that preserve the status quo involve assigning alternative fates to bills, such as being archived, rejected, returned, withdrawn by the author, or declared ineffective, among similar possibilities.

We may compare these legislative outcomes against the evaluative stances expressed by the interest groups. When the group’s stance is favorable to a bill, a ‘win’ is recorded if the bill becomes law. Similarly, if the bill becomes moot due to the approval of a new law endorsed by the group⁹, the decision is still categorized as a ‘win’. Conversely, any deviation from the group’s desired outcome for the bill is labeled as a ‘frustration’.

On the other hand, if the group opposes a bill, the decision to enact it as a law is categorized as a ‘loss’. Similarly, the outcome is also labeled a ‘loss’ if the bill becomes moot due to the approval of a bill that the group opposes¹⁰. The preservation of the status quo in response to bills that the group opposes is categorized as ‘relief’.

We considered the APF’s stance as an indicator of the agribusiness's stance regarding bills whose processing concluded during the 55^th legislature.

We should clarify that while using this method allows us to measure the level of political success achieved by agribusiness, it does not necessarily equate to measuring the influence of the agribusiness lobby. Asserting that political success occurred due to lobby influence would require counterfactual reasoning, implying that this success would not have happened without the lobby. In other words, it would involve demonstrating that lobbying – and not other factors – caused the convergence between the group’s demand and the outcome achieved (MANCUSO, 2007a; MANCUSO and GOZETTO, 2018). Therefore, while our indicator shows the success of the agribusiness lobby, it does not assess the ‘significance’ of the agribusiness lobby for these outcomes compared to a range of other potentially relevant factors.

Findings and analysis

The descriptive statistics for both the logistic regression and negative binomial regression models are presented in Table 04 below.

Table 04
Descriptive statistics. Logistic and negative binomial regressions

Logistic regression. CAPADR Membership in the 55th legislature	Dependent variable	N	Proportion or average	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
	CAPADR Membership?	587
	Yes	140	23.9%
	No	447	76.1%
	Main independent variables	N	Proportion or average	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
	Financing (100.000)	587	0.106	0.892	0.00	18.50
	Weight of the sector (%)	587	4.880	4.058	0.10	22.82
	Control variables	N	Proportion or average	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
	Rural profession	587
	Yes	56	9.5%
	No	531	90.5%
	APF	587
	Yes	219	37.3%
	No	368	62.7%
	Left	587
	Yes	136	23.2%
	No	451	76.8%
	Center	587
	Yes	230	39.2%
	No	357	60.8%
	Right	587
	Yes	221	37.6%
	No	366	62.4%
	Party size (%)	587	7.613	3.996	0.90	13.30
Negative binomial regression. Legislative production in the 55th legislature	Dependent variables	N	Proportion or average	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
	Favorable bills	587	0.44	2.205	0	46
	Opposing bills	587	0.22	0.668	0	7
	Main independent variables	N	Proportion or average	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
	Financing (100.000)	587	0.106	0.892	0.00	18.50
	Weight of the sector (%)	587	4.880	4.058	0.10	22.82
	Control variables	N	Proportion or average	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
	Rural profession	587
	Yes	56	9.5%
	No	531	90.5%
	APF	587
	Yes	219	37.3%
	No	368	62.7%
	Left	587
	Yes	136	23.2%
	No	451	76.8%
	Center	587
	Yes	230	39.2%
	No	357	60.8%
	Right	587
	Yes	221	37.6%
	No	366	62.4%
	CAPADR	587
	Yes	140	23.9%
	No	447	76.1%
	Tenure in years	587	3.313	1.186	0.01	4.00

Source: Elaborated by the authors, based on information listed in Tables 01 and 02.

CAPADR Membership

The results presented in Table 05 confirm our main hypotheses. First, they suggest that the electoral funding received from agricultural sector companies during the 2014 elections correlates with membership in the CAPADR during the 55^th legislature. On average, the likelihood of a federal deputy being a CAPADR member increases by 2.26 times for every 100 thousand reais of direct electoral funding received from the sector. However, while the indicator of instrumental power matters, it is not the sole determining factor nor the most influential one. In fact, CAPADR membership also correlates significantly with the structural power indicator, with an even stronger association according to the Wald test. In other words, being a member of the CAPADR also aligns with the importance of the agricultural sector as a source of employment for the parliamentarian’s electorate: the greater this importance, the higher the likelihood of the federal deputy securing a seat on this committee. On average, a 01% increase in this index results in a 12.8% rise in the likelihood of the parliamentarian securing a seat on this committee.

Table 05
Logistic regression. CAPADR Membership in the 55th legislature

			Hypothesis testing			Exp(B)
	B	Standard Deviation	Wald	GL	Sig.
Financing (100.000)	.815**	.411	3.932	1	.047	2.260
Weight of the sector (%)	.121***	.027	19.288	1	.000	1.128
Rural profession	1.908***	.349	29.875	1	.000	6.739
APF	1.005***	.238	17.842	1	.000	2.732
Center	.188	.338	.309	1	.578	1.207
Right	.625*	.356	3.094	1	.079	1.869
Party size (%)	-.011	.032	.109	1	.741	.989
Constant	-2.829***	.435	42.196	1	.000	.059

Table 01
• Notes: Chi-square: 139.330; Degrees of freedom: 07; Sig.: 0.000; R² Nagelkerke: 0.317.
• ***p < 0.01; **0.01≥p < 0.05; *0.05 ≥p < 0.10.

Other relevant variables include the parliamentarian’s profession, affiliation with the APF, and party ideology. As per the Wald test, the parliamentarian's profession demonstrated the strongest association in the model with CAPADR membership. Federal deputies with a professional background in the agribusiness sector are 6.7 times more likely than others to become members of the CAPADR. Additionally, being a member of the APF increases the likelihood of a federal deputy joining the CAPADR by 2.7 times. Lastly, deputies affiliated with right-wing parties have an 86.9% higher likelihood of being a member of the CAPADR compared to their counterparts from left-wing parties.

Legislative production in favor and against agribusiness¹¹

According to Table 06, on average, federal deputies who received the most funding from the agricultural sector introduced more bills in favor of and fewer bills against this business sector. However, this association did not reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

Table 06
Negative binomial regression. Legislative production in the 55th legislature

Bills in favor
			Hypothesis testing			Exp(B)
	B	EP	Wald	GL	Sig.
Financing (100.000)	.044	.1473	.087	01	.768	1.044
Weight of the sector (%)	.056*	.0307	3.308	01	.069	1.057
Rural profession	.273	.3566	.588	01	.443	1.314
APF	1.173***	.2710	18.731	01	.000	3.231
Center	.099	.3472	.082	01	.775	1.104
Right	.387	.3374	1.315	01	.251	1.472
CAPADR	.610**	.2840	4.614	01	.032	1.840
Tenure in years	.528***	.1526	11.981	01	.001	1.696
Intercept	-4.322***	.6488	44.373	01	.000	.013
Negative Binomial	3.195	.5509
Bills against
			Hypothesis testing			Exp(B)
	B	EP	Wald	GL	Sig.
Financing (100.000)	-.717	.7140	1.008	01	.315	.488
Weight of the sector (%)	-.063*	.0360	3.106	01	.078	.938
Rural profession	-.140	.4718	.088	01	.766	.869
APF	-.186	.2909	.407	01	.523	.831
Center	-.589*	.3131	3.533	01	.060	.555
Right	-.772**	.3179	5.897	01	.015	.462
CAPADR	.429	.3239	1.753	01	.186	1.535
Tenure in years	.348***	.1299	7.195	01	.007	1.417
Intercept	-1.992***	.5270	14.285	01	.000	.136
Negative Binomial	3.065	.7760

Table 02
• Note 01. Bills in favor: Likelihood-ratio chi-squared test: 95.661; Degrees of freedom: 08; Sig.: 0.000; N: 587.
• Note 02. Bills against: Likelihood-ratio chi-squared test: 25.028; Degrees of freedom: 08; Sig.: 0.002; N: 587.
• Note 03. ***p < 0.01; **0.01≥p < 0.05; *0.05 ≥p < 0.10.

Conversely, the weight of agriculture in the electorate of federal deputies not only encourages parliamentarians to introduce more bills favorable to the sector but also discourages legislators from presenting fewer bills that oppose the interests of rural producers. On average, each additional percentage point in this variable increases the rate of introducing bills favorable to agribusiness by 5.7% and decreases the rate of introducing bills opposing this segment by 6.2%.

Another noteworthy factor influencing legislative production, whether in favor of or against agribusiness, is the length of time in office. On average, each additional year in office is associated with a 69.6% increase in the rate of introducing bills favorable to agribusiness and a 41.7% increase in the rate of introducing bills opposed to the sector.

Two control variables are exclusively associated with the introduction of bills beneficial to agribusiness. The first variable is membership in the APF, as the model indicates that members of the Front introduce, on average, 3.2 times more bills favorable to the sector than non-members. This suggests, on one hand, that the APF indeed gathers parliamentarians most inclined to legislate for the benefit of the agricultural sector. On the other hand, it may imply that the APF prioritizes the classification of bills drafted by its own members.

Secondly, the CAPADR emerges as a locus that predominantly attracts parliamentarians aligned with the interests of rural producers. In comparison to other deputies, members of this standing committee introduce 84% more bills favorable to this business sector.

Another control variable associated with the introduction of bills detrimental to agricultural activity is party ideology, specifically affiliation with left-wing parties. In contrast to deputies from left-wing parties, parliamentarians from center and right-wing parties introduce fewer bills opposed to the sector (specifically, 45.5% and 53.8% fewer bills of this nature, respectively).

Level and type of political success of agribusiness in the 55th legislature

In total, the APF took a stance on 150 legislative bills whose processing concluded in the 55^th legislature. Among them, the predominant legislative type is ordinary bills , accounting for 74.7% of the total. Next, we find legislative decree bills (14.7%) and provisional decrees (8.7%). Finally, there are constitutional amendment bills (1.3%) and supplementary bills (projetos de lei complementar) (0.6%)¹².

As per Table 07, 22 bills (14.7%) were enacted into new laws, while 128 bills (85.3%) had a different fate.

Table 07
Chi-square, percentage and adjusted residuals. Level and type of political success

	Changes the status quo	Preserves the status quo	Total
Success	18 (81.8%) 3.8	49 (38.3%) -3.8	67 (44.7%)
Non-Success	04 (18.2%) -3.8	79 (61.7%) 3.8	83 (55.3%)
‍Total	22 (100.0%)	128 (100.0%)	150 (100.0%)

Source: Elaborated by the authors, based on data from the APF, the Chamber of Deputies, and the Federal Senate.
• Note: χ² = 14.397 (0.000).

Among the 22 legislative decisions that altered the status quo (bills translated into new laws), 18 had the support of the APF, indicating gains for the agricultural sector, with a success rate of 81.8%. However, out of the 128 legislative decisions that preserved the status quo (bills that were archived, rejected, returned, withdrawn by the author, or lost their effectiveness), only 49 had the backing of the APF (38.3%), representing relief for the agribusiness sector. The remaining 79 decisions (61.7%) contradicted the entity’s public stance, resulting in frustration for this business sector, which had hoped for the enactment of these bills into new laws.

The chi-square test and the analysis of adjusted residuals enable us to assert that agribusiness succeeded in the vast majority of the most significant decisions, i.e., which effectively changed the status quo. Conversely, the predominant form of failure pertained to advocating for changes that ultimately did not materialize during the 55^th legislature¹³. In other words, while agribusiness may not have achieved all desired changes, the majority of implemented alterations aligned with its preferences.

This scenario represents a significant departure from the findings observed by Ribeiro da Silva (2019) when examining the bills related to the agribusiness sector's agenda from 2011 to 2013, whose congressional processing concluded by December 2018. The prior study found a prevalence of success over failure, the absence of losses, and predominantly defensive success, i.e., relief. However, it is worth noting that these results reflect a shift in the agricultural sector’s approach to the legislative landscape, as discussed by Ribeiro da Silva (2019), and seemingly amplified during the 55^th legislature. If, during the early years of the institutionalization of ‘Instituto Pensar Agropecuária’, the primary emphasis was on averting the worsening of the legislative environment, a notable trend has since emerged: a mounting sense of frustration within the sector, stemming from the acknowledgment that the sector’s assertive efforts to influence the legislative environment have not consistently resulted in discernible and concrete changes.

Concluding remarks

The 55^th legislature demonstrated a high degree of receptiveness to the interests of agribusiness. Firstly, two crucial dimensions of parliamentary behavior, hitherto understudied in the national literature, were associated with instrumental and/or structural mechanisms for the exercise of political power by the business community. On one hand, deputies whose campaigns received more funding from the sector, and whose constituents relied heavily on the sector for employment, had a greater likelihood of securing seats in the CAPADR – the main body in Congress handling agricultural matters. On the other hand, deputies more reliant on the structural dependence of agribusiness introduced more legislative bills considered beneficial by the sector and fewer harmful bills. These findings suggest that parliamentary behavior may serve the interests of a specific business sector merely because of its inherent economic importance, even when more direct sectoral political actions, such as electoral financing, do not exert a decisive role. We could confirm or refute this argument by analyzing agribusiness and other business sectors during the 56^th legislature (2019-2023), especially in light of the prohibition of electoral financing by companies mandated by the Federal Supreme Court (STF) ruling in October, 2015.

We also demonstrated in this article that parliamentary behavior is influenced by factors beyond the instrumental or structural power of agribusiness. For example, individual attributes (prior engagement in rural professions) are associated with membership in the CAPADR. Additionally, party-level elements, such as ideology, are associated with membership in the agriculture committee (with right-wing deputies more likely to be members than left-wing deputies) and the introduction of bills contrary to the interests of agribusiness (with left-wing deputies introducing more bills of this nature than center and right-wing deputies). Finally, institutional factors also matter: membership in the APF favors presence in the CAPADR and the introduction of bills favorable to the agricultural sector; CAPADR members are more active in legislating in favor of this sector; and deputies with longer tenures are more likely to introduce bills both in favor of and against the interests of agribusiness.

Secondly, during the 55^th legislature, agribusiness attained success in the vast majority of decisions that led to the effective enactment of new laws, despite various bills supported by the sector facing different outcomes. Therefore, while the interests of agribusiness wield considerable influence in the Brazilian Congress, this influence is far from all-encompassing.

In summary, through our analysis of the politics of agribusiness in Brazil during the 55^th Legislature, we sought to provide an original contribution to the classic debate in political science regarding the political influence of the business community. Our findings provide evidence that significant aspects of parliamentary behavior are influenced by both the instrumental and structural power of the business class. Additionally, we demonstrated that economic sectors critical to the national economy, such as agribusiness, can achieve significant political victories within the parliamentary decision-making process. However, corporate political power, in both analyzed dimensions, is not the sole determining factor for parliamentary behavior, nor is it always the most influential factor. Furthermore, corporate political power does not invariably shape political decisions. Therefore, a comprehensive model of parliamentary behavior and decision-making must consider corporate political power while acknowledging its limitations and accounting for other contributing factors.

We conclude our article with four suggestions for potential future research on this topic. First, we took a conservative approach in our study by defining the source of electoral financing for the agricultural sector as originating solely from companies in section A of the CNAE. Exploring electoral financing originating from companies in other sectors of the CNAE that are directly or indirectly related to agribusiness could be a valuable avenue for subsequent investigations. Additionally, beginning with the current legislature, future research could investigate electoral financing coming from individual agribusiness entrepreneurs, as financing by individuals remained unaffected by the STF ruling or any subsequent legislative changes. Second, subsequent studies could delve into the impact of business interests on additional dimensions of parliamentary behavior, including speeches, invitations to public hearings, advisory opinions, votes in standing committees or plenary sessions, and the introduction of legislative or budgetary amendments. Third, explanatory models of parliamentary behavior or corporate political success could benefit from the incorporation of additional relevant variables to enhance their explanatory power. Fourth, future investigations could examine the level of political success attained by other business sectors, such as industry, commerce, and services, during the same period. A comparative analysis may provide deeper insights into the actual scope of political success among business sectors.

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• 1
  Several interest groups rely on the list of legislative bills introduced by parliamentarians to shape their agenda in the National Congress (MANCUSO and PRADO, 2022) and to discern their allies or opponents within the federal parliament. Additionally, while not the sole factor, the media often considers the introduction of legislative bills as a significant indicator of parliamentary performance. This performance profile sometimes leads to the bestowal of awards (such as the UOL ‘Congresso em Foco’ award), which enhances visibility for legislators among their electorate. Moreover, the content of legislative bills introduced by parliamentarians can play a crucial role in electoral campaigns. On one hand, parliamentarians themselves can use the bills they introduced to showcase their support or opposition to certain interests, recognizing that it may enhance their electoral prospects. On the other hand, opposing candidates or the media may utilize these bills to criticize the parliamentarian during elections.
• 2
  The importance of parliamentary fronts as arenas for representing social interests, including those of the business community, has been explored by authors such as Coradini (2010), Testa (2017), Cascione (2018), and Carvalho (2020).
• 3
  We obtained voting data from the TSE Electoral Data Repository.
• 4
  We obtained employment data through the 2014 Yearly Social Information List (RAIS).
• 5
  We considered the following declared occupations as professions related to agriculture, livestock farming, rural development, and food supply: rural administrator, farmer, cooperative farmer, family farmer, surveyor, agronomist, agriculturalist, poultry farmer, cocoa farmer, coffee farmer, rural entrepreneur, agricultural engineer, forestry engineer, agricultural extensionist, rural extensionist, veterinary doctor, livestock farmer, fishers, agricultural producer, rural producer, agricultural technician, agronomy and surveying technician, livestock farming technician, environmental technician, rural worker, veterinarian, and zoo technician.
• 6
  We are grateful to political scientist César Zucco Jr. for sharing the PLB data. Left-wing parties include the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), Socialism and Freedom Party (PSOL), and Workers’ Party (PT). Categorized as centrist parties are the Democratic Labor Party (PDT), Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), Popular Socialist Party (PPS), Republican Party of the Social Order (PROS), Social Democracy Party of Brazil (PSDB), Green Party (PV), and Solidarity (SD). Right-wing parties consist of Democrats (DEM), Progressive Party (PP), Republic Party (PR), Brazilian Republican Party (PRB), Social Christian Party (PSC), Social Democratic Party (PSD), and Brazilian Labor Party (PTB). The remaining political parties could not be classified according to ideology and were therefore excluded from the analysis: National Ecological Party (PEN), Humanist Solidarity Party (PHS), National Mobilization Party (PMN), Progressive Republican Party (PRP), Brazilian Labor Renewal Party (PRTB), Christian Social Democratic Party (PSDC), Social Liberal Party (PSL), Labor Party of Brazil (PT do B), Christian Labor Party (PTC), and National Labor Party (PTN). The uncategorized parties had only 36 deputies out of a total of 623 deputies who served in the 55 legislature (5.8% of the total), including both members and substitutes.
• 7
  The formation of multi-party ‘coalitions’ or ‘blocs’ is a strategy adopted by different parties at the beginning of the legislature to enhance the likelihood of securing positions of power within the House, such as seats on highly valued standing committees. However, within these ‘blocs’, the allocation of positions of power among parties tends to be proportional to each party’s size. Thus, we considered the size of each party in seats secured in Congress as a relevant control variable for our model. As highlighted by Andrade and Coutinho (2016) in their analysis of the application of regulatory norms to the committee system, the Internal Regulations of the Chamber of Deputies envisions the possibility of party agreements concerning the allocation of offices, if maintained the general rule of party proportionality. In this regard, we acknowledge that negotiations may also take place among parties concerning committee composition. Nonetheless, it is crucial to consider the regulatory dimension of party proportionality insofar as “the filling of positions on the board and seats of committees [...] is not arbitrary, but depends on a prior allocation of existing seats among the various parties” (PACHECO, 2013, p. 24).
• 8
  Footnote #13 offers additional justification for our choice of negative binomial regression.
• 9
  In this scenario, there would be a ‘win’ regardless of how the group assesses the moot bill. To prevent multiple counts of the same decision, we classified any law supported by the group as a ‘win’ only once, regardless of the number of bills evaluated by the group that may become moot due to this law.
• 10
  In this case, there would also be ‘loss’ regardless of how the group evaluates the moot bill. We classified any law not supported by the group as a ‘loss’ only once, for the same reason mentioned in the previous note.
• 11
  According to Table 06, the alpha test of the dispersion coefficient suggests that using negative binomial regression is more appropriate than the Poisson distribution, both in the model of legislative bills favorable to agribusiness and in the model of bills against the sector. In the first case, the estimated dispersion coefficient is 3.195, while in the second case, it is 3.065. Neither model's confidence interval includes the value zero. In Table 03, B corresponds to the regression coefficients of the independent and control variables, and SE to their standard errors. Exp(B) represents the incidence rate ratios. When Exp(B) is less than 01, greater than 01, or equal to 01, it indicates, respectively, that the incidence rate in the reference group is lower, greater than, or equal to that in the comparison group. The Wald test is used to test the hypothesis of statistical association between the independent and control variables, on the one hand, and the dependent variable on the other. The likelihood ratio chi-squared test compares our models to ‘null models’, i.e., models without any predictors. The p-value of this test indicates whether our models represent any improvement compared to the ‘null models’. The analysis of negative binomial models is based on IDRE-UCLA (2017): <https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/spss/dae/negative-binomial-regression/.
• 12
  The requirements for approval of different types of legislation are as follows. Constitutional Amendment Bills: Article 60, §2, of the Brazilian Constitution stipulates that the “Bill must be discussed and voted on in each House of the National Congress, in two rounds, and is considered approved if it obtains three-fifths of the votes of the respective parliamentarians in both rounds”. Supplementary Bills: Article 69 of the Brazilian Constitution states that ‘Supplementary bills will be approved by an absolute majority’. Oher types of legislative proposals (Provisional Measures, Legislative Decree Bills, and Ordinary Bills) follow the guidelines outlined in Article 47 of the Constitution, which states that “Unless otherwise constitutionally provided, deliberations in each House and its Committees will be decided by a majority of votes, with the presence of the absolute majority of its members”.
• 13
  The chi-square test (sig<0.001) suggests a very low likelihood of error in the assertion that the level of political success of agribusiness differs according to the type of decision. When the adjusted residual value is less than -02 (or greater than 02), it indicates that there are fewer (more) cases in that cell than would be expected if the variables were not associated.
• *
  This article was presented at the 13th Meeting of the Brazilian Political Science Association (ABCP), which took place from September 19 to September 23, 2022, in an online format, and was named as the best paper presented in the subfield of Political Institutions.

• Funding information: Wagner Pralon Mancuso: National Council for Scientific and Technological Development. CNPq Productivity Grant 307919/2020-0. Coauthor João Felype Vieira Prado: São Paulo Research Foundation (Fapesp) - Scientific iniciation fellowship 2019/20488-4. Coauthor Ana Luiza Ormeni Almeida dos Santos: Fapesp - Scientific iniciation fellowship 2019/12504-0.

Publication Dates

• Publication in this collection
  22 Apr 2024
• Date of issue
  Mar 2024

History

• Received
  10 Nov 2022
• Accepted
  24 Aug 2023