Relations between CEO characteristics and mergers and acquisition decisions in Brazilian companies

Main, Kamilla Tairine de Assunção; Silva, Vinicius Augusto Brunassi

doi:10.15728/bbr.2021.18.4.2

Kamilla Tairine de Assunção Main

Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado, FECAP, São Paulo, SP, Brasil

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2858-3338

Vinicius Augusto Brunassi Silva

Fundação Escola de Comércio Álvares Penteado, FECAP, São Paulo, SP, Brasil

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1299-321X

kamillatairine@hotmail.com

vinicius.brunassi@fecap.br

AUTHOR’S CONTRIBUITION

Contribution: Author 1 e Author 2. 1. Definition of the research problem. 2. Development of hypotheses or research questions. 3. Theoretical foundations. 4. Definition of methodological problems. 5. Data collect. 6. Statistics Analysis. 7. Analysis and Interpretation of data. 8. Critical review of the manuscript. 9. Writing of the manuscript

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

We declare that we have no academic/personal conflicts of interest in the publication of this article.

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	Total	% Part.
Number of companies	113	112	118	126	136	140	158	205	209	215	228	237	239	249	253	257	261	273	307
Number of M&As	3	2	2	8	9	12	17	33	21	9	25	16	14	8	4	2	3	15	203
Number of M&As (firms)	3	2	2	7	8	6	15	20	15	8	15	14	10	7	4	2	3	14	87
Number of CEOs (full sample)	114	115	127	135	144	146	167	213	266	218	234	276	274	289	297	309	309	307	794	100%
Number of CEOs (M&As)	3	2	2	7	8	7	15	20	15	8	15	14	10	7	4	2	3	14	114
Tenure as a CEO (years)	0	1	2	2	3	3	4	3	3	3	4	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	4
Average CEO’s age	56	56	57	57	58	57	57	55	54	53	54	55	54	55	54	55	55	55	55
Number of male CEOs	113	113	123	131	141	145	166	210	261	212	228	267	264	278	286	301	303	302	774	97%
Number of female CEOs	1	2	4	4	3	1	1	3	5	6	6	9	10	11	11	8	6	5	20	3%
CEOs with educational background in finance	82	82	91	94	97	103	118	150	192	164	176	204	208	222	227	246	242	242	587	74%
CEOs with educational background in engineering	10	10	12	10	13	10	11	15	25	15	14	20	19	20	24	25	26	23	71	9%
CEOs with educational background in other areas	13	14	15	22	25	24	27	34	35	29	33	42	38	35	33	29	31	29	105	13%
CEOs without college academic background	9	9	9	9	9	9	11	14	14	10	11	10	9	12	13	11	10	13	31	4%
CEOs with graduate degrees	27	30	34	34	38	43	52	72	99	84	90	110	111	119	128	142	143	139	349	44%
CEO and entrepreneur	44	43	47	48	54	50	71	105	114	102	110	130	131	133	132	127	126	125	275	35%
CEO and board president	58	58	64	61	69	61	73	81	85	68	70	79	68	62	58	46	45	40	187	24%
CEOs among the 5 largest shareholders of the company	18	20	24	20	23	21	21	29	29	27	28	31	32	38	35	29	30	34	86	11%
M&As value (billions of Reais)	0.0	0.0	12.8	3.5	91.6	10.1	35.5	37.0	12.9	7.1	34.6	11.3	18.6	8.7	1.2	5.7	4.4	18.5	313.6	100%

Variables	No.	Abbreviation	Description	Data Source/Proxy	Theory	Expected Sign
Dependent	1	F&A	Equal to 1 for acquiring companies that performed an M&A in the sample period	Anbima	Malmendier & Tate (2008Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.0... ), Brown & Sarma (2007Brown, R., & Sarma, N. (2007). CEO overconfidence, CEO dominance and corporate acquisitions. Journal of Economics and Business, 59(5), 358-379. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2007.04.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2007.... )
	2	DmFin	Dummy variable for CEOs with an educational background in finance	Formulário de referência 12.5 e IAN	Malmendier & Tate (2005Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005... )	(-)
	3	DmEng	Dummy variable for CEOs with an educational background in engineering	Formulário de referência 12.5 e IAN	Malmendier & Tate (2005Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005... )	(+)
	4	DmOth	Dummy variable for CEOs with an educational background in other areas	Formulário de referência 12.5 e IAN	Malmendier & Tate (2005Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005... )	(+)
	5	DmNoCol	Dummy variable for CEOs without college academic background	Formulário de referência 12.5 e IAN	Malmendier & Tate (2005Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005... )	(-)
	6	DmGrad	Dummy variable for CEOs who hold an MBA, a master’s or a Ph.D.	Formulário de referência 12.5 e IAN	Malmendier & Tate (2005Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005... ), Choi, Saito & Silva (2015Choi, D., Saito, R., & Silva, V. (2015). Estrutura de capital e remuneração dos funcionários: Evidência empírica no Brasil. RAC - Revista de Administração, 19(2). Recuperado de http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=84035381006 http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=84... )	(-)
	7	DmEntrep	Dummy variable for entrepreneur CEOs	Formulário de referência 12.5 e IAN	Malmendier & Tate (2008Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.0... ), Barros & Silveira (2008Barros, L. A. B. de C., & Silveira, A. D. M. (2008). Excesso de confiança, otimismo gerencial e os determinantes da estrutura de capital. Revista Brasileira de Finanças, 6(3), 293-335. Recuperado de http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=305824735001 http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=30... ), Palich & Bagby (1995Palich, L. E., & Bagby, D. R. a Y. (1995). Using cognitive theory to explain risk-taking: challenging conventional wisdom. Journal of Business Venturing, 9026(95), 425-438.)	(+)
	8	DmCEO&Pres	Dummy variable for CEOs who are presidents of the board	Formulário de referência 12.5 e IAN	Malmendier & Tate (2008Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.0... )	(+)
	9	DmCEO&Stock	Dummy variable for CEOs who are among the 5 largest shareholders of the company	Economatica	Malmendier & Tate (2008Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.0... )	(+)
	10	Age	CEO age	Formulário de referência 12.5 e IAN	Malmendier & Tate (2008Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.0... ), Hryshko, Luengo-Prado & Sørensen (2011Hryshko, D., Luengo-Prado, M. J., & Sørensen, B. E. (2011). Childhood determinants of risk aversion: The long shadow of compulsory education. Quantitative Economics, 2(1), 37-72. https://doi.org/10.3982/QE2 https://doi.org/10.3982/QE2... )	(-)
	11	CEO_WT	Tenure as CEO (years)	Formulário de referência 12.5 e IAN	Malmendier & Tate (2005Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005... )	(-)
	12	DmGov	Dummy variable for corporate governance tiers (Níveis de governança N2 e Novo Mercado)	Economatica	Brown & Sarma (2007Brown, R., & Sarma, N. (2007). CEO overconfidence, CEO dominance and corporate acquisitions. Journal of Economics and Business, 59(5), 358-379. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2007.04.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2007.... ), Malmendier & Tate (2005Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005... )	(-)
	13	Size	Size	Ln (Total assets)	Brown & Sarma (2007Brown, R., & Sarma, N. (2007). CEO overconfidence, CEO dominance and corporate acquisitions. Journal of Economics and Business, 59(5), 358-379. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2007.04.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2007.... )	(+)
	14	Tobin’s Q	Growth opportunities	(Equity market value + Debt)/ Total assets	Malmendier & Tate (2008Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.0... )	(+)
	15	Ebit	Earnings before interest and taxes	Ln (Ebit)	Brown & Sarma (2007Brown, R., & Sarma, N. (2007). CEO overconfidence, CEO dominance and corporate acquisitions. Journal of Economics and Business, 59(5), 358-379. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2007.04.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconbus.2007.... ), Malmendier & Tate (2008Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.0... )	(+)
	16	ROA	Return on assets	Net earnings / Total assets	Malmendier & Tate (2005Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005... )	(+)
	17	Leverage	Debt-to-equity ratio	(Debt/Equity)	Barros & Silveira (2008Barros, L. A. B. de C., & Silveira, A. D. M. (2008). Excesso de confiança, otimismo gerencial e os determinantes da estrutura de capital. Revista Brasileira de Finanças, 6(3), 293-335. Recuperado de http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=305824735001 http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=30... ), Malmendier & Tate (2008Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2008). Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction. Journal of Financial Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.07.002 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.0... )	(-)
	18	Cash	Cash and equivalents	Ln (Cash)	Malmendier & Tate (2005Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00813.x https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005... )	(+)

No.	Sector	Sample Number	Sample Mean	Sample Min	Sample Max	Sample S.D	M&A Number	M&A Mean	M&A Min	M&A Max	M&A S.D
1	Industrial Goods	153	4.77	0.25	18.01	4.16	20	3.12	0.26	9.64	2.47
2	Consumption - cyclical	138	4.57	0.25	18.01	4.17	18	2.21	0.08	10.65	2.32
3	Consumption - non cyclical	57	3.28	0.25	12.18	2.88	14	2.95	0.51	10.15	2.28
4	Financial	37	4.68	0.25	17.25	3.79	4	3.05	2.03	4.57	1.15
5	Basic Materials	114	4.43	0.25	18.01	3.85	24	3.26	0.25	10.66	3.15
6	Oil, gas and biofuels	19	2.31	0.25	9.13	2.06	4	2.24	0.26	5.83	1.98
7	Health	42	2.11	0.25	9.38	2.06	8	1.27	0.08	4.21	1.29
8	Information technology	13	3.61	0.76	11.93	2.83	1	2.54	2.54	2.54	NA
9	Telecommunications	47	2.28	0.26	11.41	2.24	14	2.50	0.25	5.80	1.71
10	Utilities	174	3.06	0.25	18.01	3.15	7	5.63	0.76	13.95	4.17
	Total	794	4.04	0.25	18.01	3.79	114	2.87	0.08	13.95	2.65

No.	Sector	Sample Finance	Sample Engineering	Sample Others	Sample No College Degree	Sample Total	M&A Finance	M&A Engineering	M&A Others	M&A No College Degree	M&A Total
1	Industrial Goods	131	6	8	9	154	16	0	3	1	20
2	Consumption - cyclical	103	6	23	6	138	12	1	5	0	18
3	Consumption - non cyclical	39	5	5	8	57	10	0	1	3	14
4	Financial	27	1	7	2	37	3	0	0	1	4
5	Basic Materials	80	12	17	5	114	17	4	3	0	24
6	Oil, gas and biofuels.	11	2	6	0	19	3	0	1	0	4
7	Health	30	2	10	0	42	6	1	1	0	8
8	Information technology	12	1	0	0	13	1	0	0	0	1
9	Telecommunications	36	3	7	1	47	14	0	0	0	14
10	Utilities	118	33	22	0	173	3	3	1	0	7
	Total	587	69	105	31	794	85	9	15	5	114

No.	Sector	Sample CEOs with an MBA, master’s or Ph.D	Sample CEOs without an MBA, master’s or Ph.D	Sample Total	M&A CEOs with an MBA, master’s or Ph.D	M&A CEOs without an MBA, master’s or Ph.D	M&A Total
1	Industrial Goods	54	99	153	6	14	20
2	Consumption - cyclical	53	85	138	11	7	18
3	Consumption - non cyclical	25	32	57	5	9	14
4	Financial	16	21	37	1	3	4
5	Basic Materials	41	73	114	12	12	24
6	Oil, gas and biofuels	9	10	19	2	2	4
7	Health	25	17	42	6	2	8
8	Information technology	3	10	13	0	1	1
9	Telecommunications	27	20	47	9	5	14
10	Utilities	96	78	174	4	3	7
	Total	349	445	794	56	58	114

No.	Sector	Sample Number	Sample Mean	Sample Min	Sample Max	Sample S.D	M&A Number.	M&A Mean	M&A Min	M&A Max	M&A S.D
1	Industrial Goods	153	56	30	92	12	20	51	37	84	11
2	Consumption - cyclical	138	54	29	91	11	18	51	35	65	9
3	Consumption - non cyclical	57	52	32	81	11	14	46	36	64	9
4	Financial	37	60	36	92	13	4	54	48	59	5
5	Basic Materials	114	58	39	96	10	24	54	42	75	7
6	Oil, gas and biofuels	19	58	45	73	7	4	56	49	62	5
7	Health	42	47	25	66	9	8	48	33	66	11
8	Information technology	13	49	35	67	7	1	48	48	48	NA
9	Telecommunications	47	51	39	70	7	14	52	40	70	9
10	Utilities	174	54	23	78	10	7	56	32	78	15
	Total	794	55	23	96	11	114	52	32	84	10

No.	Sector	Sample Male	Sample Female	Sample Total	M&A Male	M&A Female	M&A Total
1	Industrial Goods	152	1	153	20	0	20
2	Consumption - cyclical	135	3	138	17	1	18
3	Consumption - non cyclical	56	1	57	14	0	14
4	Financial	37	0	37	4	0	4
5	Basic Materials	111	3	114	24	0	24
6	Oil, gas and biofuels.	18	1	19	4	0	4
7	Health	41	1	42	8	0	8
8	Information technology	13	0	13	1	0	1
9	Telecommunications	45	2	47	13	1	14
10	Utilities	166	8	174	7	0	7
	Total	774	20	794	112	2	114

No.	Sector	Sample CEO & President	Sample CEO only	Sample Total	M&A CEO & President	M&A CEO only	M&A Total
1	Industrial Goods	43	110	153	4	16	20
2	Consumption - cyclical	37	101	138	2	16	18
3	Consumption - non cyclical	12	45	57	3	11	14
4	Financial	14	23	37	0	4	4
5	Basic Materials	29	85	114	5	19	24
6	Oil, gas and biofuels	3	16	19	0	4	4
7	Health	5	37	42	1	7	8
8	Information technology	1	12	13	1	0	1
9	Telecommunications	9	38	47	3	11	14
10	Utilities	34	140	174	0	7	7
	Total	187	607	794	19	95	114

No.	Sector	Sample CEO & shareholder	Sample CEO only	Sample Total	M&A CEO & shareholder	M&A CEO only	M&A Total
1	Industrial Goods	31	122	153	3	17	20
2	Consumption - cyclical	23	115	138	1	17	18
3	Consumption - non cyclical	4	53	57	0	14	14
4	Financial	5	32	37	0	4	4
5	Basic Materials	14	100	114	0	24	24
6	Oil, gas and biofuels	0	19	19	0	4	4
7	Health	2	40	42	0	8	8
8	Information technology	3	10	13	0	1	1
9	Telecommunications	3	44	47	0	14	14
10	Utilities	1	173	174	0	7	7
	Total	86	708	794	4	110	114

No.	Sector	Sample CEO & Entrepreneur	Sample CEO only	Sample Total	M&A CEO & Entrepreneur	M&A CEO only	M&A Total
1	Industrial Goods	75	78	153	10	10	20
2	Consumption - cyclical	62	76	138	10	8	18
3	Consumption - non cyclical	22	35	57	4	10	14
4	Financial	15	22	37	3	1	4
5	Basic Materials	36	78	114	7	17	24
6	Oil, gas and biofuels	5	14	19	0	4	4
7	Health	13	29	42	6	2	8
8	Information technology	6	7	13	1	0	1
9	Telecommunications	9	38	47	1	13	14
10	Utilities	32	142	174	0	7	7
	Total	275	519	794	42	72	114

	EBIT	TobinsQ	ROA	Leverage	Cash	Size	Age	CEO tenure
EBIT	1.000	0.012	0.051	0.026	0.496	0.643	- 0.013	- 0.028
TobinsQ		1.000	- 0.039	- 0.016	- 0.063	- 0.151	- 0.059	0.015
ROA			1.000	0.004	0.094	0.101	0.009	- 0.002
Leverage				1.000	0.025	0.027	0.017	0.024
Cash						1.000	- 0.145	- 0.125
Size							- 0.066	- 0.070
Age							1.000	0.360
CEO tenure								1.000

Independent Variables	Expected Sign	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Marginal Effect
Independent Variables	Expected Sign	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DmFin	(-)	-0.573^**	-0.519^**	-0.468^*	-0.477^*	-0.003^*
		(0.249)	(0.257)	(0.261)	(0.268)	(0.268)
DmEng	(+)	-0.394	-0.447	-0.027	-0.057	-0,0004
		(0.348)	(0.359)	(0.366)	(0.379)	(0.379)
DmNoCol	(-)	0.252	0.500	0.309	0.404	0,003
		(0.431)	(0.441)	(0.466)	(0.485)	(0.485)
DmGrad	(-)	0.077	0.159	0.090	0.125	0,001
		(0.175)	(0.178)	(0.180)	(0.184)	(0.184)
DmEntrep	(+)	0.029	0.188	-0.053	0.076	0,000
		(0.188)	(0.193)	(0.195)	(0.201)	(0.201)
DmCEO&Pres	(+)	0.077	-0.334	-0.075	-0.556^**	-0.004^**
		(0.240)	(0.255)	(0.247)	(0.264)	(0.264)
DmCEO&Stock	(+)	-0.623	-0.461	-0.612	-0.418	-0,003
		(0.483)	(0.489)	(0.492)	(0.499)	(0.499)
Age	(-)	0.041	0.043	0.007	0.019	0,000
		(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.079)
Age²	(-)	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0,000002
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
CEO_WT	(-)	-0.004^*	0.000	-0.004	-0.000	-0,000002
		(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
DmGov	(-)	-0.315^*	-0.157	-0.356^*	-0.163	-0,001
		(0.168)	(0.175)	(0.186)	(0.193)	(0.193)
Size (Ln)	(+)	0.372^***	0.529^***	0.259^*	0.473^***	0.003^***
		(0.139)	(0.145)	(0.143)	(0.154)	(0.154)
Tobins’Q	(+)	0.136^**	0.111	0.108	-0.055	-0,0004
		(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.119)	(0.119)
EBIT (Ln)	(+)	0.118	0.028	0.233^**	0.135	0,001
		(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.119)	(0.125)	(0.125)
ROA	(+)	-3.020	-3.321	-3.858	-2.982	-0,019
		(3.111)	(3.312)	(3.129)	(3.376)	(3.376)
Leverage	(-)	-0.226^**	-0.279^***	-0.204^**	-0.193^*	-0.001^*
		(0.097)	(0.102)	(0.096)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Cash (Ln)	(+)	0.078^*	0.076	0.009	-0.006	-0,0004
		(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.052)
Constant		-11.716^***	-12.997^***	-9.744^***	-11.903^***	-
		(2.222)	(2.384)	(2.290)	(2.511)	-
Year Fixed Effects		No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Sector Fixed Effects		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations		9.671	9.671	9.671	9.671	9.671

Independent Variables	Expected Sign	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Coef.	Marginal Effect
Independent Variables	Expected Sign	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DmFin	(-)	-0.663^*	-0.638^*	-0.659^*	-0,579	-0.004^*
		(0,369)	(0,372)	(0,385)	(0,392)	(0,392)
DmEng	(+)	-0,428	-0,385	-0,111	0,119	0,001
		(0,545)	(0,550)	(0,582)	(0,595)	(0,595)
DmNoCol	(-)	0,057	0,143	-0,191	-0,134	-0,001
		(0,596)	(0,613)	(0,671)	(0,696)	(0,696)
DmGrad	(-)	-0,057	0,005	-0,032	0,098	0,001
		(0,271)	(0,272)	(0,280)	(0,280)	(0,280)
DmEntrep	(+)	0,303	0,384	0,219	0,307	0,002
		(0,268)	(0,270)	(0,280)	(0,281)	(0,281)
DmCEO&Pres	(+)	-0,047	-0,494	-0,104	-0,668	-0,003
		(0,416)	(0,438)	(0,425)	(0,452)	(0,452)
DmCEO&Stock	(+)	-0,798	-0,680	-0,667	-0,490	-0,002
		(0,635)	(0,639)	(0,650)	(0,658)	(0,658)
Age	(-)	-0,019	-0,025	-0,009	-0,035	-0,0002
		(0,103)	(0,105)	(0,102)	(0,105)	(0,105)
Age²	(-)	-0,0002	-0,0001	-0,0002	0,000	0,000
		(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)
CEO_WT	(-)	-0,002	0,001	-0,001	0,001	0,000
		(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,003)
DmGov	(-)	-0,028	0,053	-0,114	-0,025	-0,0001
		(0,262)	(0,264)	(0,284)	(0,285)	(0,285)
Size (Ln)	(+)	0.366^*	0.444^**	0.419^**	0.556^**	0.003^**
		(0,197)	(0,201)	(0,211)	(0,217)	(0,217)
Tobins’Q	(+)	0,107	0,080	-0,087	-0,164	-0,0009
		(0,155)	(0,165)	(0,174)	(0,188)	(0,188)
EBIT (Ln)	(+)	0,033	0,002	0,043	-0,030	-0,0002
		(0,156)	(0,159)	(0,169)	(0,172)	(0,172)
ROA	(+)	-3,604	-4,896	-0,874	-0,391	-0,002
		(5,292)	(5,560)	(5,312)	(5,550)	(5,550)
Leverage	(-)	-0,010	-0,011	0,042	0,117	0,001
		(0,145)	(0,148)	(0,143)	(0,151)	(0,151)
Cash (Ln)	(+)	0,038	0,030	-0,005	-0,010	-0,0001
		(0,070)	(0,072)	(0,072)	(0,073)	(0,073)
Constant		-8.907^***	-9.228^***	-10.537^***	-11.353^***	-
		(3,108)	(3,196)	(3,236)	(3,387)	(0,000)
Year Fixed Effects		No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Sector Fixed Effects		No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations		5.759	5.759	5.759	5.759	5.759

Independent Variables	Expected Sign	Coef.	Coef.	Marginal Effect.	Coef.	Coef.	Marginal Effect.
Independent Variables	Expected Sign	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DmFin	(-)	-0.553^**	-0.441^*	-0.003^*	-0.543^**	-0.592^**	-0.004^**
		(0,247)	(0,266)	(0,266)	(0,265)	(0,283)	(0,283)
DmEng	(+)				-0.561^**	-0,243	-0,002
					(0,262)	(0,289)	(0,289)
DmNoCol	(-)	0,273	0,457	0,004	0,276	0,460	0,004
		(0,429)	(0,483)	(0,483)	(0,430)	(0,485)	(0,485)
DmGrad	(-)	0,086	0,149	0,001	0,086	0,133	0,001
		(0,174)	(0,182)	(0,182)	(0,174)	(0,182)	(0,182)
DmEntrep	(+)	0,019	0,078	0,001	0,016	0,128	0,001
		(0,187)	(0,201)	(0,201)	(0,189)	(0,204)	(0,204)
DmCEO&Pres	(+)	0,072	-0.568^**	-0.003^**	0,072	-0.604^**	-0.003^**
		(0,240)	(0,263)	(0,263)	(0,240)	(0,263)	(0,263)
DmCEO&Stock	(+)	-0,626	-0,416	-0,002	-0,627	-0,373	-0,002
		(0,483)	(0,499)	(0,499)	(0,483)	(0,499)	(0,499)
Age	(-)	0,043	0,029	0,000	0,044	0,0121	0,0001
		(0,074)	(0,079)	(0,079)	(0,074)	(0,079)	(0,079)
Age²	(-)	-0,0007	-0,0005	0,0000	-0,001	-0,0003	-0,000002
		(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)
CEO_WT	(-)	-0.004^*	0,000	0,000	-0.004^*	0,000	0,000
		(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,003)
DmGov	(-)	-0.319^*	-0,180	-0,001	-0.319^*	-0,1757	-0,0011
		(0,168)	(0,192)	(0,192)	(0,168)	(0,192)	(0,192)
Size (Ln)	(+)	0.377^***	0.481^***	0.003^***	0.377^***	0.482^***	0.003^***
		(0,138)	(0,153)	(0,153)	(0,138)	(0,154)	(0,154)
Tobins’Q	(+)	0.135^**	-0,056	0,000	0.135^**	-0,0535	-0,0003
		(0,060)	(0,119)	(0,119)	(0,060)	(0,119)	(0,119)
EBIT (Ln)	(+)	0,117	0,132	0,001	0,117	0,1364	0,0009
		(0,111)	(0,124)	(0,124)	(0,111)	(0,125)	(0,125)
ROA	(+)	-2,953	-2,924	-0,019	-2,952	-3,176	-0,021
		(3,106)	(3,384)	(3,384)	(3,104)	(3,409)	(3,409)
Leverage	(-)	-0.225^**	-0.201^*	-0.001^*	-0.226^**	-0.183^*	-0.001^*
		(0,097)	(0,104)	(0,104)	(0,098)	(0,105)	(0,105)
Cash (Ln)	(+)	0,074	-0,011	0,000	0,074	-0,0116	-0,0001
		(0,047)	(0,051)	(0,051)	(0,047)	(0,052)	(0,052)
Constant		-11.813^***	-14.078^***		-11.826^***	-13.731^***
		(2,220)	(2,542)		(2,224)	(2,543)
Year Fixed Effects		No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Sector Fixed Effects		No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations		9.671	9.671	9.671	9.671	9.671	9.671

Independent variables	Expected Sign	Pooled Coef.	Pooled Coef.	Pooled Marginal Effect	Random Effects Coef.	Random Effects Coef.	Random Effects Marginal Effect
Independent variables	Expected Sign	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DmFin	(-)	-0.573^**	-0.477^*	-0.003^*	-0.666^**	-0.617^*	-0.007^*
		(0.269)	(0.257)	(0,002)	(0.338)	(0.355)	(0.355)
DmEng	(+)	-0.394	-0.057	-0,0004	-0.479	-0.454	-0,005
		(0.458)	(0.477)	(0,003)	(0.528)	(0.543)	(0.543)
DmNoCol	(-)	0.252	0.404	0,003	0.251	0.041	0,000
		(0.398)	(0.529)	(0,003)	(0.655)	(0.700)	(0.700)
DmGrad	(-)	0.077	0.125	0,001	0.269	0.310	0,003
		(0.209)	(0.219)	(0,001)	(0.224)	(0.208)	(0.208)
DmEntrep	(+)	0.029	0.076	0,000	-0.079	0.156	0,002
		(0.216)	(0.214)	(0,001)	(0.277)	(0.250)	(0.250)
DmCEO&Pres	(+)	0.077	-0.556^*	-0.004^*	0.116	-0.547	-0,006
		(0.271)	(0.289)	(0,002)	(0.330)	(0.338)	(0.338)
DmCEO&Stock	(+)	-0.623	-0.418	-0,003	-0.900	-0.540	-0,006
		(0.483)	(0.510)	(0,003)	(0.624)	(0.578)	(0.578)
Age	(-)	0.041	0.019	0,000	0.093	0.092	0,0010
		(0.082)	(0.082)	(0,001)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.096)
Age²	(-)	-0.001	-0.000	0,0000	-0.001	-0.001	-0,000010
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0,000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
CEO_WT	(-)	-0.004^*	-0.000	0,000	-0.004	0.001	0,000
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0,000)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)
DmGov	(-)	-0.315	-0.163	-0,001	-1.018^**	-0.763^*	-0.008^*
		(0.232)	(0.238)	(0,002)	(0.465)	(0.463)	(0.463)
Size (Ln)	(+)	0.372^***	0.473^***	0.003^***	0.270^*	0.744^***	0.008^***
		(0.128)	(0.130)	(0,001)	(0.149)	(0.164)	(0.164)
Tobins’Q	(+)	0.136^***	-0.055	0,000	0.189^***	0.084	0,0009
		(0.046)	(0.123)	(0,001)	(0.065)	(0.100)	(0.100)
EBIT (Ln)	(+)	0.118	0.135	0,001	0.175	0.038	0,0004
		(0.105)	(0.116)	(0,001)	(0.111)	(0.106)	(0.106)
ROA	(+)	-3.020	-2.982	-0,019	-3.854	-2.417	-0,025
		(3.025)	(3.272)	(0,021)	(3.225)	(3.356)	(3.356)
Leverage	(-)	-0.226^**	-0.193^*	-0.001^*	-0.354^**	-0.198	-0,002
		(0.111)	(0.110)	(0,001)	(0.138)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Cash (Ln)	(+)	0.078^*	-0.006	0,000	0.074	0.026	0,0003
		(0.046)	(0.047)	(0,000)	(0.048)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Constant		-11.716^***	-11.903^***		-12.735^***	-17.327^***
		(2.522)	(2.585)		(3.212)	(3.435)
Year Fixed Effects		Não	Sim	Sim	Não	Sim	Sim
Sector Fixed Effects		Não	Sim	Sim	Não	Sim	Sim
Observations		9.671	9.671	9.671	9.671	9.671	9.671

{P r o b (y = 1| x)}_{} = G (α + B_{1} {D m F i n}_{} + B_{2} {D m E n g}_{} + B_{3} {D m N o C o l}_{} + B_{4} {D m G r a d}_{} + B_{5} {D m E n t r e p}_{} + B_{6} {D m C E O & P r e s}_{} + B_{7} {D m C E O & S t o c k}_{} + B_{8} {A g e}_{} + B_{9} {A g e ²}_{} + B_{10} {C E O_W T}_{} + B_{11} {D m G o v}_{} + B_{12} {L n S i z e}_{} + B_{13} {T o b i n^{'} s Q}_{} + B_{14} {L n E b i t}_{} + B_{15} {R O A}_{} + B_{16} {L e v e r a g e + B_{17} L n C a s h)}_{} + ɛ i

[1] kamillatairine@hotmail.com

Brasil

Brasil

Relations between CEO characteristics and mergers and acquisition decisions in Brazilian companies

ABSTRACT