| Argument order |
MXG |
AM |
| I |
I argument, ontological, reasoning that the existent is identical to the non-existent, which forms the basis for subsequent arguments |
| II |
II argument, epistemic - reasoning possible co-dependence of thinking, being and developing knowledge |
| Thesis (Claim) |
If х can be thought (known), then х necessarily exists, and if х does not exist, then х cannot be thought. |
If x can be thought (known), then х does not exist, and then, if х exists, it cannot be thought. |
| 1 |
Argument on actuality (the state of things) and non-distinction of falsehood and truth (an intentional argument) |
| (1) |
980a |9-10| If there are no things existent, all evidence is false: from the necessary existence of the thing thought is it concluded as per argument from the contraposition that it is impossible to think about things that truly do not exist. МaB implies ~Ba~М |
VII |77| If things thought do not exist, than existence cannot be thought of. Ма~B implies B~M |
| (2) |
-
|
|78| Explanation with an example similarly to conceivable of white (if an object with predicate of white is thought of, then whiteness is thought together with the predicate of white, "things thought is white"), and similarly, existence is not thought, if non-existence is typical for things thought (the law of contraposition). |
| (3) |
980a11-13 1) Substantiating the thesis "things not thought are not (factually) the existence", built on assuming absence of false and as a consequence - inability to establish true existence (the case of chariots fighting on the sea). 2) - (An argument about existence of things thought in different types depending on the thinking subjects is specially analyzed below, in III.2). |
VII |79| 1) Substantiating the thesis "things thought are not the existence": refuting transition of things in actual existence as they are thought (the case of a flying man and chariots fighting on the sea). 2) All things thought exist in different types, whoever thought them (everyone thinks in one's own way - an implicit reference to the Protagoras' homo mensura). |
| (4) |
-
|
VII |80| Addition: In its turn, a lot of non-existent can be thought; An argument from the contraposition: if it is intrinsic for the existent to be thought, it is intrinsic for the non-existent not to be thought (the example of Scylla and Chimera). МаB implies ~Bа~M |
| 2 |
A categorical argument: discerning and autonomy of different ways of comprehending (perception and thinking) (an epistemological argument) |
| (5) |
980a |14-15| Evidently, things heard etc. can be known, but exists not as a result of development of knowledge, as well as - by analogy - things thought do not acquire existence as a result of knowing them (conceivable) (excluding subjective idealism -"things seen do not acquire existence because we see them" (980a |14|)). |
|81-82| Each way of perception has its own criterion (things visible can be seen, things audible can be heard, but not vice versa, things visible can be heard, etc.), and they are not substitutes. The same concerns things thought: even if they are not perceived visually and are not audible, they all have their own criteria. |
| (6) |
980a |16-19| Autonomy of different ways of perception and think implies inability to establish, which of them enable a privileged access to true knowledge about things (true development of knowledge), therefore, the possibility of knowing things does not stem from external (irrespective of senses) existence of things (otherwise, the way of knowing things would be unessential: think, hear or see, since the results of these processes would be identical). A general conclusion on II: Even if there are things existent - they are unknowable (ἄγνωστα εἶναι τὰ πράγματα). |
|82| Overturning (5) the example with chariots on the sea from the absence of supporting thinkable with factual and indicating absurdity: someone thinks something absurd, does not actually see it but still (only thinking it) believes that it is so. A general conclusion on II: Things existent cannot be thought and apprehended (οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ὂν φρονεῖται καὶ καταλαμβάνεται). |
| III |
III argument, epistemic - properties and functions of word / language |
| 1 |
Evidence of impossibility to communicate the content of knowledge: |
| а |
through the nature of word |
| (7) |
980a |20|-980b |1-2| Overturning that knowledge is communication with words. Just as eyesight does not distinguish sounds and audition hears no colours, so a speaker pronounces words rather than colours or things. |
|83|-|84| The existent is external reality (substance), it is visible, heard, and generally perceived with senses; besides, visible from this filed is perceived through eyesight and audible things - through hearing, and not vice versa. Can knowledge about these fields of the existent be communicated with words? |
| (8) |
980b |4-7| If something is not thought of by somebody, then it is impossible to make sure that somebody thinks of exactly this object. Particularly, expressing it with words. When a word is pronounced, it's not a sound (= produced by the thing) or colour (= of the thing) that is pronounced but a word (=indicating a sound or a colour of the thing), so it is impossible to think of color but only see it, like sound can only be heard. The conclusion: Word cannot be a knowledge-development mediator between the one who has developed knowledge and the one who does not know yet since word communicates it is nature (possesses its own essence). |
|84|-|85| An argument on categorical difference of word from any other things existent: Word is neither substance (=external reality), nor thing existent, i.e., word is not eminently the existence, it does not have a phenomenal nature, and it emerges due to external things similarly to senses (colour, taste). The conclusion: words do not communicate things in existence, they communicate another reality. |
| 1 |
Evidence of impossibility to communicate the content of knowledge: |
| б |
Through the law of contradiction |
Through the way of word existence |
| (9) |
980b |8-10| If a listener is told of a thing, he will not think of the same as the speaker. Substantiation: the same thing (knowledge about a thing) cannot be in the same relation in two different places (i.e. in two different minds). |
- |
| (10) |
- |
|86| - |87| Even assuming that word exists as a substrate (existent, phenomenal things), their colours or sounds do not make each other's nature clear; likewise, word differs from other substrates and does not express an array of other substrates. Word does not indicate a thing directly (there must be an intermediary between a word as a pronounced set of sounds and a thing, for example, the meaning of a word (compare with stoic lekton). Different substrates do not make each other's nature clear. |
| 2 |
Evidence that two different subjects cannot think of the same thing (through the law of contradiction) (the issue of inter- and intra-subjectivity) |
(absent in AM as a separate argument, and only briefly mentioned in I.1) |
| (11) |
980b |11-14| Even if two people can think of the same thing, it will not seem similar to them because they themselves are not fully similar and are not in the same place, otherwise they would be one rather than two. |
- |
| (12) |
980b |15-17| A person perceives the same objects in a different way in the same time, for instance, seeing and hearing an object, or discerning an object now and prior. Therefore, even one (each) person himself perceives everything in a different way, a fortiori - differently from another person. |
- |
| Conclusion |
980b |18-20| Thus, nothing exists but if something could be known, nobody would be able to communicate it, because things are not words, and so nobody can think the same as any other person. These aporiai are given already by the ancients, and should be studied starting from early philosophers. |
|87| If these aporiai are accepted, the criterion eludes. Since there are no things in existence and by nature they cannot be known or communicated, there is no criterion of true knowing. |
