| Legitimacy and voice |
Endogenous decisions;
Perennial dialogue;
Low turnover in cooperative management and weak youth engagement. |
Local organization for fisheries, supplemented by government regulations; Gradual punishment; Consolidated participatory mechanisms. |
External norms not observed; Few local representation; Punitive and exogenous rules. |
| Management |
Depends on monitoring clandestine production and other infractions; Non-cooperators have less decision-making space; Prohibition of burning and deforestation to guarantee honey production. |
Fishing management proposed as an alternative to restrictive legislation and reduction of fish for food; Recovery of fish stock contributes to food security and family income. |
Prohibition of cutting as the only strategy;
Incoherent alternative uses; Conflicting external norms. |
| Performance |
Related to the diversity of partnerships and income possibilities;
Affected by the discontinuity of public policies and natural factors (drought). |
Management areas have better established partnerships; Community interest defines the continuity or not of fishing; Resilience depends on fisheries participation in the budget, partnerships, and threats. |
Related to the diversity of partnerships and income possibilities;
More effective learning when promoted locally; Payback time discourages participation; Financial returns can generate new conflicts. |
| Transparency |
Regular meetings contribute to the cooperative’s history of transparency, Cooperative vs. uncooperative conflicts, and Other productive activities outside the flowering period. |
Within an area, not everyone joins in fishing; Clear roles and obligations; Annual reports on using financial resources. All management categories must have internal regulations. |
Associated vs. non-associated conflicts; Unclear roles and dependence on formal leadership; Lack of transparency discourages participation in new initiatives. |
| Justice and Rights |
Communities see environmental standards as a cost; Good practices are important, but they do not prevent clandestine production; government payment delay stimulates production without processing, Wide network of actors. |
Management provides legal fishing opportunities; any category can submit a fishing management plan. Enforced environmental standards; Direct trade, and access to public procurement markets may occur; Price variations and institutional instability are threats. |
Environmental standards are considered a high cost and are disrespected; The repressive history hampers shared governance; Higher decision levels limit alternatives proposed by UC managers. |
| Vitality |
Meliponine |
Pirarucu |
Juçara |
| Functional Integration |
Cooperative mediates local interactions, Network of connections with multiple levels, and power asymmetry. |
Project financing and consumption diversity stimulate interactions at different scales: Small-scale fishing and involving local communities. |
There are few external interactions and occasional connections between communities in the region. |
| Adaptation |
Some producers resist new productive forms; Deforestation, fires, and drought affect adaptive capacity. |
Protected environments led to increased fish stocks; Resilience affected by encroachments in management areas. |
Older extractivists and hunters resist alternative uses; Adaptive capacity affected by defaunation and climate change. |
| Wisdom |
The synergy between local and scientific knowledge; Communities interested in external support. |
Fishing encouraged collective practices to replace individual ones. Integration with local knowledge at the base level. |
Forms of extractivism and use vary regionally; Sustainable uses are limited to a few users. |
| Innovation |
Opening (Melipona pastures) favors pollination, fruit yield, and food security. |
Main innovations: sanitary adaptations, search for new markets, and slaughter practices aiming at animal welfare. |
Agroforestry systems have low community engagement; Adherence to intensive monocultures in the use of pesticides. |
| Power |
Local organization is structured in some communities; Inspection and monitoring depend on the State. |
Different levels of organization do not prevent the search for partnerships that make fisheries management viable. |
Different levels of local organization; Centralization in the role of the State weakened community organizations. |
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Source: NUGEO/IBAMA/AM, 2022.
Source: Authors; IBAMA, 2022.